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Federal courts must apply state law to state-created rights; "[there is no federal
general common law." Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); see Rules of Decision
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976). When federal rights are at issue, however, federal courts
often engage in what, "for want of a better term, ... may [be] call[ed] specialized federal
common law." Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 383, 405 (1964). See Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional
Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1024, 1026 (1967); Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974
Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1, 10-17 (1975).
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INTRODUCTION
For over 150 years 2 the federal courts have struggled with the
question of how long a litigant's claim remains viable when the
2 See, e.g., M'Cluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270 (1830). For a discussion of M'Cluny
see notes 73-91 and accompanying text infra.
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underlying federal statute prescribes no limitations period. 3
Congress has not always chosen to limit the rights that it has
created.4 The federal judiciary has responded by absorbing the
law of forum states, but courts disagree whether the Rules of De-
cision Act 5 compels this absorption.' The federal law of limita-
tions thus varies from circuit to circuit, state to state, and litigant
to litigant.7  Commentators have often assailed the uncertainty
and inconsistency that absorption has produced.8 Nevertheless,
Congress continues to legislate without enacting limitations
periods, 9 and the confusion surrounding the borrowing of state
law continues.' 0
This Project rejects the view that the Rules of Decision Act
compels the application of state limitations law to federal rights of
action. Rather, Congress has deferred to the judiciary the deter-
mination of appropriate periods. However, unlike other commen-
taries, this Project does not advocate abandoning the absorption
of state limitations periods; although absorption is not legislatively
3 Of course, "[ilf Congress explicitly puts a limit upon the time for enforcing the right
which it created, there is an end of the matter. The Congressional Statute of Limitation is
definitive." Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946). See Kird v. Rockwell Int'l
Corp., 578. F.2d 814, 819, 826 (9th Cir. 1978); Saffron v. Department of the Navy, 561
F.2d 938, 941 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1033 (1977); Adams v. Jefferson Davis
Parish School Bd., 450 F. Supp. 1141, 1144 (W.D. La. 1978).
This Project examines the absorption of state limitations law not only for federal
statutory causes of action, but also for federal non-statutory rights. Such rights or actions
include admiralty claims, see note 11 infra, and actions for damages implied under the
Constitution. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971); note 311 and accompanying text infra.
4 See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 100 S. Ct. 1790, 1794 (1980) (absence of
statute of limitations for § 1983 action is "a void which is commonplace in federal statutory
law"); C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs 284 (3d ed. 1976) ("Quite
commonly, ... federal statutes will create a right of action without stating the time within
which such action must be brought.").
5 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976).
6 See note 72 and accompanying text infra.
See, e.g., notes 195-231 & 247-96 and accompanying text infra.
6 See, e.g., Blume & George, Limitations and the Federal Courts, 49 MicH. L. REv. 937
(1951); Note, Statutes of Limitations in Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 1976 ARIz. ST. L.J. 97;
Note, A Limitation on Actions for Deprivation of Federal Rights, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 763 (1968);
Note, Federal Statutes Without Limitations Provisions, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 68 (1953); Note,
Rules of Decision in Nondiversity Suits, 69 YALE L.J. 1428 (1960); Note, Disparities in Time
Limitations on Federal Causes of Action, 49 YALE L.J. 738 (1940); 31 ARK. L. REV. 692 (1978).
9 See, e.g., Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-760h
(1976). See also note 66 and accompanying text infra.
10 Compare Wright v. Tennessee, 613 F.2d 647 (6th Cir. 1980) (justifying absorption of
state law on RDA) with Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1979) (appli-
cation of state law a matter of judicial presumption).
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compelled, the borrowing process has become a matter of judicial
compulsion through stare decisis.
Nonetheless, courts remain free to fashion federal common
law on ancillary issues. Such issues include choosing when a state
period begins to run and which period applies. In light of the
purposes behind limitations periods, especially predictability, and
the federal interests in litigation of federal rights, federal courts
should create uniform rules for some subsidiary issues, but con-
tinue to absorb state law for others.
I
NATURE AND PURPOSES OF TIME BARS
There are three sources of time limitations upon rights of
action: the equitable doctrine of laches," common law time
11 Laches is an equitable doctrine premised on the maxim that "equity will not aid a
plaintiff whose unexcused delay, if the suit were allowed, would be prejudicial to the de-
fendant." Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280, 287 (1940); see Gardner v. Panama Ry., 342 U.S.
29, 31 (1951) (per curiam); Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 490 (1919); Good-
man v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 606 F.2d 800, 804 (8th Cir. 1979). In Russell, the Court
held that a laches defense is only available when the sole remedy for plaintiff's claim lies in
equity. If the court can provide a remedy at law, jurisdiction is "concurrent," and a statute
of limitations applies. 309 U.S. at 289. The federal courts have split over whether "concur-
rent jurisdiction" includes only cases where adequate legal relief is available, or extends to
all cases where any legal relief is available. Compare Saffron v. Department of the Navy, 561
F.2d 938, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1033 (1978) and Tobacco & Allied
Stocks, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 143 F. Supp. 323, 327 (D. Del. 1956), aff'd, 244 F.2d
902 (3d Cir. 1957) ("the decisive feature ... is ... whether the federal right in issue may
be judicially enforced in any action by means both legal and equitable") with Gruca v.
United States Steel Corp., 495 F.2d 1252, 1258 (3d Cir. 1974) (laches applied where legal
relief inadequate). See also Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 373 (1977)
(implying availability of laches defense to plaintiff's Title VII claim for backpay and injunc-
tive relief); Note, Laches in Federal Substantive Law: Relation to Statutes of Limitations, 56
B.U.L. REv. 970, 974-75 (1976).
In determining whether laches bars plaintiff's claim, courts consider whether plain-
tiff's tardiness has prejudiced the defendant. See, e.g., Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Austin,
168 U.S. 685, 698 (1898) (court of equity will not grant relief if "the position of the parties
has so changed that.., injustice" would result); Hill v. W. Beans & Co., 498 F.2d 565, 568
(2d Cir. 1974) (claim stale if "impossible or difficult ... to defend because evidence has
been destroyed or lost"); Gruca v. United States Steel Corp., 495 F.2d 1252, 1260 (3d Cir.
1974) (claim barred by laches because relief would cause extensive disruption to defendant
company); Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("loss of evidence and
unavailability of witnesses" barred claim). On the other hand, courts also consider whether
plaintiff's delay was justified. See, e.g., Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946)
(defendant's fraudulent conduct cause of delay); Mogavero v. McLucas, 543 F.2d 1081,
1083 (4th Cir. 1976) (period of settlement negotiations not counted in determining laches);
Moore v. Schultz, 491 F.2d 294, 300-01 (10th Cir. 1974) (no bar where plaintiff ignorant of
infringement of patent); Note, supra, at 971-73.
When considering a laches defense, federal courts generally look to the analogous state
statute of limitations. See, e.g., Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 463-64, 468 (1947);
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bars,1 2 and statutes of limitations.1 3  In practical terms, each de-
nies a plaintiff relief if sufficient time has elapsed between the accrual
of the right of action and the commencement of the suit. This effect
may occasionally offend notions of justice and fairness: while the
wrongdoer escapes liability, the injured party is left without a
remedy. From a broader perspective, however, time bars are "wise
and beneficial," 14 "tend[ing] to the peace and welfare of society." "
Musicanese v. United States Steel Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1394, 1398 (E.D. Pa. 1973). But see
McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958) (applying Jones Act limitations
period to state admiralty claims). Thus, the problems in the analogizing process discussed
in this Project apply when litigants invoke the doctrine of laches.
Courts give statutes of limitations varying degrees of weight; some shift the burden of
persuasion to the plaintiff after the period has run, although others consider the running
merely as one element in the defense. Compare Churma v. United States Steel Corp., 514
F.2d 589, 593 (3d Cir. 1975) ("prior to the running of the statute, the defendant has to
prove laches, but thereafter the plaintiff has to disprove laches.") with Giddens v. Is-
brandtsen Co., 355 F.2d 125, 128 (4th Cir. 1966) (burden remains on defendant, "[blut he
may rest on the inference [of the statute's running] alone or introduce additional evi-
dence."). See Note, supra, at 976-81. Shifting the burden of persuasion better serves the
purposes of time bars by increasing the predictability of when the cause of action expires,
while allowing a court of equity to exercise its discretion as to the merits of the defense.
12 Common law time bars are judicially created limitations on rights of action. Exam-
ples of common law time bars include: the rule against perpetuitites, the common law
year-and-a-day murder rule, the presumption of death after seven years absence, and the
presumption of satisfaction on notes after the lapse of 20 years. See Bean v. Tonnele, 94
N.Y. 381, 384-85 (1884); D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS 893-94 (2d ed. 1975). Cf. UAW v.
Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 713 (1966) (dissenting opinion, White, J.) ("Courts
have not always been reluctant to 'create' statutes of limitations.").
"3 All states have general statutes of limitations that categorize rights of action and
assign them specific time periods. Most states have adopted a "catch-all" provision for
rights of action that do not fall into one of the categories. Developments in the Law-Statutes
of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1179 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Limitations De-
velopments]. These statutes may also contain provisions for accrual, borrowing, "post-
ponement, suspension, or extension of the period in specified circumstances." Id. See notes
341-44 & 376-85 and accompanying text infra.
Some statutory limitation periods apply only to specific laws. The federal government
has adopted such a piecemeal approach. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1976) (four-year statute
of limitations for antitrust action); 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (1976) (three-year statute of limita-
tions on copyright actions); 35 U.S.C. § 286 (1976) (six-year statute of limitations on patent
actions). See generally Note, supra note 8, 53 COLUM. L. REV. at 68. Some statutes also pro-
vide for special suspension or extension periods. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 16(i) (1976). States
also provide special limitation periods for particular actions. See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 56:9-14 (West Supp. 1979-80) (antitrust); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 881 (West 1964)
(blue sky); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 485-20 (1976) (blue sky); IDAHO CODE § 30-1446 (1967);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 137.13 (1975) (securities).
14 Bell v. Morrison, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 351, 360 (1828) (Story, J.).
,5 M'Cluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270, 278 (1830).
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Time limitations rest on three broad, overlapping justifications:
institutional, remedial, and promotional. 16
A. Institutional
Three institutional reasons justify placing time bars on rights
of action. First, the limitations protect litigants' reasonable expec-
tations'" and promote the stability of property ownership. In so
doing, they also regulate modes of conduct. Justice Holmes ob-
served:
A thing which you have enjoyed and used as your own for a
long time, whether property or an opinion, takes root in your
being and cannot be torn away without your resenting the act
and trying to defend yourself.... The law can ask no better
justification than the deepest instincts of man.18
While the statutory period is running, the possibility of litigation
influences the activity of prospective parties. 19 Once the statute
has run, there is "repose." 0
Convenience is also a long-recognized institutional justifica-
tion for limiting actions. 21  Today's overloaded dockets demand
procedures that reduce burdensome litigation levels. By keeping
"' Institutional justifications benefit the courts and society; remedial justifications ben-
efit the defendant, and promotional justificaitons benefit the plaintiff. See W. FERGUSON,
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS SAVINGS STATUTES 40 (1978).
11 Limitations Developments, supra note 13, at 1185 ("There comes a time when [the de-
fendant] ought to be secure in his reasonable expectation that the slate has been wiped
clean of ancient obligations.") (footnote omitted).
18 Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 477 (1897).
19 See Allen v. United States, 542 F.2d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 1976) (limitations "serve to
strike a balance between the need for certainty and predictability in legal relationships and
the role of the courts in resolving private disputes"); Gates Rubber Co. v. U.S.M. Corp.,
508 F.2d 603, 611 (7th Cir. 1975) ("the interest in certainty and finality in the administra-
tion of our affairs, especially in commercial transactions, makes it desirable to terminate
contingent liabilities at specific points in time"); Newman v. Freeman, 262 F. Supp. 106,
112 (E.D. Pa. 1966) ("It is rudimentary that the purpose of a Statute of Limitations is to
... give potential defendants a fixed point in time when they will no longer have to fear a
lawsuit."); Limitations Developments, supra note 13, at 1185 ("the public policy of limitations
lies in avoiding the disrupting effect that unsettled claims have on commercial inter-
course").
2" Doe v. Jones, 4 Term R. 300, 308, 100 Eng. Rep. 1031, 1035 (K.B. 1791) (Lord
Kenyon, C.J.); see Greyhound Corp. v. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 437 U.S. 322, 334 (1978);
City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 516 (1965); Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482,
485 (1947); Shephard v. Thompson, 122 U.S. 231, 235 (1887).
21 King v. Walker, I Black W. 286, 287, 96 Eng. Rep. 159, 160 (K.B. 1761); R. SOHM,
THE INSTITUTES OF ROMAN LAW 283 (3d ed., Ledlie trans. 1907) ("Emperors Honorious
and Theodosios, ... moved by obvious considerations of convenience, enacted in 424 A.D.
that all actions should be barred in a certain period.").
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stale claims out of court, statutes of limitations relieve courts "of
the burden of trying stale claims when a plaintiff has slept on his
rights." 22
Limitations periods also preserve the credibility of the judicial
system by barring claims that "have been allowed to slumber until
evidence has been lost, memories faded, and witnesses disap-
peared.'2 3  Decisionmaking based upon full and fair presentation
of the facts from all litigants is a tenet of the adversary system.
Barring stale claims promotes justice and fairness 24 and di-
minishes the risk of perjury and fraud.25
B. Remedial
Many institutional justifications for time bars also serve reme-
dial interests.26  But limitations periods also serve the unique re-
medial function of notifying the potential defendant of the dura-
tion of his exposure to liability. 7 When a cause of action accrues,
he may know that he is susceptible to suit for the period of time
specified in the applicable statute of limitations. 8  Once aware of
the limitation period's length, he can preserve facts necessary to
22 Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (footnote omitted); see
United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 72 (1956) ("purpose of [statutes of
limitations] is to keep stale litigation out of the courts"); Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson,
325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945); Meyer v. Frank, 550 F.2d 726, 730 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 830 (1977); Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. United States, 312 F.2d 545, 550 (2d Cir. 1963).
23 Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944)
(quoted in American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974)). See Burnett v.
New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965); Meyer v. Frank, 550 F.2d 726, 730 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 830 (1977).
24 See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974); Burnett v. New
York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965); Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express
Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348 (1944); Goodman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 606 F.2d 800,
805 (8th Cir. 1979); Limitations Developments, supra note 13, at 1185.
22 See Dedmon v. Falls Prods., Inc., 299 F.2d 173, 178 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v.
Palm Beach Gardens, 466 F. Supp. 1155, 1164 (S.D. Fla. 1979); Canadian Ace Brewing Co.
v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 769, 772 (N.D. Ill.), affd, 601 F.2d 593 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 884 (1979); Adams v. Coon, 36 Okla. 644, 129 P. 851, 853 (1913);
W. BLANSHARD, A TREATISE ON STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS 1 (London 1826), reprinted in 1
LAW LIBRARY 1 (T. Sergeant & J. Lowber eds. 1833).
26 Fairness, justice, and stability serve both institutional and remedial functions. See
notes 18-20 & 24 and accompanying text supra.
27 Isthmian Lines, Inc. v. Rosling, 360 F.2d 926, 927 (2d Cir. 1966); Snoqualimes Tribe
of Indians ex rel. Skykomish Tribe of Indians v. United States, 372 F.2d 951, 960 (Ct. Cl.
1967).
28 Service of process, of course, notifies the defendant that a suit has actually been filed
against him. Time bars, in contrast, notify defendants of their potential period of liability.
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his defense until the statute has run 29 and avoid unfair surprise
from a mistaken belief that his exposure has ended.30
C. Promotional
Time bars serve two counter-balanced promotional interests.
On the one hand, they provide plaintiffs with an incentive to
bring suit quickly; on the other, they allow plaintiffs enough time
to vindicate their rights. 31  Lord Kenyon described the incentive
created by time bars to bring suit diligently: "if parties neglect
their interests for such a length of time, . . . they shall lose the
benefits of suing to enforce their demands. ' 32  Similar policies
support the equitable doctrine of laches, 33 which "'aids the vigil-
ant, not those who slumber on their rights.' "'34 Indeed,
"[statutes] of limitations [are] designed to force suits to be brought
without unreasonable delay. '35
D. Application
Despite these compelling reasons for placing time limitations
upon rights of action, courts often suspend these periods. Such
suspensions illustrate the interplay among the various purposes of
time bars. One such widely-used suspension doctrine is fraudulent
concealment. 36
9 D'Onofrio Constr. Co. v. Recon Co., 255 F.2d 904, 908 (1st Cir. 1958); DeMalheabe
v. International Union of Elevator Constructors, 449 F. Supp. 1335, 1341 (N.D. Cal. 1978);
Homcy v. United States, 536 F.2d 360, 364 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 984 (1976);
Hodges v. United States, 11 F. Supp. 268, 270 (Ct. Cl. 1953).
30 Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348 (1944);
Meyer v. Frank, 550 F.2d 726, 730 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 830 (1977); Macklin v.
Spector Freight Syst., 478 F.2d 979, 994 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Eastridge v. Fruehauf
Corp., 52 F.R.D. 129, 131 (W.D. Ky. 1971); United States v. Vibradamp Corp., 257 F.
Supp. 931, 939-40 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
31 Judicial and statutory tolling rules can mitigate the effects of overly restrictive time
periods. See notes 341-48 and accompanying text infra.
32 Perry v. Jackson, 4 Term R. 516, 519, 100 Eng. Rep. 1150, 1152 (K.B. 1792).
33 See note 11 supra.
"' Powell v. Zuckhart, 366 F.2d 634, 636 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (quoting 2 A. POMEROY,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 418 (5th ed. 1941)).
35 Vason v. Nickey, 438 F.2d 242, 244 (6th Cir. 1971). See NLRB v. California School
of Professional Psychology, 583 F.2d 1099, 1101 (9th Cir. 1978); Dedmon v. Falls Prods.,
Inc., 299 F.2d 173, 178 (5th Cir. 1962); Armstrong v. Maple Leaf Apts., Ltd., 436 F. Supp.
1125, 1148 (N.D. Okla. 1977); Maricopa Co. v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 303 F. Supp.
77, 85 (D. Ariz. 1969), aff'd, 431 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 937
(1971); United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 54 F. Supp. 351, 352 (N.D. Ohio 1943); Cable v.
Commercial & Say. Bank, 31 F. Supp. 628, 631 (W.D. Va. 1940).
6 For other examples of suspension doctrines, see notes 341-75 and accompanying text
infra.
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The fraudulent concealment doctrine applies when the de-
fendant has prevented the plaintiff from discovering his injury. In
the seminal case of Bailey v. Glover,37 an assignee in bankruptcy
brought suit to set aside certain fraudulent conveyances that the
defendant allegedly made. Those conveyances made the defen-
dant appear bankrupt despite his great wealth. 38  Defendant suc-
cessfully concealed the transfers until long after the limitation
period had run. 9  The statute barred the action, 40 but the Su-
preme Court suspended the time bar.41  The Court reached this
conclusion despite strong policies favoring "speedy disposition of
the bankrupt's assets, 42 and the statute's "imperative"'43 language
that "admitted of no exceptions.""
[W]e hold that when there has been no negligence or laches on
the part of a plaintiff in coming to the knowledge of the fraud
which is the foundation of the suit, and when the fraud has
been concealed, or is of such character as to conceal itself, the
statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered by,
or becomes known to, the party suing, or those in privity with
him.4
5
The equitable doctrine of Bailey v. Glover meshes with the
purposes of time bars. No remedial policies justify barring an ac-
tion when, as in Bailey, the defendant has prevented the plaintiff
from bringing suit. Protection of defendant's right to repose can-
not justify a time bar in these circumstances.
37 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342 (1874).
38 Id. at 342-43 (statement of the case).
'9 Congress provided a two-year limitation period for the bankruptcy act. Act of March
2, 1867, ch. 176, § 2, 14 Stat. 518. Plaintiff filed suit more than three years after the right
of action had accrued. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 345 (argument for property holder).
40 Id. at 346.
41 Id. at 350.
41 Id. at 346. The Court stated:
The act is filled with provisions for quick and summary disposal of questions
arising in the progress of the case, without regard to usual modes of trial at-
tended by some necessary delay. Appeals in some instances must be taken
within ten days; and provisions are made to facilitate sales of property, com-
promises of doubtful claims, and generally for the early discharge of the bank-
rupt and the speedy settlement of his estate.
Id. at 346-47.
"' Id. at 346 (argument for property holder). For the statutory language, see id. at 344
(statement of the case) ("no suit... shall in any case be maintainable ... unless ... brought
within two years") (emphasis added).
44 Id. at 346.
45 Id. at 349-50.
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Similarly, barring an action involving fraudulent concealment
serves no promotional interests because even the most diligent
plaintiff cannot commence litigation if he is kept unaware of the
existence of his claim.4 6  Furthermore, the plaintiff's strong in-
terest in redressing his wrong weighs heavily in favor of suspend-
ing the period.
Institutional factors tip both sides of the scale. Stability favors
unwavering application of the time bar. Even when the defendant
fraudulently conceals his wrongdoing, suits after the limitations
period has run thwart his expectations of repose. These expecta-
tions, however, differ greatly from the reasonable expectations
that time bars were designed to protect. The remaining policies,
convenience and credibility of evidence, favor barring the action.
After a lapse of many years, witnesses may be unavailable, and the
parties may have lost evidence. In weighing these factors against
the countervailing considerations, the Bailey Court struck the
proper balance.
II
HISTORY OF LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS
A. Roman Law
Time limitations on rights of action existed in ancient legal
systems. 47  Under the Roman civil law, the doctrine of usucapio 48
operated to quiet title after one had possessed property for a
46 In the language of Justice Miller:
[Statutes of limitations] were enacted to prevent frauds; to prevent parties from
asserting rights after the lapse of time had destroyed or impaired the evi-
dence.... To hold that by concealing a fraud, or by committing a fraud in a
manner that it concealed itself until such time as the party committing the
fraud could plead the statute of limitations to protect it, is to make the law
which was designed to prevent fraud the means by which it is made successful
and secure.
Id. at 349.
47 One commentator suggests that "[s]tatutes of limitation relating to real property
may be traced to ancient Greece or beyond." W. FERGUSON, supra note 16, at 7; see J.
ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS AT LAw 5 (6th ed. 1876).
48 Sohm defines usucapio as "the acquisition of ownership by continuous possession."
R. SOHM, supra note 21, at 318. For example,
[i]f a person, having come into possession of land on some lawful ground Ousto
titulo) and in good faith (bona fide), and having continued in the possession of
such land for "a long time," were sued by the person claiming to be owner of
the land, he (the defendant) had a good defence to the action, and was pro-
tected by ... a reservation made in his favour....
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specified period of time. 49 However, most actions not involving
real property50 had no time limitations 51 until the enactment, in
424 A.D., of a statute of limitations that generally barred actions
unless plaintiff commenced suit within thirty years 52 of the ac-
crual of the right.
53
B. English Common Law
Modern American limitations doctrines are rooted in the En-
glish common law. 54  Although the common law imposed no time
limitations on contract remedies, 55 the maxim "actio person-
alis moritur cum persona" confined suits to the life of the parties in
tort actions. 6 The doctrines of presumption 7 and wager of
Id. at 319. See also J. ANGELL, supra note 47, at 1-2; W. BLANSHARD, supra note 25, at 3;
Ailes, Limitation of Actions and the Conflict of Laws, 31 MICH. L. REv. 474, 474n.1 (1933);
Limitations Developments, supra note 13, at 1177.
9 The necessary period of possession depended upon the domiciles of the parties: 10
years if the parties were domiciled in the same province, 20 years if domiciled in different
provinces. R. SOHM, supra note 21, at 319. But see M. ORTOLAN, THE HISTORY OF ROMAN
LAW 668 (I. Prichard & D. Nasmith trans. 1871) ("Usucapio, acquisition by use, ... by
possession for a certain period: one year for movables, two years for immovables.").
50 Sohm contends that "limitations of actions were on principle unknown to the civil
law." R. SOHM, supra note 21, at 283.
51 In "quite exceptional cases" civil law actions were barred after the passage of time.
Id. "[A] number of actiones honorariae," however, had specific time limitations. Id. at 282.
These rights of action were known as "actiones temporales." Id. at 283. The expiration of
the specific time period extinguished the action and the right. Id.
52 Id. at 283.
53 "[Clonsiderations of convenience" moved Emperors Honorious and Theodosios to
enact the limitation period. Id. at 283. Expiration of the period extinguished the remedy,
not the right. Id. at 283-84.
'4 See J. ANGELL, supra note 47, at 9; W. FERGUSON, supra note 16, at 7.
55 See H. BANNING, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 1-2 (1877); W. BLANSHARD, supra note 25,
at 3 (a single instance of "a right being barred after a certain lapse of time, without the
intervention of a statute"); J. WILKINSON, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 1
(London 1829), reprinted in 1 LAW LIBRARY (T. Sergeant & J. Lowber eds. 1833); 1 H.
WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS 4 (4th ed. D.C. Moore 1916). Bracton
disagreed: "omnes actiones in mundo infra certa tempora habent limitationem." 2 BRACTON, ON
THE LAWS AND CuSTOMS OF ENGLAND 157 (S. Thorne trans. 1968) ("every action in the
world is limited to a certain time"). Many commentators, however, have criticized this
statement. The basic objection, apparently applicable to much of Bracton's work, is his
wholesale application of Roman law to English law. See T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY
OF THE COMMON LAW 261 (5th ed. 1956). Banning claims the truth of Bracton's statement
"seems as doubtful as the Latinity." H. BANNING, supra, at 1 n.l. Blanshard, drawing sup-
port from Coke, also takes issue with the statement. See W. BLANSHARD, supra note 25, at 3.
5 See J. WILKINSON, supra note 55, at 1; 1 H. WOOD, supra note 55, at 4-5.
5 "It was a rule of the common law that the payment of a bond or other specialty,
would be presumed after the lapse of twenty years from the time it became due, in the
absence of evidence explaining the delay, although there was no statute bar." Bean v. Ton-
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law,5 8 both applied infrequently,;5 also served the purposes of time
limitations on actions."'0
Great Britain enacted its first statute of limitations applicable
to personal actions in 1623.61 It attached different periods of
time to different actions, recognizing that some actions demanded
longer periods than others. 62 The American colonies adopted
nele, 94 N.Y. 381, 385 (1884) (action on note 21 years after maturity barred by presump-
tion of satisfaction).
Although the doctrine of presumption developed in courts of equity, 1 H. WOOD,
supra note 55, at 4, "from an early time it [was] recognized by courts of law." Bean v.
Tonnele, 94 N.Y. at 385. The doctrine enabled courts to refuse to enforce stale demands.
See 1 H. WOOD, supra note 55, at 4-5.
s Plucknett defined wager of law operationally:
The party who was called upon to make his law had to find a number of
people, twelve or some other number fixed by the court according to cir-
cumstances, and then take a solemn oath that he was innocent. His companions,
or "compurgators" as they were called, then swore that the oath which he had
taken was clean. In other words, the court calls upon the accused to produce a
specified number of people (occasionally from a particular class or even from
the names on a given list) who are prepared to swear that in their opinion his
oath is trustworthy. They do not swear to the facts of the case, but merely to
their judgment that the accused is a credible person.
T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 55, at 115. The wager of law was an absolute defense to an
action, 1 H. WOOD, supra note 55, at 5 n.22, available to defendants and to plaintiffs deny-
ing affirmative pleas interposed by defendant's counterclaims. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MATT-
LAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH COMMON LAW 634 (2d ed. Reiss. 1968). With this remedy avail-
able, stale claims were of little moment to defendants. See W. FERGUSON, supra note 16, at
'I I ("The right to wage his law ... protected the defendant against loss of evidence and the
death of witnesses obviating the need for a statute of limitations."). See generally J. WILRiN-
SON, supra note 55, at 2-3.
59 Wager of law was only available in actions of debt and detinue. R. FIELD, B. KAPLAN
& K. CLERMONT, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 298 (1978); 2 F.
POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 58, at 634; 1 H. WOOD, supra note 55, at 5 n.22. It was
not available in actions on assumpsit. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 55, at 645. Banning
suggests presumption had limited usefulness, characterizing it as a "doubtful doctrine." H.
BANNING, supra note 55, at 1-2.
60 See H. BANNING, supra note 55, at 1-2; 1 H. WOOD, supra note 55, at 5.
61 21 Jac. 1, c. 16 (1623).
Twenty-one years earlier, plaintiffs were given the option of electing to sue in as-
sumpsit, rather than debt. See Slade's Case, 4 Coke 92b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (K.B. 1602).
Because wager of law was unavailable in actions for assumpsit, Edgecomb v. Dee, Vaugh.
89, 101 Eng. Rep. 984, 990 (D.B. 1682), a general statute of limitations became a logical
necessity. See J. WILKINSON, supra note 55, at 4; W. FERGUSON, supra note 16, at 11.
Statutes of limitations on real property actions had existed for some time. These stat-
utes cut off actions that had accrued before the occurrence of some "notable" event, such
as a coronation or the end of a reign. H. BANNING, supra note 55, at 2; W. FERGUSON, supra
note 16, at 7. See, e.g., 3 Edw. 1, c. 39 (1329).
62 The first modern statute of limitations for real property actions was 32 Hen. 8, c. 2
(1540). See W. FERGUSON, supra note 16, at 8. Although 4 Hen. 7, c. 24 (1487) was the first
time limitation on real property rights, only the 1540 statute classified actions into
categories and based the time period on the character of the right. 32 Hen. 8, c. 2, §§ 3-5
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this concept of limitations" and continued to apply it after inde-
pendence."
The federal government, however, never adopted the English
limitations statutes and remains without a general statute of limi-
tations.6 5 The number and importance of federally created rights
with no specific limitations period 66 highlights the problems of
this omission.
(1540). Such classification is the essence of modern statutes of limitations. Unlike the "not-
able event" periods of the past (see generally note 61 supra), both statutes limited actions to
specific time periods that began running upon the accrual of the action. W. FERGU-
SON, supra note 16, at 7-9. But see Note, Limitation Borrowing in Federal Courts, 77 MICH. L.
REV. 1127, 1129 (1979) (32 Hen. 8, c. 2 (1540)) (first statute fixing limitation period be-
tween "accrual of the right and the commencement of the action"). This note misinterprets
Wood, who observed that 32 Hen. 8, c. 2 is one example of a modern statute; he never
claimed that it was the first. 1 H. WooD, supra note 55, at 6.
The 1540 statute placed a six-year limitation period on actions for trespass, detinue,
debt, and replevin. Assault, battery, wounding, and imprisonment had periods of four
years. A later statute placed a two-year limit on actions for slander. 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, § 3
(1623). For persons with disabilities, such as imprisonment, the limitation period did not
commence running until after the cessation of the disability. Id. § 7.
63 See J. ANGELL, supra note 47, at 10 (21 Jac. 1, c. 16 was "generally adopted by the
original American states"); W. FERGUSON, supra note 16, at 46; 1 H. WOOD, supra note 55,
at 6.
"' See, e.g., Walden v. Heirs of Gratz, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 292 (1816) (construing state
statute of limitations in light of 21 Jac. 1, c. 1).
6' See Note, supra note 8, 53 COLUM. L. REV. at 68; Note, supra note 62, at 1127.
For a time, it appeared that 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1976) would remedy the problem. It
provides:
Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an action, suit or proceeding
for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or
otherwise, shall not be entertained unless commenced within five years from
the date when the claim first accrued ....
Originally enacted in 1799, in a somewhat different form (Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 22, §
89, 1 Stat. 696), this statute has had little effect. The Supreme Court has construed its
language narrowly, rendering the statute inapplicable to most civil actions. In Chattanooga
Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906), an antitrust action, the
Court defined "penalty or forfeiture" in the criminal sense, severely limiting the statute's
application in the civil area. Id. at 397. See Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 236 U.S. 412,
423 (1915) (limiting "penalty or forfeiture" to punitive recoveries for infractions of public
laws, as opposed to liability imposed to redress private injuries); Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S.
148, 155-58 (1899) (limiting the statute to penal actions); Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S.
657, 667-68 (1892) (equating "penalty" with "penal").
Courts have held the statute inapplicable in antitrust actions (Chattanooga Foundry &
Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 397 (1906)), civil rights actions (O'Sullivan v.
Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 322-23 (1914)), actions for recovery of delinquent tax interest (United
States v. Guest, 143 F. 456, 458 (4th Cir. 1906)), and actions under the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act (Keen v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 58 F. Supp. 915, 919 (N.D. Iowa
1945)).
66 These rights arise under the antifraud provision of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1976)), Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188
(1976)), Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976)), civil rights acts (42 U.S.C.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
III
SPECIALIZED FEDERAL COMMON LAW
Modern American law is more complex than the unitary
common law systems because of the interplay of the state and
federal systems. On any particular question, federal and state laws
may provide different answers. Of course, if a valid federal stat-
ute provides the answer, the supremacy clause commands that
federal law controls. 67 But in the absence of such a statute, the
choice is often unclear. Congress restricted the choice somewhat
through the Rules of Decision Act (RDA), which provides:
The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or
treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise re-
quire or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil
actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they
apply 68
Although the Supreme Court has interpreted the RDA to re-
quire application of state statutory or common law rules unless
the Constitution, or a federal statute or treaty "otherwise requires
or provides," 69 the scope of the exception has generated consid-
erable debate. After construing it narrowly for 100 years, the
Supreme Court now interprets the exception expansively.7
Consequently, federal courts should not be subject to the RDA's
mandate when adjudicating federally-created rights. 71  Yet the
Court's early interpretation of the RDA continues to confuse the
lower courts. 72
§§ 1981-1988 (1976)), Outer Continental Oil Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343
(1976)), Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976)), and Military Selective
Service Act (50 U.S.C. §§ 459-473 (1976)).
Some federally created rights have statutory limitations periods. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.
§ 15b (1976) (antitrust, four years); 17 U.S.C. § 507 (1976) (copyright, three years); 35
U.S.C. § 286 (1976) (patent, six years).
6 U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. 2. See also note 3 supra.
68 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976). For a discussion of the origins of this provision, see note 78
infra.
9 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976). See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("Except
in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be
applied in any case is the law of the State.").
70 See, e.g., Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946); Clearfield Trust Co. v. Un-
ited States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); Board of County Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343
(1939). See also note 139 infra.
71 Hereinafter, the phrase "the RDA is inapplicable," or words to that effect, will be
used as a shorthand to express the idea that the RDA does not compel a federal court to
apply state law.
71 See Wright v. Tennessee, 613 F.2d 647, 648 (6th Cir. 1980); Warner v. Perrino, 585
F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir. 1978); International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Fishback &
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A. Early Interpretations of the RDA
In M'Cluny v. Silliman 73 a frustrated purchaser sued a federal
land office registrar thirteen years after the officer allegedly re-
fused to enter a tendered land purchase application7 4 in violation
of federal law. 75 The circuit court held that Ohio's six-year stat-
ute of limitations for actions on the case barred the plaintiff's ac-
tion. 76  The plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court, claiming
"no statute of limitations of the state ... is pleadable ... in the
circuit court of the United States ... where the plaintiff's rights
accrued to him under a law of congress. 77  The Court held
summarily that the RDA 78 required "the acts of limitations of the
Moore, Inc., 350 F.2d 936, 938-39 (9th Cir. 1965); Nickels v. Koehler Management Corp.,
392 F. Supp. 804, 805 (N.D. Ohio 1975); cf. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S.
696, 704 (1966) (citing cases decided under RDA).
73 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270 (1830).
74 Id. at 275-76. Plaintiff allegedly produced two receipts from the receiver of public
moneys "for the purchase of public lands." Id. With the receipt, plaintiff attempted to
purchase the land from defendant, who erroneously claimed that the lands either had been
sold, or were not for sale, and who refused to enter plaintiff's purchase application. Id. at
276.
" See generally Act of May 18, 1796, ch. 29, 58, 1 Stat. 468. The Act provided for the
"Sale of the Lands of the United States, in the territory northwest of the river Ohio, and
above the mouth of Kentucky river." M'Cluny apparently sued under § 8, although the
argument of counsel and the Court placed M'Cluny's reliance on § 10. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at
270-71, 276. Section 8 required land registrars to enter all purchase applications; § 10
provided for compensation for surveyors. Act of May 18, 1796, ch. 29, §§ 8, 10, 1 Stat.
468.
The source of the right, as well as the basis of jurisdiction in M'Cluny, is the subject of
considerable dispute. For discussions concluding that the basis of the claim was federal law,
see Hill, State Procedural Law in Federal Nondiversity Litigation, 69 HARv. L. REv. 66, 79
(1955); Note, supra note 8, 1976 ARIz. ST. L.J. at 102 n.37. Plaintiff tendered the receipts
on August 2, 1810 (28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 275), yet did not file suit until December 15, 1823.
Id. at 270. Neither the parties nor the Court advanced any reason for the delay.
7 Id. at 276. See generally An Act for the Limitations of Actions, § 1, OHIo AcTs ch. 18
(Collins 1810) ("all actions of trespass upon real property, trespass, detinue, trover and
conversion, and replevin; all actions upon the case, and of debt for rent, shall be sued or
brought within six years next after the cause of such actions [arose]").
77 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 276.
78 The early version of the RDA provided:
That the laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties or
statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be re-
garded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United
States in cases where they apply.
Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92. The modern counterpart of this statute is
substantially similar to the original enactment. See text accompanying note 68 supra. For a
discussion of the legislative history behind the RDA, see Warren, New Light on the History of
the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REv. 49 (1923).
The role of the RDA in non-diversity cases was rarely examined because most cases
(other than appeals from state court) which reached federal courts before 1875 were based
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several states, where no special provision has been made by con-
gress, form a rule of decision in the courts of the United States,
and the same effect is given to them as is given in the state
courts."7 9  The Court concluded that because the state statute en-
upon diversity jurisdiction. See Frankfurter, Judicial Power of the Federal and State Courts, 13
CORNELL L.Q. 499, 507-08 (1928). See also Friendly, supra note 1, at 406 n.111 (federal
statutory provisions in the twentieth century greatly outnumber those in the nineteenth
century). Not until 1875 did Congress enact a statute granting federal courts jurisdiction
over matters arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. See gen-
erally Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (pt. 3). For a history of federal question
jurisdiction before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Frankfurter, supra, at 507-11.
'9 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 277. It is not clear why the court felt compelled to apply state law,
nor why the RDA was chosen as the source of the directive. The RDA was intended to
insure that federal courts would administer state law in diversity jurisdiction cases "to se-
cure to a non-citizen the application of the same law which a State Court would give to its
own citizens, and to see that within a State there should be no discrimination against non-
citizens in the application of justice." Warren, supra note 78, at 83. Apparently, Congress'
sole concern was to ensure the equal treatment of state-created rights in the federal and
state courts. There is no indication that Congress intended the RDA to apply to federally-
created rights of action. Id. at 81-88 passim.
The RDA has three elements: (1) only the "laws of the several states" are the rules of
decision in (2) "cases where they apply," but (3) the mandate to apply state law is inapplic-
able where the "Constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States otherwise [shall]
require or provide." The Supreme Court has adopted varying interpretations of these three
elements.
In Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), the Court held that decisions of state
courts, except those construing state statutes or constitutions, were not "laws of the several
states" for purposes of the RDA. Id. at 18. Justice Story's interpretation of the language
conflicted with the legislative history of the RDA and with the spirit as well as the holding
of M'Cluny. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72-73 (1938). See Warren, supra note 78,
at 83-88. Nevertheless, Suft remained the law until 1938 when the Court expressly over-
ruled it in Erie.
The "in cases where they apply" language does not limit the scope of the RDA. See
Note, supra note 8, 69 YALE L.J. at 1432. The Court has long recognized that "[tihe stat-
ute, however, is merely declarative of the rule which would exist in the absence of the
statute." Mason v. United States, 260 U.S. 545, 559 (1923). See Hill, supra note 1, at 1069-
70 (clause requires the application of the appropriate or relevant state law). See also Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72 n.2 (1938). Indeed, the only case that misconstrued the
phrase to limit the scope of the RDA is Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895). The
Campbell Court stated that this exception would relieve federal courts from the necessity of
following state laws which discriminate against "causes of action ... enforceable only in the
Federal courts." Id. at 614-15.
[I]t might be plausibly argued that it could never have been intended by Con-
gress that [the RDA] should apply to statutes passed in manifest hostility to
Federal rights or jurisdiction, but only to such as were uniform in their opera-
tion upon state and Federal rights and upon state and Federal courts.
Id. at 615. Other courts, however, did not share this view. For a more complete discussion
of Campbell, see notes 96-108 and accompanying text infra.
Early federal cases adopted a narrow construction of the "otherwise require or pro-
vide" exception. See Note, supra note 8, 69 YALE L.J. at 1433. "If the state law in question
was not inconsistent with the federal statute," the exception was irrelevant and the state law
applied. Id. Later, the Court greatly expanded this exception. After Erie state law applied
only where state rights were involved, a federal interest looming in the background of a
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compassed all actions on the case, it applied to actions for malfea-
sance against federal officers80 and thus barred the action.
The M'Cluny Court faced several choices in deciding which
limitations period applied to plaintiff's federally-created rights. It
might have fashioned its own limitations period,8 extended laches
to suits at common law,8 2 applied the statutory limitation of a
case sufficed to trigger the exception. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 394
(1946); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943); D'Oench, Duhme
& Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1942); Royal Indem. Co. v. United States, 313 U.S.
289, 294-95 (1941); Diethnick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 200-01 (1940); Board of County
Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1939).
Although the Court's expansive interpretation of the RDA appears to limit the statute
to diversity cases, the RDA also applies to nondiversity cases involving state-created rights:
The Erie doctrine is sometimes spoken of as applying only in cases in
which jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship. It is plain, is it not, that
this is erroneous, and that Erie applies, whatever the basis of the jurisdiction, to
any issue in the case which is governed by state law operating of its own force?
It is equally clear, is it not, that Erie is inapplicable with respect to issues
governed by federal law, even if jurisdiction does rest on diversity of citizen-
ship?
P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 766 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART &
WECHSLER]. For example, the Second Circuit asserted that "it is the source of the right sued
upon, and not the ground on which federal jurisdiction over the case is founded which
determines the governing law." Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234
F.2d 538, 540 n.1 (2d Cir. 1956) (emphasis in original) (citing HART & WECHSLER, supra, at
690-700). See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 475 (1979) ("first step" in determining whether
state or federal law applies is ascertaining which law creates the cause of action).
Professor Hill offers a preemption analysis to determine whether a question is one of
state or federal law. He suggests:
[e]ven when there is undoubted competence in the federal judiciary, state law
may'be applied for.., judicial economy, or to avoid the introduction of unwar-
ranted uncertainties into the conduct of public or private affairs. But it is also
possible that sometimes state law is or should be applied ex proprio vigore be-
cause the particular issue is one that should not be taken to be federalized by
force of the Constitution itself in view of the strength of the state interests
involved and the relative inconsequentiality of the federal interests (from which
it does not necessarily follow that the issue is outside the scope of congressional
competence).
Hill, supra note 1, at 1042. See id. at 1033-34; Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HARV.
L. REv. 1013, 1033-34 (1953).
80 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 277-78.
"I If historical precedent is a proper benchmark, the court has inherent power to estab-
lish time bars. See UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 713 (1966) (dissenting
opinion, White, J.) ("Courts have not always been reluctant to 'create' statutes of limita-
tions .... ). It exercises such power whenever it rules on a laches issue. See note 11 supra.
Further, courts have formulated limitations periods in other contexts. See note 12 supra.
82 Laches is an equitable doctrine, Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280, 287 (1939), and,
despite the merger of law and equity, is still recognized as such. Goodman v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 606 F.2d 800, 804 (8th Cir. 1979). Cf 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1292 (1976) (gener-
ally limiting federal appellate jurisdiction to final decisions, but permitting review of inter-
locutory orders having equitable origins).
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similar federal right,8 3 absorbed a state statute of limitations by
choice, or held there was no limitation period at all. 84  Instead,
the Court failed to recognize the choices available, assuming that
the RDA mandated absorption of the state limitations period.
The position that appellant urged upon the M'Cluny Court
was equally narrow. Without specifying which federal solution was
preferable, the appellant contended that state legislatures inher-
ently lacked jurisdictional power to affect federally created
rights.8 5 He argued that strong interests in uniformity of federal
rights disfavored adoption of state limitation periods. 86
A recent commentator claims, however, that in Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432
U.S. 355 (1977), the Supreme Court extended the doctrine of laches to "federal actions at
law lacking congressional limitations." Note, supra note 11, 77 MIcH. L. REv. at 1142. If
this commentator is correct, then Occidental Life marks a departure from the Russell rule
that a court cannot apply laches if jurisdiction is concurrent. 309 U.S. at 280. See note 11
supra. This conclusion is only correct if a backpay award is a legal remedy. The weight of
authority, however, suggests that it is not. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405, 443 (1975); Johnson v. Georgia High. Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir.
1969). But see EEOC v. Griffin Wheel Co., 511 F.2d 456, 459 (5th Cir. 1975) (applied state
statute of limitations to Title VII backpay claims).
83 See, e.g., McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 228-30 (1958) (concur-
ring opinion, Brennan, J.); Gatlin v. Missouri-Pac. R.R., 475 F. Supp. 1083, 1089 (E.D.
Ark. 1979). For a discussion of this opinion, see notes 323-29 and accompanying text infra.
84 Chief Justice Marshall warned that having no limitation on rights of action would be
"utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws." Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 342
(1804) (dicta). In Adams, Marshall discussed only a federal statutory limitation, implying
that the choice was between the federal statutory limitation or none at all. Id. at 340-41.
Marshall's warning should carry equal weight when the arguably applicable limitations
period is a state statute. See Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80, 83 (2d
Cir. 1961) (Friendly, J.) (although Congress may create a federal right without a limitation
period, it does not intend that courts apply an unlimited period). A court should focus
upon the purposes underlying time bars, not on which sovereign promulgated the limita-
tions period.
8 Apparently, the argument rested on the division of power between state and federal
governments. The appellant contended that:
it rests with the sovereign power of the state to say how far the interests of the
society it represents require that its own Courts shall be kept open to give re-
dress in each particular case, or whether there shall be any limitation of per-
sonal actions. It particularly belongs to each government to say how long its
ministerial officers shall be exposed to the claims of those who consider them-
selves aggrieved by their acts of misfeasance or nonfeasance; consequentially, in
such cases, the statutes of limitation of one state cannot be pleaded in bar in the
Courts of another state.
28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 271-72 (citations omitted). In essence, the appellant argued that state
legislative enactments may never limit the duration of federally created rights of action.
The source of this jurisdictional limitation probably was the supremacy clause. See generally
Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489 (1954).
8 The appellant claimed that the Ohio legislature could not have contemplated that
federal officers would be subject to the statute. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 274-75, 277. He alleged
that applying state statutes would "produce the absurdity and injustice of different laws,
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By assuming that a state period may not operate, ex proprio
vigore, to limit a federal right, the appellant's argument mis-
construed the operation of federal common law. Once a federal
court fills a gap in federal law, the gap-filler, whether judicially-
created or absorbed from the state, becomes federal law.8 7 Whether
a state time bar may operate of its own force is irrelevant unless
absorption of a state statute of limitations conflicts with the under-
lying federal rights-and the plaintiff in M'Cluny failed to show
any such conflict. Federalism does not preclude a federal court
from applying the state statute.
Neither does the interest in uniformity preclude absorption
of state statutes of limitations. Although the time period for the
same federal claim will inevitably vary among the states,88 mere
disharmony does not justify mandatory judicial creation of uni-
form federal limitations periods. 89  Nor does this interstate varia-
and different limitations" throughout the nation. Id. at 278. Although a lack of uniformity
would exist even if the state intended courts to apply state periods to federal rights, the
appellant argued that to apply them where they were "unintended" aggravated the dis-
harmony to an "absurd" and "unjust" degree. Id. This argument is hardly convincing;
absorption of state time bars, whether "intended" or "unintended," would produce disun-
iformity.
87 See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957) ("state law
applied [through federal law], however, will be absorbed as federal law"),; Hill, supra note
1, at 1074 (well settled in practice that federal judge-made law is binding upon the states);
Monaghan, supra note 1, at 10 (federal common law created by the Supreme Court is
binding on the states).
88 Federal rights are characteristically subject to varying time periods. Courts have
applied at least five different periods to claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (see
note 281 infra), and three different periods to § 1985 claims (see note 282 infra). See note
272 infra (10b-5 claims).
89 See Friendly, supra note 1, at 410-11; Monaghan, supra note 1, at 12-13. Professor
Monaghan argues that lack of uniformity seems an insufficient justification for judicial
creation of federal common law. Monaghan argues for a narrow role for federal law. He
believes that the RDA compels the application of state law unless there is preemption-a
material conflict between state law and the policies underlying the federal law. Monaghan,
supra note 1, at 12 n.69. Further, Professor Monaghan asserts that only an overriding
justification, perhaps disharmony in the area of primary conduct, would justify judicial
legislation when the "principal reason for creating federal law is a postulated need for
national uniformity." Id. at 13 & n.70. Clearly, simply deciding when to commence a law-
suit is not such conduct.
Courts presently agree with Professor Monaghan's position on uniformity. In Occiden-
tal Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977), the Supreme Court adopted a preemption
analysis and refused to apply a state statute of limitations to a Title VII action, partly
because "Is~tate legislatures do not devise their limitations periods with national interests in
mind." Id, at 367. However, the Court did not base its decision on a lack of uniformity;
instead, it rejected the state statute because applying the state limitations provision would
so limit the duration of the remedy as to "be inconsistent with the underlying policies of
the federal statute." Id. The result thus rested on preemption principles; the Court felt
that "it is the duty of the federal courts to assure that the importation of state law will not
frustrate or interfere with the implementation of national policies." Id.
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tion alone conflict with federal interests; only a conflict of state
law with basic federal policies would justify such mandatory judi-
cial invention.D" Finally, as long as parties contemplating litiga-
tion are able to predict the duration of their claims by ascertaining
which state period the court will absorb, lack of uniformity among
state periods is not a significant problem. The M'Cluny court
reached the proper result. However, its construction of the RDA 91
left a legacy of confusion 2 that continues to this day.9'
3
The Court has rejected the uniformity argument when it has not been supported by
strong policies. In UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966), the Court con-
fronted the problem of setting a time limitation for claims under § 301 of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). The appellant urged the Court to
"devise a uniform time limitation to close the statutory gap left by Congress" (383 U.S. at
701), rather than apply the state limitations period adopted by the district court (id. at
699). Despite the disharmony that would result from absorbing the various state limitations
periods for § 301 claims, the Court refused to create a uniform rule. Id. at 702-05. The
Court noted that "there are problems so vital to the implementation of federal ... policy
that they will command a high degree of inventiveness from the courts (id. at 701), and
that "the subject matter of § 301 is 'peculiarly one that calls for uniform law' " (id. (citation
omitted)). Nonetheless, the Court asserted that "[t]he need for uniformity ... is greatest
where its absence would threaten the smooth functioning of those consensual processes
that federal labor law is chiefly designed to promote." Id. at 702. The Court recognized
that under § 301 there was a "need for uniformity in the 'substantive principles' that gov-
ern these suits." Id. at 703 n.4. Although it gave the issue short shrift, the Court noted that
"lack of uniformity in limitations provisions is unlikely to have a substantial effect upon the
private definition or effectuation of 'substantive' or 'primary' rights" in the type of litiga-
tion at hand. Id. Cf United States v. Kimball Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 729 (1979) (need
for uniform federal rule of priority of liens insufficient to "override intricate state laws of
general applicability on which private creditors base their daily commercial transactions").
The case law thus supports Professor Monaghan's conclusion. Simple disharmony in
limitations periods does not justify the judicial creation of a uniform rule. But see UAW v.
Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. at 711-13 (dissenting opinion, White, J.) (need for uni-
formity to prevent unequal treatment of litigants in substantive law of labor agreements
constitutes sufficient reason to create uniform rule); Note, supra note 8, 68 COLUM. L. REV.
at 772-73 (urging creation of uniform limitations period for civil rights actions).
9' Varying time limitations upon federal rights alone would probably not justify the
creation of a uniform federal rule. Uniformity becomes compelling only when the primary
decisions respecting human conduct become subject to conflicting requirements. Cf Hanna
v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474-75 (1965) (concurring opinion, Harlan, J.) (uniform applica-
tion of state law required in federal diversity cases where primary conduct would otherwise
be subject to conflicting demands). The Court in UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383
U.S. 696 (1966), recognized the need for uniformity where primary conduct would be
affected. Id. at 702. See note 89 supra. The UAW Court held that statutes of limitations
merely regulate secondary activity; they come "into play only when [the primary] processes
have already broken down." 383 U.S. at 702.
9' Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) highlights the potential danger of the
M'Cluny holding. In Erie, the Court held that the word "laws" in the RDA includes both the
enactments of the state legislature and the decisions of the state judiciary. Id. at 78. Read
together, M'Cluny and Erie would mean that the RDA compels a federal court to apply not
only state limitations periods, but also state common law rules on subsidiary issues such as
tolling, accrual, and commencement.
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In Campbell v. Haverhill,94 the Supreme Court again adopted a
narrow interpretation of the RDA exception. Assignees of a pat-
ent brought an infringement action in federal court, 95 which
exercised exclusive jurisdiction over such claims. The trial court
applied the state statute of limitations and barred the action.16
The Supreme Court affirmed, 97 construing the RDA to require
the application of the state time bar.98
The Campbell Court added a new wrinkle to the mandatory
interpretation of the RDA first advanced in M'Cluny. The Court
Where state law is determined to govern of its own force, that determination
generally means that all issues in the subject-matter area will be similarly gov-
erned by local law. This follows almost inevitably from the idea that local law
governs of its own authority; in our federal system, the authority of states runs
over whole areas of law, and determinations of jurisdiction will thus generally
cover such areas.
Mishkin, The Varioumess of "Federal Law:" Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National
and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797, 805 (1957). See C. WRIGHT, supra note
4, at 284. Mandatory application of state law on these subsidiary issues could seriously
undermine federal interests involved in suits on federal claims. For an extensive discussion
of these problems, see notes 187-431 and accompanying text infra.
92 After M'Cluny, the circuit courts split over the applicability of state statutes of limita-
tions in patent infringement actions, over which federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction.
U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8. See Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (actions at law); Act of
Feb. 19, 1819, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 481 (actions in equity); 28 U.SC. § 1338 (1976) (current
codification). For example, in Hayden v. The Oriental Mills, 15 F. 605 (C.C.D.R.I. 1883),
the court followed the rationale of M'Cluny and held that the RDA required it to adopt the
Rhode Island statute of limitations. Accord, Sayles v. Richmond, F. & P.R.R., 21 F. Cas. 613,
613 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1879) (No. 12,424); Sayles v. Oregon Cent. Ry., 21 F. Cas. 611, 612
(C.C.D. Or. 1879) (No. 12,423); Rich v. Ricketts, 20 F. Cas. 681, 682 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1870)
(No. 11,762); Parker v. Hawk, 18 F. Cas. 1135, 1135-36 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1857) (No. 10,737)
(citing M'Cluny).
The court in Brickell v. City of Hartford, 49 F. 372 (C.C.D. Conn. 1892), reached the
opposite conclusion. Expressly holding the RDA inapplicable in patent infringement ac-
tions, the court noted that a congressional mandate to absorb state limitations periods,
based upon the RDA, would require courts to absorb time periods that might discriminate
against federal rights. Id. at 374-75. A mandate to absorb discriminatory periods would
permit state legislatures to accomplish indirectly what they had no power to legislate di-
rectly. The court held that the RDA's mandate applied to those cases "which involve mat-
ters or rights within the legislative jurisdiction of the state; " and that because suits for
patent infringements fell outside of that category, the RDA did not require absorption of
the state statute. Id. at 375. Most lower courts followed Brickell until the Supreme Court
decided Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 106 (1895). See, e.g. Sayles v. Richmond, F & P.
R.R., 21 F. Cas. 613, 613 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1879) (No. 12,424); Rich v. Ricketts, 20 F. Cas. 681,
682 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1870) (No. 11,762).
91 See note 72 and accompanying text supra.94 155 U.S. 610 (1895).
95 Id.
91 Id. at 611.
"I Id. at 621.
98 Id. at 614.
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hesitantly concluded that although the RDA required federal
courts to absorb state periods, this requirement could be waived if
that period unduly burdened or discriminated against a federal
right. Thus, the Campbell court chipped away at the M'Cluny
Court's narrow reading of the "in cases where they apply" excep-
tion by allowing courts "discretion" in the application of burden-
some or discriminatory state periods. 99 Even if this reading of
the RDA is construed as an accommodation of the supremacy
clause, it left the court in an awkward posture because it pierced
the "mandatory" nature of the RDA with a considerable
discretionary loophole.
The Campbell Court apparently read the RDA to require ap-
plication of state law in all cases except those in which Congress
had attached a limitations period to the federal right involved.
Rejecting the plaintiff's contention that the exclusive federal
jurisdiction over his claim was sufficient to bring it outside the
RDA's mandate, the Court thought it lacked the power to fashion
its own limitations period; 100 it held that the RDA required ab-
sorption of the state period. The Court reached this result by
examining the RDA in cases of concurrent and exclusive jurisdic-
tion; this examination rested on the erroneous assumption that
the RDA applied where jurisdiction over federal rights was con-
current.
The Court assumed unquestioningly that Congress intended
the RDA to apply in cases of "concurrent jurisdiction." Although
the Court did not define "concurrent jurisdiction," the term
clearly referred to federally-created rights litigable both in federal
and state courts.101 From this false assumption-that the RDA ex-
99 Id. at 614-16. The Court stated:
In such case it might be plausibly argued that it could never have been in-
tended by Congress that [the RDA] should apply to statutes passed in manifest
hostility to Federal rights or jurisdiction, but only to such as were uniform in
their operation upon state and Federal rights and upon state and Federal
courts.
Id. at 615.
100 Id. at 616. See Note, supra note 8, 68 COLUm. L. REv. at 771 (The Campbell Court
.apparently felt powerless to fashion its own rule.").
101 155 U.S. at 616.oFrom the Court's initial premise that the RDA applied in cases of
concurrent jurisdiction came the query whether the RDA should require application of
state law where federal jurisdiction is exclusive. The Court concluded that it should. Why,
it asked, would Congress discriminate in favor of plaintiffs with exclusive federal claims by
rejecting state limitations law, -and against defendants by eliminating their use of that law as
a defense? Id. Neither argument is persuasive. Even accepting the fallacious contention that
the RDA applies to federal rights with concurrent jurisdiction, discrimination would not
result unless remedies for rights with exclusive federal jurisdiction were of unlimited or
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tended to federal rights of concurrent jurisdiction-followed logi-
cally the Court's conclusion that the RDA should apply to cases of
federal rights of exclusive jurisdiction. t 2 Because of its initial
significantly longer duration. But the Court could have set its own period-even if it de-
nied it had such power. See note 103 infra.
The Court's concern with the plight of defendants in actions of exclusive federal juris-
diction is equally misplaced. It asked: "[w]hy ... should the fact that Congress has created
the right, limit the defences to which the defendant would otherwise be entitled?" 155 U.S.
at 616. But Congress unquestionably could favor federal rights of exclusive jurisdiction by
specifically providing longer statutes of limitations for them than similar concurrent federal
rights, thus creating discrimination between defendants.
The real question is how to interpret the congressional silence. The Court claimed that
it was "more reasonable to presume that Congress ... intended to subject such action[s] to
the general laws of the State applicable to actions of a similar nature." Id. This argues for
the absorption of state law, but not necessarily by an RDA mandate. State law can be
absorbed by federal courts without relying on a congressional mandate. See text accom-
panying note 124 infra.
Even if extending the RDA to cases of exclusive federal jurisdiction would eliminate
this form of discrimination between litigants, other forms would necessarily result. For
example, an RDA mandate would require the application of all state laws which discrimi-
nate against nonresident plaintiffs, such as state borrowing statutes. These statutes protect
the claims of resident plaintiffs in situations where the limitation period of a foreign juris-
diction would bar a nonresident plaintiff's claim. See notes 418-19 and accompanying text
infra. In diversity cases, federal courts typically enforce these provisions. See, e.g., Schiess-
Froriep Corp. v. Steamship Finnsailor, 574 F.2d 123, 125 n.5 (2d Cir. 1978); Ramsay v.
Boeing Co., 432 F.2d 592, 594 n.4 (5th Cir. 1970); Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright
Corp., 424 F.2d 427, 428 (2d Cir.) (under New York's borrowing statute, non-resident
plaintiffs bringing causes accruing in another state are barred from instituting suit if they
are barred by the statute of limitations of either jurisdiction, but New York residents are
affected only by the New York limitations period), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 829 (1970); Bartho-
lomeo v. Parent, 71 F.R.D. 86, 87 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Sangdahl v. Litton, 69 F.R.D. 641, 643
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). Under this Project's analysis of the RDA this inequity would not result in
cases concerning federal rights because, when under a federal common law presumptive
application of state law, a federal court would apply only the local time limit, and not the
discriminatory provision. See note 431 and accompanying text infra.
12 155 U.S. at 616. By assuming that the RDA applies to cases of concurrent jurisdic-
tion, the Court ignored the fundamental distinction between state-created rights and fed-
eral rights. See note 79 supra. Some commentators argue that, through its "concurrent-
exclusive" analysis, the Court distinguished state claims over which both state and federal
courts could exercise jurisdiction from federal rights, which could be litigated only in fed-
eral courts. See, e.g., Note, supra note 8, 68 COLUM. L. REV. at 768; Note, supra note 8,
53 COLUM. L. REV. at 74. This interpretation has some logical appeal. Certainly the
RDA applies to suits based on state rights in federal courts-it was enacted for that very
purpose. See note 79 supra. The Campbell Court's error, then, lies in the extension of the
RDA to federal rights that can only be litigated in federal courts.
But a closer reading of the case reveals that the previous commentators incorrectly
interpreted Campbell. The Court characterized the appellant's argument as follows:
It is insisted, however, that, by the express terms of [the RDA], the laws of the
several States should be enforced only "in cases where they apply," and that
they have no application to causes of action created by Congressional legislation
and enforceable only in the Federal courts. The argument is, that the law of the
forum can only apply to matters within the jurisdiction of the state courts.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:1011
false assumption, the Court failed to focus on the source of plain-
tiff's right in Campbell. Whether this right was state or federally-
created should have determined the RDA's applicability.
The Court's perception of its limited power to fashion its own
period is flawed for another reason. By 1895, the Court's power
to devise rules through federal common law was well-
established. 10 3 Nothing prevented the Court from creating its
own time bar.
155 U.S. at 614 (emphasis added). This language strongly suggests that the Court was
distinguishing "causes of action created by Congressional legislation and enforceable only
in the Federal courts" from state created and congressionally created rights enforceable in
both state and federal courts. The Court further read the appellant's argument to say "that
the States, having no power to create the right or enforce the remedy, have no power to
limit such remedy or to legislate in any manner with respect to the subject-matter." Id. at
615. This emphasis on state legislatures makes it unlikely that "concurrent" jurisdiction re-
ferred to diversity matters; rather the Court was focusing on federally-created rights. The
historical development of patent infringement actions, in particular, lends support to this
interpretation. Initially, state as well as federal courts could hear patent infringement ac-
tions. Later, they became the exclusive domain of the federal courts. See note 89 supra.
Because Campbell involved a patent claim, the conclusion that "concurrent" includes fed-
eral, and not just state claims, seems unmistakable.
Thus, this Project comes to a different view of Campbell than did the two Columbia
Notes. The Columbia Notes assumed that M'Cluny involved a state, and not a federal claim.
See Note, supra, 68 COLUM. L. REV. at 767-68; Note, supra, 53 COLUM. L. REV. at 74
(Campbell (not M'Cluny) was the first Supreme Court case dealing with a federal statutory
right without a limitations period). Because of this assumption and because the Campbell
Court referred to the RDA's application in M'Cluny when analyzing the statute's application
in patent actions, the two Columbia Notes could conclude that the Court was comparing the
effect of state-created rights with those of federally-created rights. This Project, however,
concludes that M'Cluny involved a federal right, see note 75 supra, and that the Campbell
Court compared federal rights of concurrent and exclusive jurisdiction.
This Project's analysis faults the Campbell Court only for its poor reading of the RDA.
The RDA does not apply to federal claims, concurrent or exclusive. But the other com-
mentators are overly critical of the Campbell Court's analysis. Those writers apparently be-
lieved that the court could perceive no difference between state-created and federally-
created rights, and that this lack of perception led to the Court's holding that the RDA also
controls federally created rights. For example, when one commentator stated that the
Campbell Court held "the distinction between a state right enforceable in state courts and a
federal right enforceable in federal courts irrelevant" (Note, supra note 8, 68 COLUM. L REv. at
768), he implied that the Court ignored an obvious distinction. This Project, on the other
hand, only questions the Court's reading of the RDA, which was undoubtedly influenced
by previous cases such as M'Cluny. Prior case law mechanically applied the RDA. Given this
background, the Campbell Court's extension of the RDA to claims of exclusive federal juris-
diction is understandable.
This Project agrees with other commentators, however, that the Campbell Court's re-
liance on the RDA was inappropriate. See id. at 769; Note, supra note 8, 53 COLUM. L.
REv. at 74-76; notes 109-10 and accompanying text infra.
0' See, e.g., Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1842); Schofield, Swift v. Tyson.
Uniformity of Judge-Made State Law in State and Federal Courts, 4 ILL. L. REv. 533, 536 (1910)
("[no judge in England or in the United States ever did need to be told ... that he has the
power to make law") (emphasis added).
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The confusion in the Court's analysis of the RDA's compul-
sion in cases involving federal rights pales in comparison to the
intellectual chaos of its notion of discretionary application of the
RDA. 104 Congress did not intend the RDA's "cases where they
apply" language to be a vehicle for judicial discretion, and no
precedent supported such a view.10 5  In addition, the supremacy
clause' 0 6 provided protection against state laws that discriminated
against or burdened federal rights.' 0 7  Thus, the Court strained
' The plaintiff in Campbell claimed that mechanical application of state law through
the RDA would require federal courts to apply unreasonably short state time periods. The
Court held, however, that it could choose not to absorb statutes, according litigants too
short a period in which to bring suit. 155 U.S. at 615. No authority other than the Court's
own reading of the RDA supported this finding of discretionary power to ignore state
statutes.
The Court also responded to plaintiff's argument by stating that it could declare un-
reasonably short state limitations periods unconstitutional. Id. The authorities on which the
Court relied, however, were inapposite to the Campbell facts. They also highlight the
Court's failure to understand the preemption doctrine.
The Court cited Koshkonong v. Burton, 104 U.S. 668 (1881), and Wheeler v. Jackson,
137 U.S. 245 (1890). These cases involved accrued state rights of action and subsequent
legislative pronouncements shortening the time period. Both cases turned on the depriva-
tion of a property right without due process. In neither case did the Court question
whether a particular time limitation was sufficiently long for a particular type of claim.
Further, the Court actually upheld the statutes in both cases, because the newly enacted
time periods were not unreasonably short. 137 U.S. at 255; 104 U.S. at 675. Finally, and
equally inappropriately, Campbell also cited a treatise that deals with prejudice to existing
causes of action by the shortening of an existing statute of limitations. See T. COOLEY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 366-67 (Boston 8th ed. 1868). In short, the Court failed to
recognize that the preemption doctrine was the proper vehicle for invalidating unreasona-
bly short limitations on federal rights. See notes 163-79 and accompanying text infra. This
analysis is consistent with both an RDA mandate and a federal common law presumption
to absorb.
105 See note 79 supra.
106 U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2. Ordinary Erie rules do not then force an application of
state law. For example, in Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942) the
Court stated: "It is familiar doctrine that the prohibition of a federal statute may not be set
at naught, or its benefits denied, by state statutes or state common law rules. In such a case
our decision is not controlled by Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64." Id. at 176. The
state rule must give way to the conflicting federal rule, because of the supremacy clause.
Francis v. Southern Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445, 450 (1948). Cf Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386
(1947) (state courts having jurisdiction over certain state actions cannot refuse to hear ac-
tions involving similar federal rights).
107 See notes 163-79 and accompanying text infra. In a preemption case, "the primary
task of the Court is to ascertain whether a challenged State law is compatible with the
policy expressed in the Federal statute." W. CHASE & C. DUCAT, CORWIN'S THE CONSTITU-
TION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 272 (14th ed. 1978) (emphasis added); see D. CURME,
FEDERAL COURTS 684-87 (2d ed. 1968). The policies expressed in the federal statute are
"divined by the normal common law techniques of looking to the words of the statute, the
problem it was meant to solve, the legislative history, the structure of the statute, its place
among other federal statutes, and the need for a uniform national rule of law." Monaghan,
supra note I, at 12. Recent developments have limited the doctrine's application to cases in
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the statutory language to create a safeguard against discriminatory
state time bars instead of relying on well-established preemption
principles. 11 8  By importing these notions of discretion into the
RDA, the Court broadened a well-defined provision beyond sen-
sible bounds and treated the clear congressional mandate as if it
were a mere rebuttable presumption. This reading conflicts with
both the language of the statute and the doctrine of separation of
powers.10 9
In short, the reasons given by the Campbell Court fail to with-
stand even cursory analysis.110 Campbell, however, like many of the
which "state law is seen to be in material conflict with the policies of federal law." Id. at 12
n.69. See Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger
Court, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623, 653 (1975).
108 See, e.g., M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
109 The doctrine of separation of powers requires that the governmental body that
makes law must not also execute and interpret that law; rather, governmental power must
reside in a separate legislature, executive, and judiciary. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (J.
Madison), at 323 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). See generally W. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEP-
ARATION OF POWERS (1965); Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of "The Separation of Pow-
ers," 2 U. CHI. L. REv. 385 (1935). Two concerns underlie the doctrine: (1) a fear of power
concentrated into a single group or class; and (2) a "[s]olicitude for liberty." Sharp, supra,
at 434; THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (J. Madison), at 325 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Allocation of
powers and responsibilities to separate branches is also rooted in the goal of efficient gov-
ernment. W. GWYN, supra, at 127.
Although the doctrine requires separate governmental branches, it does not preclude
the overlapping of governmental functions. Justice Jackson, concurring in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952), noted that separation of powers
"enjoins upon [the] branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity."
The Court in Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) agreed,
stating that the Youngstown case "squarely rejected the argument that the Constitution con-
templates a complete division of authority between the three branches." It repudiated the
"archaic view" of "airtight departments of government." Id. As Madison recognized in
1788, the doctrine seeks only to prevent the situation "where the whole power of one de-
partment is exercised by the same hands which possess the, whole power of another de-
partment." THE FEDERALIST, No. 47 (J. Madison), at 325-26 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). It does
not preclude the exercise of "partial agency" over the functions of another branch. Id.
Under this view of the doctrine, the judiciary's role is to review the actions of other
governmental bodies to determine if they are constitutionally valid. Moreover, the judiciary
must interpret and effectuate those laws that it does find constitutional. See W. GWYN,
supra, at 125. Interpretation of legislation and effectuation of congressional policy are con-
sistent with the separation doctrine's prohibition of exercising the whole power of another
branch.
However, were a court to read the clearly absolute mandate of the RDA as merely a
presumptive absorption of state law, the judicial branch would effectively be usurping the
whole function of the legislature. Ignoring a law's patent command is to make law, not to
interpret and effectuate legislative intent. Labelling the RDA a rebuttable presumption
would thus violate the doctrine of separation of powers.
110 In addition to its other flawed arguments for absorbing state law, the Campbell Court
stated that federal courts should apply state limitations periods because Congress had com-
pelled absorption of state procedural law by enacting the Conformity Act, ch. 255, 17 Stat.
1036
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early cases in this area, reached the right result for the wrong
reasons. Clearly it would have been proper to absorb the state
time bar as a matter of choice. I I Despite its correct result,
Campbell's theoretical difficulties plagued later courts. 1 12  The
Court's mistaken reliance on the RDA and its dilution of the
RDA's mandate with "discretion" generated confusion from which
courts did not escape for nearly fifty years.
For example, a decade after Campbell, in Chattanooga Foundry
& Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta,1 13 the Court adopted Campbell's
flawed rationale without lengthy discussion and applied a state
statute of limitations to a federal antitrust action." 4 The Court
held the state period applicable because the "matter [had been]
196 (1872). 155 U.S. at 617-18. The Court suggested that statutes of limitations were
closely related .to procedure and should be treated as such.
But an opposite result can easily be argued in light of modern practice. Statutes of
limitations are more than procedural rules. See Limitations Developments, supra note 13, at
1186-88. In diversity suits, for example, state statutes of limitations are treated as substan-
tive rules of law, subject to compulsory absorption under Erie. See Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-11 (1945). Arguably, then, limitations periods for federal rights
deserve different treatment than simple rules of procedure. York held that in diversity suits
logic as well as congressional compulsion required the application of the state period. Id. at
112. When the origin of the right is federal, the logical, as well as congressional, compul-
sion to apply the state statute vanishes. In this situation, a mechanical application of state
periods under RDA compulsion would severely limit the federal courts' ability to protect
and enhance federal policies. A presumptive application of state law, however, preserves
this ability.
Finally, the Court stated that the state period applied because statutes of limitations
"affect the remedy," and because it was "settled" congressional policy "to permit rights
created by its statutes to be enforced in the manner and subject to the limitations pre-
scribed by the laws of the several States." 155 U.S. at 618. The Court relied upon M'El-
moyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312 (1839), which held that statutes of limitations were
pleas "to the remedy" to which the "lex fori must prevail." Id. at 327. The Court, however,
misapplied this authority. The M'Elmoyle Court was confronted not with a choice between
the application of federal or state law, but a choice between two state laws. Id. at 327-28. A
court may properly invoke the lexfori rule only after it has decided to apply state law.
11 See text accompanying note 123 infra. Even without RDA compulsion, however, fed-
eral courts may be unable to reexamine whether state periods should be adopted, because
consistent judicial application of state statutes may have foreclosed such an inquiry through
the operation of stare decisis. Thus, what on a clean slate should have been only a presump-
tion would now be a result compelled by judicial practice. This 'Judicial compulsion," how-
ever, only requires federal courts to apply existing state periods rather than formulate
uniform federal periods. The courts enjoy greater freedom regarding the less settled ques-
tions of ancillary, yet related, doctrines such as tolling, accrual, and survival. See notes
187-431 and accompanying text infra.
112 See note 72 supra.
113 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
114 The action was based on § 7 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 209
(1890) (currently codified at 15 U.S.C. §15 (1976)). Congress obviated the need to absorb
state limitations statutes in 1955 by passing a uniform statute of limitations for federal
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left to the Local law by the silence of the Statutes of the United
States." 115
B. Specialized Federal Common Law and the RDA
In 1939, the Court adopted new reasoning that was to prove
more harmonious with the nature of a federally created right.
The case, Board of County Commissioners v. United States, 16 involved
an 1861 treaty exempting Indian lands from taxation."' The
United States, on behalf of the Indians, sued the county to re-
cover taxes allegedly collected in violation of the treaty.'" The
County admitted liability for the principal, but challenged the
claim for interest on the wrongly collected funds; it argued that
under state law, it was "settled ... that a taxpayer may not re-
cover from a county interest upon taxes wrongfully collected.""' 9
The government urged the Court to be "indifferent" 120 to the
state law; the locality argued that state law controlled ex proprio
vigore. The Court disagreed with both positions. Implicitly inter-
preting the "otherwise require or provide" exception of the RDA
and rejecting the notion that the statute requires courts to apply
state law in cases involving federal rights, Justice Frankfurter
stated:
The starting point for relief in this case is the Treaty of 1861,
exempting [Indian] property from taxation. Effectuation of the
exemption is, of course, entirely within Congressional control.
But Congress has not specifically provided for the present con-
tingency, that is, the nature and extent of relief in case loss is
antitrust actions. Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 283, § 4B, 69 Stat. 282 (currently codified at 15
U.S.C. § 15b (1976)). For a discussion of the justifications for enacting the uniform period,
see S. REP. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-6, reprinted in [1955] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2328, 2330-33. For discussions of the problems courts previously had with placing
time limitations on federal antitrust actions, see Fulda & Klemme, The Statute of Limitations
in Antitrust Litigation, 16 OHIO ST. L.J. 233 (1955); Note, Antitrust Enforcement by Private
Parties: Analysis of Developments in the Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1030-31 (1952);
Note, Treble Damage Time Limitations: Federalism Rampant, 60 YALE L.J. 553 (1951); note 195
infra.
115 203 U.S. at 397. For similar applications of state limitations periods through the
RDA, see O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 322 (1914) (Civil Rights Act); McClaine v.
Rankin, 197 U.S. 154, 158 (1905) (National Bank Act); Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148, 158
(1899) (copyright).
16 308 U.S. 343 (1939) (Frankfurter, J.).
117 Id. at 348.
"I Id. at 348-49.
119 Id. at 349 (citation omitted).
120 Id.
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suffered through denial of exemption. It has left such remedial
details to judicial implications. Since the origin of the right to
be enforced is the Treaty, plainly whatever rule we fashion is
ultimately attributable to the Constitution, treaties or statutes of the
United States, and does not owe its authority to the law-making
agencies of [the state].12'
Because fashioning remedial details to protect rights deriving
from the Constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States is a
function of the federal judiciary, federal courts are free to fashion
uniform federal rules, or to absorb state law to fill the interstices
of statutes creating federal rights. 122  In Board of County Commis-
sioners, the Court absorbed the state law:
Nothing that the state can do will be allowed to destroy the
federal right which is to be vindicated; but in defining the ex-
tent of that right its relation to the operation of state laws is
relevant....
Having left the matter at large for judicial determination
within the framework of familiar remedies equitable in their
nature ... Congress has left us free to take into account ap-
propriate considerations of "public convenience."... Nothing
seems to us more appropriate than due regard for local institu-
tions and local interests. 123
The Court emphasized that application of state law was a judicial
choice:
The state law has been absorbed, as it were, as the govern-
ing federal rule not because state law was the source of the
right but because recognition of state interests was not deemed
inconsistent with federal policy. In the absence of explicit legis-
lative policy cutting across state interests, we draw upon a gen-
eral principle that the beneficiaries of federal rights are not to
have a privileged position over other aggrieved tax-payers in
their relation with the states or their political subdivisions. To
respect the law of interest prevailing in Kansas in no wise im-
pinges upon the exemption which the Treaty of 1861 has
commanded Kansas to respect and the federal courts to vindi-
cate.
24
121 Id. at 349-50 (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (emphasis added)).
122 But see note 111 supra.
123 308 U.S. at 350-51 (citations omitted).
124 Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
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This conclusion had yet to be applied in the statute of limitations
context. In less than a decade, the opportunity arose.
In Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 125 creditors sued the shareholders of
a bank under section 16 of the Federal Farm Loan Act.1 26 A de-
cade after the cause of action arose, the plaintiffs learned that a
shareholder had concealed his stock ownership and they com-
menced suit in district court eleven years after the cause of action
accrued. 27  The district court rejected the defendant's assertion
that either the ten year statute of limitations of the forum state or
laches barred the action.1 28  The Court of Appeals reversed, 129
holding state statutes of limitations subject to the outcome-
determinative test of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York. 130 The Supreme
Court reversed. Justice Frankfurter again explained:
The considerations that urge adjudication by the same law in all
courts within a State when enforcing a right created by that
State are hardly relevant for determining the rules which bar
enforcement of ... [rights] created not by a State legislature,
but by Congress.1 3 1
Having dismissed the circuit court's conclusion that York re-
quired the application of state law, the Court then focused on
what law it should choose. The Court noted that a federal statute
of limitations, if Congress had enacted one, would put "an end
[to] the matter,"'132 but that "[alpart from penal enactments, Con-
gress ha[d] usually left the limitation of time for commencing ac-
tions under national legislation to judicial implications." 133 In ac-
tions at law, congressional silence has been "interpreted to mean
that it is federal policy to adopt the local law of limitation." 134
For this proposition, the Court cited three cases 135 that had all
applied state law because of a mistaken belief that the RDA com-
125 327 U.S. 392 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.).
126 39 Stat. 374 (1916) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 92-181, Title V, § 5.26(a), 85 Stat. 624
(1971), 12 U.S.C. § 812 (1976)).
121 327 U.S. at 393.
12' Holmberg v. Anchell, 24 F. Supp. 594, 600-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1938), rev'd sub nom.
Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 150 F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1945), rev'd, 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
129 Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 150 F.2d 829, 832 (2d Cir. 1945), rev'd, 327 U.S. 392
(1946).
130 326 U.S. 99 (1945). York is a progeny of Erie. The cases "can be viewed as an in-
terpretation of the Rules of Decision Act." Mishkin, supra note 91, at 800 n.16.,
131 327 U.S. at 394.
132 Id. at 395.
133 Id.
134 Id. (citations omitted).
135 Id.
1040 [Vol. 65: 101 1
19801 TIME BARS 1041
pelled them to do so: Campbell, Chattanooga, and Rawlings v.
Ray. 136  But the Court abandoned the justifications for absorption
set forth by these precedents:
The implied absorption of State statutes of limitation within the
interstices of federal enactments is a phase of fashioning reme-
dial details where Congress has not spoken but left matters for
judicial determination within the general framework of familiar
legal principles.13 7
Holmberg should have dispelled the notion that the RDA man-
dated application of state statutes of limitations in litigation involv-
ing federal rights. Thus under this view, if Congress prescribes no
time bar, 38 federal courts may choose-but are not required-to
13c 312 U.S. 96 (1941).
137 327 U.S. at 395 (citing Board of County Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343,
340-50, 351-52 (1939)).
138 See note 4 supra. Congress's failure to attach a specific statute of limitations to a
federal right does not necessarily mean that Congress has been silent. In civil rights ac-
tions, for example, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) may require federal courts to apply state law.
That section provides:
The jurisdiction in civil ... matters conferred on the district courts by the
provisions of this Title, and of Title "CIVIL RIGHTS," ... for the protection
of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication,
shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United
States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all
cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provi-
sions necessary to furnish suitable remedies.... the common law, as modified
and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court
having jurisdiction of such civil ... cause is held, so far as the same is not
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be ex-
tended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause
Id.
Section 1988's effect on the application of state law recently received judicial attention.
In Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 100 S. Ct. 1790 (1980), the Court applied New York
statute of limitations and tolling laws to bar a § 1983 claim. The opinion lends itself to two
interpretations of the role of § 1988. On the one hand, the Court proferred a view of §
1988 similar to the Campbell Court's view of the RDA when it stated that "federal courts
[are] obligated to apply ... the analogous New York statute of limitations to respondent's
federal constitutional claims .... " Id. at 1794 (emphasis added). Federal courts should re-
ject state law only if it is "inconsistent" with federal law. Id. at 1796. The factors that the
Court considered when determining whether state law was inconsistent, however, suggest a
second view of § 1988. The Court analyzed the effect of absorbing state law on: (1) the
underlying policies of § 1983 actions and (2) general federalism concerns. Id. at 1797-99.
The Court's concern with these factors offers a second view of § 1988: it is simply a con-
gressional codification of the presumption to apply state law to fill interstices in federal
rights of action. This latter interpretation appears correct because it closely comports with
the view offered in Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978) and Johnson v. REA, 421
U.S. 454 (1975), upon which Tomanio heavily relies.
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apply state law.1 39 This judicial freedom is not, however, unlim-
ited, and there are a number of circumstances in which federal
courts properly refuse to apply state time bars.
Courts have applied state law in several other areas by relying on § 1988. See, e.g.,
Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 593 (1978) (state survivorship statute); Johnson v.
REA, 421 U.S. 454, 464 (1975) (state tolling law) (dictum); Warner v. Perrino, 585 F.2d
171, 174-75 (6th Cir. 1978) (state statute of limitations); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works
of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476, 488 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970) (state
statute of limitations); Hughes v. Smith, 264 F. Supp. 767, 769 (D.N.J. 1967), aff'd, 389
F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1968) (state statute of limitations).
For a discussion of § 1988 and its relationship to state statutes of limitations, see 1976
Aiuz. ST. L.J., supra note 8, at 107-08. See generally Eisenberg, State Law in Federal Civil
Rights Cases: The Proper Scope of Section 1988, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 499 (1980).
139 See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 476 (1979) ("Since we proceed on the premise of
the existence of a federal cause of action, it is clear that 'our decision is not controlled by
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,' and state law does not operate of its own force.")
(citation omitted); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 180 (1976) (citing Holmberg); Johnson
v. REA, 421 U.S. 454, 469 (1975) (concurring opinion, Marshall, J.) ("As a general practice,
where Congress has created a federal right without prescribing a period for enforcement,
the federal courts uniformly borrow the most analogous state statute of limitations.");
UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 709 (1966) (dissenting opinion, White, J.)(courts apply state law when it supplements and fulfills federal policy with the ultimate
question being what comprises federal policy); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S.
301, 305-10 (1947); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943) (in
absence of applicable act of Congress federal courts fashion governing rule of law accord-
ing to own standards); Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450, 457 (3d Cir. 1979)
(concurring opinion, Sloviter, J.) (suggesting state statutes apply "because they are there");
Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 529 (5th Cir. 1974) (state statute applied not be-
cause of legal compulsion, but merely as a matter of convenience when no other limitation
period available); Gatlin v. Missouri-Pacific R.R., 475 F. Supp. 1083, 1087 (E.D. Ark. 1979)
(citing Donaldson). Professor Mishkin explained:
Since the Erie doctrine basically represents a determination of a lack of compe-
tence in the federal courts to do other than apply the state law, this is an accu-
rate statement of the issue only if the term "federal law" is taken to refer to
federal judicial competence to choose which law shall govern. However, ["fed-
eral law"] may seem to imply more: not only the power to choose, but also the
exercise of that power by a choice in favor of a single, federally-created sub-
stantive rule. The latter is not a necessary corollary of the former. The power
to choose may also be exercised by adopting state law as the governing rule-
by incorporating the local rules for decision as the "federal law" for this pur-
pose ....
What makes the distinction important is that if the issue is seen only as a
choice between a federal rule of substance and Erie, the problem appears much
more difficult than need be. For the implication of this breakdown is that any
application of state law-whether of its own force or by way of federal
incorporation-is subject to the entire body of rules and doctrine which de-
veloped in the aftermath of Erie. In fact, however, these two modes of using
local law may involve substantially different approaches, particularly as to the
methods and scope of applying state law. Much of the doctrine as to such
methods and scope which was developed under Erie is premised upon that
case's basic concept of lack of federal judicial competence in the pertinent area.
Therefore, it is not necessarily applicable where local law is adopted as the
discretionary federal choice in an area of undoubted competence.
1042
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IV
ABSORPTION OF STATE PERIODS
Even after Justice Frankfurter freed the federal courts to
fashion specialized federal common law, the courts generally con-
tinued to absorb state time bars. Only for good reason will courts
depart from the state period. Although the present practice, was
born out of the Court's misinterpretation of the RDA, strong
reasons support the continued existence of this framework.
A. Presumption to Absorb State Periods
Three pragmatic justifications support the presumption to ab-
sorb state limitations periods. The practice (1) promotes local ex-
perimentation; (2) avoids undermining the substantive policies of
the states; and (3) eliminates the difficult task of analyzing the
implications of each new rule in all fifty states. 140 Factors espe-
Mishkin, supra note 91, at 802-03 (footnotes omitted). Professor Hart agreed:
In an accurate analysis, it seems, state law cannot be said to operate of its
own force in such situations. The case is rather one in which "the state law has
been absorbed, as it were, as the governing federal rule"-a rule which "does
not owe its authority to the law-making agencies of" any state, but is "ultimately
attributable to the Constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States." But
there is illumination, again, in the fact that Congress should choose to make the
reference, by absorption or otherwise.
For every instance in which Congress has made the choice expressly there
are dozens in which it has left it uncertain. In such cases the Court has come to
recognize, with increasing candor in recent years, its duty to make the choice in
Congress' behalf. "In absence of an applicable Act of Congress," in the blunt
language of Justice Douglas, "it is for the federal courts to fashion the govern-
ing rule of law according to their own standards." Again and again the Court
has found "reasons which ... make state law ... the appropriate federal rule"
in matters which beyond doubt are basically federal. Thus state law has been
applied in determining whether a judgment for the United States in an action
to recover taxes illegally exacted from an Indian should include interest. And
when Congress creates a new statutory right of action for the recovery of dam-
ages but fails to specify any period of limitations, the inference has seemed
irresistible that some limitation must have been intended and, in default of any
federal measure, the Court has turned to state law.
Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 529-30 (1954)
(footnotes omitted). See Hill, supra note 1, at 1042.
140 Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1512, 1517-19 (1969). See HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 79, at 470-71 ("Federal legislation, on the whole, has been conceived
and drafted on an ad hoc basis to accomplish limited objectives. It builds upon legal rela-
tionships established by the states, altering or supplanting them only so far as necessary for
the special purpose."); Hart, supra note 139, at 490 ("the existence of varied facilities, pro-
viding alternative means of working out by common action, through various groupings of
interest, solutions of problems which cannot be settled unilaterally, appears as an enrich-
ment of equipment for successful social life."); Mishkin, supra note 91, at 803-04 (1957)
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cially relevant to time bars also favor the presumptive absorption
of state statutes of limitations. For example, the very arbitrariness
of statutes of limitations argues against judicial rulemaking. 14 1 It
is better left to the legislatures; whenever judges engage in this
type of line-drawing, a chorus of criticism generally follows.
4 2
Finally, there is arguably a congressional preference, albeit implied,
to absorb state time periods. Legislative omission of a limitations
period does not imply that Congress intended the right to endure
indefinitely, 43 and absorption of state law is a reasonable means
of filling gaps left by Congress.144  Although it is plausible that
("there may be situations where state la;v is chosen only because of special difficulty in the
judicial framing of a definite federal rule in a specific issue in an area otherwise totally
national").
Similarly, three situations stand as general exceptions to the presumption: (1) where
the controversy is between two states, or affecting foreign ambassadors; (2) where there is
explicit or implicit congressional authorization to create uniform rules, rather than absorb
state law; and (3) where the courts must formulate remedies for federal duties. Note, supra,
at 1519-26. For a discussion of the first exception, see Note, supra note 8, 69 YALE L.J.
1428, at 1431-32. For an example of the second exception, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2175
(1976) (empowering Supreme Court to promulgate procedural rules).
One commentator argues that fixing time bars when Congress has been silent falls
under the third exception of judicial formulation of federal remedies. Note, supra, 82
HARV. L. REV., at 1524. The better approach, however, favors a presumption to absorb
state law. Statutes of limitations should not fall under any of the three exceptions to the
general rule of absorption. Time bars do not pit equal sovereignties against each other, nor
is there evidence that "Congress considered whether [courts should create a uniform rule],
and reached a meaningful conclusion that [they] should." Id. at 1523. The only remaining
exception is also inapplicable. Although statutes of limitations are remedial (Campbell v.
Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 618 (1895)), precedent and practicality prevent them from falling
under the "formulation of remedies" exception. See notes 141-46 and accompanying text
infra.
141 See, e.g., Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1961)
(Friendly, J.) ("selection of a period of years [is] not ... the kind of thing judges do");
Note, supra note 8, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 68, at 75 (limitation period is arbitrary measure
traditionally and justifiably left to legislature).
142 The reactions to the Rule Against Perpetuities is an example. See, e.g., Lucas v.
Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 591-93, 364 P.2d 685, 690, 16 Cal. Rptr. 821, 826 (1961) (attorney
not liable in malpractice for drafting instrument which violated rule because of overtechni-
cality of rule); C. DONAHUE, T. KAUPER & P. MARTIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY
691 (1974) (calling the rule a "technical morass"); Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending
the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 HARV. L. REV. 721, 722 (1952).
143 See note 84 supra.
144 In Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966), the Court absorbed state
law for regulating the dealings between private parties in an oil and gas lease under the
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. Justice Harlan pointed out that "[e]ven where there is related
federal legislation in an area .... it must be remembered that 'Congress acts ... against the
background of the total corpus juris of the states .. ' " Id. at 68 (quoting H. HART & H.
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 435 (1953)). See Burks v.
Lasker, 411 U.S. 471, 478 (1979). See also Mishkin, supra note 91, at 810-11, 814; Hill, supra
note 1, at 1024 n.1.
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congressional silence may require courts to fashion rules, absorp-
tion is more reasonable and pragmatic. 145 Moreover, recent case
law strongly supports presumptive absorption. 46
B. Preemptive Limits on Absorption of State Periods
Despite these policies supporting absorption of state periods,
the presumption is defeasible. Federal courts have refused to
adopt state periods if (1) the state statute would provide an un-
duly short limitations period that would impermissibly undermine
a federal right, or (2) the state statute would discriminate against
a federal right by providing a longer limitations period for an
analogous state right. 47  These two preemption concepts derive
from the supremacy clause.' 48  The federal courts will not permit
145 On the surface, it is more reasonable to suppose that Congress intended a missing
element to be filled by a known rather than an unknown. Congress cannot anticipate what
time period a court will find reasonable, but can easily examine, and approve, existing state
provisions. See Note, The Federal Common Law, supra note 140, at 1519 (relative order and
clarity of law in state courts compared to uncertain and unpredictable common law rule
applied in federal court). Further, through time, this interpretation's persuasiveness gradu-
ally increases: once courts begin to apply state statutes of limitations, continued congres-
sional silence indicates at least tacit approval of the absorption process.
From another perspective, legislative decisions are more directly produced by the
democratic process than are judicial decisions. The elected state legislator is inherently in
closer contact with the population than the appointed federal judiciary. See Roberts v.
Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450, 458 (3d Cir. 1979) (concurring opinion, Sloviter, J.)
("It is a task uniquely suited to a legislative body which, although it may sometimes make
an arbitrary decision, is ultimately answerable to its constituency."). But see Note, supra note
8, 68 COLUm. L. REV. 763, at 771. Furthermore, the factfinding capabilities of a legislative
body are far superior to those of the courts. As a result, legislatures are better qualified to
discern and account for local practices and procedures, which are necessary factors in
choosing reasonable time periods within which suit must be brought. See S. REP. No. 619,
84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-6, reprinted in [1955] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2328, 2331-32
(discussing method of selecting limitations period for antitrust actions). Case law has not
justified absorption on this ground, however.
146 See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977) (presumption to
absorb state limitation period in Title VII action); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160,
179-82 (1976) (Civil Rights Act of 1866); UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696,
701-05 (1966) (§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act); O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233
U.S. 318, 322 (1914) (Civil Rights Act of 1871). This is not to suggest that absorption will,
in fact, occur. See, e.g., Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977) ("the
Court has not mechanically applied a state statute of limitations simply because a limita-
tions period is absent from the federal statute"). But see Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe
Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 397 (1906) (civil suit under Sherman Antitrust
Act); Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 614-18 (1895) (Patent Act). For a discussion on
the proper interpretation of Campbell, Chattanooga, and O'Sullivan, see notes 94-115 and
accompanying text supra.
"" Van Horn v. Lukhard, 392 F. Supp. 384, 389-91 (E.D. Va. 1975).
148 U.S. CONsT. art. VI, para. 2. Technically, the supremacy clause only preempts state
laws which, ex proprio vigore, interfere with federal interests. Of course, absorbed state time
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state laws to conflict with federal interests; if such a conflict arises,
the offending state law must yield.
1. Burdensome Limitations Periods
In Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, (EEOC), 149 the EEOC °50 brought an action in federal
court' m charging Occidental with discriminatory employment
practices that allegedly violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.52 The EEOC's investigation of the claim and its efforts
periods do not operate of their own force. See notes 66-139 and accompanying text supra.
However, the analysis is essentially the same; a federal court will only absorb state periods
that do not conflict with federal rights. Thus, it is helpful to use preemption language in
analyzing the absorption process; courts will only absorb state time bars up to a point of
preemption.
This Project uses the term "burdensome state period" to describe a statute that pre-
scribes a period so short that applying it would emasculate the federal claim, thus violating
the supremacy clause. For example, a statute providing a period of two hours would bur-
den the federal right because almost no litigants would be able to file actions within this
time limit. This Project also employs the term "discriminatory state period" to describe a
period that treats similar state and federal claims differently, but that is not always so short
that it destroys the federal claim. For example, a statute allowing six years for a federal
civil rights cause of action, but eight years for the state counterpart, would be discrimina-
tory; although this statute treats the federal and state claims differently, it accords ample
time to both. However, courts should presume that such discriminatory statutes, absent
sufficient justifications, are also burdensome, and hence preempted under the supremacy
clause.
For a discussion of preemption, see D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS 887 (2d ed. 1975);
Monaghan, supra note 1, at 12. For cases holding that discriminatory state statutes violate
the supremacy clause, see Caldwell v. Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co., 161 F.2d 83,
86 (5th Cir. 1947); Republic Pictures Corp. v. Kappler, 151 F.2d 543, 546-47 (8th Cir.
1945), aff'd per curiam, 327 U.S. 757 (1946); Wolf Sales Co. v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 105
F. Supp. 506, 508 (D. Colo. 1952).
Some courts have invoked the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment tojustify their refusal to absorb discriminatory state periods, reasoning that litigants making
claims under federal law should not be treated differently than litigants making claims
under state law. See Republic Pictures v. Kappler, 151 F.2d 543, 547 (8th Cir. 1945), aff'd
per curiam, 327 U.S. 757 (1946) (relying on both the supremacy clause and the equal pro-
tection clause); Van Horn v. Lukhard, 392 F. Supp. 384, 391 (E.D. Va. 1975). For a criti-
cism of the use of the equal protection clause to analyze state statutes of limitations which
allegedly "discriminate" against federal claims, see Note, supra note 75, at 135-36.
"-9 432 U.S. 355 (1977).
150 The EEOC is responsible for the administration of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4
(1976).
151 The 1972 amendments to Title VII granted the EEOC power to commence an en-
forcement action in federal court if, after 30 days following the filing of a charge with the
EEOC, the EEOC has been unable to obtain a conciliation agreement. 42 U.S.C. k 2000e-
5(f)(1) (1976).
152 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 to 2000e-17 (1976). In Occidental Life, a female employee alleged
that her employer denied her benefits provided to male employees, and that her employ-
ment had been terminated because of her pregnancy, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
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to obtain voluntary compliance before filing suit consumed three
years. 53 The district court applied a one-year statute of limita-
tions'54 and barred the action. The Supreme Court reversed:155
[T]he one-year statute of limitations applied by the District
Court in this case could under some circumstances directly con-
flict with the timetable for administrative action expressly estab-
lished in the 1972 Act.
But even in cases involving no inevitable and direct conflict
with the express time periods provided in the Act, absorption
of state limitations would be inconsistent with the congressional
intent underlying the enactment of the 1972 amendments.156
The Court noted that "[s]tate legislatures do not devise their limi-
tations periods with national interests in mind, and it is the duty
of the federal courts to assure that the importation of state law
will not frustrate or interfere with the implementation of national
policies."' 1 7  Congress required Title VII plaintiffs to exhaust
administrative remedies to encourage voluntary compliance and
conciliation. Particularly in light of the EEOC's large case load,
subjecting these federal rights to the "vagaries of diverse state
limitations statutes"' 58 would constitute more interference with
(1976). EEOC v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1298 (M.D. Cal. 1974),
rev'd, 535 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 432 U.S. 355 (1977).
'-3 432 U.S. at 358.
154 The district court applied CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE ANN. § 340(3) (West Supp. 1980),
a general statute of limitations covering, among other things, an action to recover for libel,
slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, seduction and wrongful death.
"' The Supreme Court rejected § 706f(l), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1976), as an
appropriate limitations period. This section provides:
If a charge filed with the Commission ... is dismissed by the Commission, or if
within one hundred and eighty days from the filing of such charge ... the
Commission has not filed a civil action under this section ... or the Commis-
sion has not entered into a conciliation agreement to which the person ag-
grieved is a party, the Commission ... shall so notify the person aggrieved and
within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought
against the respondent named in the charge (A) by the person claiming to be
aggrieved or (B) if such charge was filed by a member of the Commission, by
any person whom the charge alleges was aggrieved by the alleged unlawful
employment practice.
Id. If the Court interpreted this section as a limitations period for Title VII, the EEOC's
action would have been barred because it failed to commence the action within 180 days of
the complainant's filing of the charge. The Court, however, stated that § 706f(1) provides
only that a private right of action does not arise until 180 days after a charge has been
filed, and imposes no time constraint upon EEOC enforcement powers. 432 U.S. at 366.
156 432 U.S. at 368-69 (footnote omitted).
157 Id. at 367.
158 Id. at 368-71.
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this congressional policy than the Court would allow. The Court
refused to absorb the state statute of limitations and stated that
any state time bar would impermissibly burden the federal right.
Consequently, it fashioned a federal common law rule seemingly
establishing an unlimited period for Title VII suits.
Occidental Life is an extreme example of preemption analysis;
ordinarily, courts do not reject every possible analogous state
period. 159 Instead, they scrutinize state statutes for impermissible
burdens upon the assertion of federal rights. If a court finds one
statute burdensome, it will usually search for an analogous state
statutory period.' 60 Indeed, the courts have rarely found that
state statutes impose impermissible burdens, probably out of de-
ference to state legislatures.' 6 ' Additionally, although Erie and
the RDA no longer have compelling force in this area, they exert
a gravitational pull. Unless absorption would clearly burden fed-
' See Ashland Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co., 567 F.2d 984 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1977).
Considering whether to apply a state statute of limitation to an action brought under the
Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973 (EPAA), 15 U.S.C. § 754(a)(1) (1976), the
court inquired whether borrowing a state time period would conflict with the strong na-
tional policy embodied in the EPAA. The conclusion it reached, however, differed from
the conclusion the Court reached in Occidental Life. The Court stated: "There is no sugges-
tion whatever in the statutory structure undergirding the claims before us that Congress
intended no limitation provisions to apply or that state statutes of limitations should not be
looked to in accordance with the general rule in the absence of express federal provision."
Id. at 989.
" 0 For example, in Van Horn v. Lukhard, 392 F. Supp. 384, 389-90 (E.D. Va. 1975),
the court rejected Virginia's one-year statute of limitations, although explicitly applicable to
§ 1983 actions, because it impermissibly burdened the assertion of federal rights. But the
court absorbed the state's two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, implicitly
finding that it comported with federal policies.
161 See Note, supra note 140, 82 HARV. L. REV. at 1512, at 1524 ("[Alnalogous state
statutes of limitations may be followed since the choice of an arbitrary cutoff lirre is a
discretionary act more appropriate for legislatures than for courts"); note 145 supra.
In Caldwell v. Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co., 161 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1947)
(applying state period to action under Fair Labor Standards Act), the court said:
The lawmaking body is the primary judge as to what is a reasonable time limi-
tation for the bringing of actions, and courts will not inquire into the wisdom of
a legislative decision establishing a period of limitation unless the time allowed
is so manifestly insufficient as to amount to a denial of justice.
Id. at 85 (citations omitted). The court in Smith v. Cudahy Packing Co., 73 F. Supp. 141
(D. Minn. 1947), displayed a similar attitude:
The Minnesota legislature is primarily the judge of what constitutes a reasona-
ble period of limitation for the commencement of actions under circumstances
here existing, and the wisdom of that law-making body in so doing will not be
questioned by the Court unless the time allowed is so inadequate as to deny
justice.
Id. at 143 (citations omitted).
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eral interests, courts should absorb state periods that provide a
reasonable time within which plaintiffs can assert federal
claims. 162
2. Discriminatory Limitations Periods
Even if a state limitations period is not unreasonably short,
federal courts will refuse to absorb it if it discriminates against
federal rights. 16 3  In ascertaining whether a state period is dis-
criminatory, courts focus on whether the state statute provides a
shorter limitations period for a federal right than for a similar
state right.' 64  Exclusive application to federal claims is one indi-
cation of discrimination, but standing alone, it generally does not
constitute a fatal defect; the crucial inquiry is whether the statute
that applies only to federal claims provides a shorter period for
federal claims than for analogous state claims. 165
162 See Chambers v. Omaha Pub. School Dist., 536 F.2d 222, 230 (8th Cir. 1976);
Caldwell v. Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co., 161 F.2d 83, 85 (5th Cir. 1947); Peter-
son v. Parsons, 73 F. Supp. 840, 846 (D. Minn. 1947); Smith v. Cudah', 73 F. Supp. 141,
143 (D. Minn. 1947); Warnick v. Bethlelem-Fairfield Shipyard, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 857, 867
(D. Md. 1946).
63 One of the harbingers of this discrimination doctrine is Campbell v. Haverhill, 155
U.S. 610 (1895) (dicta). Campbell suggested that non-adoption based on a discrimination
rule would be appropriate for "statutes ... discriminating against causes of action enforce-
able only in the Federal courts." Id. at 615. Courts have cited it as precedent for the
discrimination principle. Rockton & Rion Ry. v. Davis, 159 F.2d 291, 293 (4th Cir. 1946);
Van Horn v. Lukhard, 392 F. Supp. 385, 389 (E.D. Va. 1975); Wolf Sales Co. v. Rudolph
Wurlitzer Co., 105 F. Supp. 506, 508 (D. Col. 1952). Campbell, however, is not convincing
authority on this point. The Court relied upon the mandate of the Rules of Decision Act,
28 U.S.C. § 725 (1976), yet imported a discretionary element into the statute. For a critique
of Campbell, see notes 106-26 and accompanying text supra.
164 A discriminatory state period may also impermissibly burden the federal right. In
Van Horn v. Lukhard, 392 F. Supp. 384 (E.D. Va. 1975), for example, the court found the
Virginia limitations period applicable to § 1983 actions "unconstitutional because it both
burdens the assertion of a federally created right of substantial importance and because it
effects an invidious and unwarranted discrimination against assertion of the 'constitutional
tort.' " Id. at 389. See id. at 389-91.
165 See, e.g., Johnson v. Davis, 582 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1978); Van Horn v. Lukhard, 392
F. Supp. 384 (E.D. Va. 1975). See also Warnick v. Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard, Inc., 68 F.
Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1946). Some language in'Rockton & Rion Ry. v. Davis, 159 F.2d 291
(4th Cir. 1946), intimates that exclusive application to federal claims might, without more,
constitute unlawful discrimination. The Davis court said "a statute of limitations of a State
is unconstitutional when the statute is directed exclusively at claims arising under a federal
law. And particularly is this true when the State statute of limitations is discriminatory in its
effect in favor of State claims and against federal claims." Id. at 293. Cf J. ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST 84 (1980) (arguing courts should protect the interests of minorities by "tying
their interests to those of groups that [do) possess political power.") Most courts, however,
have insisted on discriminatory periods before refusing to absorb state periods. See text
accompanying notes 166-74 infra.
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Several illustrative cases1 66 involve a 1973 amendment to a
Virginia statute of limitations barring civil rights actions under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 brought more than one year after they had ac-
crued.16 7 In Van Horn v. Lukhard, 168 the district court clearly
noted the federal policy of presumptive-not compulsory-
absorption of state statutes of limitations.169  However, the court
observed that prior to the enactment of the amendment, the
Fourth Circuit had held Virginia's two-year period for personal
injury actions applied to a section 1983 claim.1 70  Thus, a clear
case of discrimination confronted the Van Horn court: the Vir-
ginia amendment afforded plaintiffs with claims under section
1983 only one year, while the state provided a two-year period for
plaintiffs with analogous claims under state law. Consequently, the
Van Horn court refused to absorb the discriminatory one-year
period established by the Virginia amendment.'1
7
In contrast, federal courts have absorbed a Tennessee statute
of limitations172 explicitly applicable to federal civil rights ac-
166 Johnson v. Davis, 582 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1978); Brady v. Sowers, 453 F. Supp. 52
(W.D. Va. 1978); Brown v. Blake & Bane, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Va. 1976); Van
Horn v. Lukhard, 392 F. Supp. 384 (E.D. Va. 1975); Edgerton v. Puckett, 391 F. Supp.
463 (W.D. Va. 1975).
167 VA. CODE ANN. § 8-24 (1976).
168 392 F. Supp. 384 (E.D. Va. 1975).
169 The court, quoting Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946), noted that
applying state limitations periods to federal rights was a "remedial detail where Congress
has not spoken but left matters for judicial determination within the general framework of
familiar legal principles." 392 F. Supp. at 389. The Van Horn court also observed that when
filling the interstices of federal rights of actions "federal courts for reasons of economy and
federalism will often refer to the great corpus of state law." Id. at 388-89. See text accom-
panying notes 125-39 supra.
170 Almond v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1972).
1 Other courts faced with such discriminatory schemes have reached similar results. In
Caldwell v. Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co., 161 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1947), the Fifth
Circuit considered a one-year state statute of limitations intended to govern actions
brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Because Congress failed to enact a statute of
limitations for the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, wage and hour claims brought under
the federal act in the absence of such a specifically applicable state period would have been
governed by an analogous three-year state period for claims on an implied employment
contract and a six-year limitation for claims under an express employment contract. Be-
cause the specifically applicable state statute provided a much shorter period for FLSA
claims, the Fifth Circuit found it discriminatory and refused to allow its application to bar
plaintiff's claims. For additional cases, see Rockton & Rion Ry. v. Davis, 159 F.2d 291 (4th
Cir. 1946); Republic Pictures v. Kappler, 151 F.2d 543 (8th Cir. 1945), aff'd per curiam, 327
U.S. 757 (1946). Cf Chambers v. Omaha Pub. School Dist., 536 F.2d 222, 229 (8th Cir.
1976) (Nebraska statute applicable to "[aIll actions upon a liability created by a federal
statute" not discriminatory; plaintiffs claims had no state law counterpart to afford a basis
for comparison.).
172 TE N. CODE ANN. § 28-304 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1979).
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tions. 173  The statute provides a one-year period for federal civil
rights claims, as did the Virginia statute, but the courts have ab-
sorbed it because it also applies to a wide variety of similar state-
created tort actions.17
4
Although the courts have never fully explained the rationale
underlying the discrimination principle, its origins lie in M'Culloch
v. Maryland.175 There, the Court invalidated a state tax on the
operations of all banks not chartered by the state when the only
such bank was the Bank of the United States. 176  Although Chief
Justice Marshall's opinion relied on notions of sovereignty and in-
tergovernmental immunity, dictum at the end of the opinion
suggests that the Constitution would permit the state to impose a
nondiscriminatory tax:
This opinion ... does not extend to a tax paid by the real
property of the bank, in common with the other real property
within the State, nor to a tax imposed on the interest which the
citizens of Maryland may hold in this institution, in common
with other property of the same description throughout the
state.
177
Although dictum, it rests on sound political theory. Because the
federal government cannot protect its interests by participating in
a state's political process, only the supremacy clause prevents
states from treating federal interests more harshly than state in-
terests.17 8  However, the political process is an effective safeguard
173 Johnson v. REA, 489 F.2d 525, 529 (6th Cir. 1973), aff'd, 421 U.S. 454 (1975) (Ten-
nessee one-year, period for civil rights-claims applied to bar § 1981 action); Harrison v.
Wright, 457 F.2d 793 (6th Cir. 1972) (actions under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3) barred by
Tennessee one-year period); Williams v. Hollins, 428 F.2d 1221 (6th Cir. 1970) (Tennessee
one-year period barred action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Beckum v. Tennessee Hotel, 341
F. Supp. 991 (W.D. Tenn. 1971).
174 In fact, prior to 1969, the statute applied only to general tort actions. See TENN.
CODE ANN. § 28-304 (Bobbs-Merrill 1955). In 1969, the Tennessee legislature amended the
statute to cover claims arising under the federal civil rights -statutes. See 1969 TENN. PUB.
AcTs 43-44; Gentry v. Evans, 310 F. Supp. 840, 841 (E.D. Tenn. 1969) (mem.).
275 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
176 The petitioner's brief stated, "this tax is leveled exclusively at the branch of the Un-
ited States Bank established in Maryland. There is, in point of fact, a branch of no other
bank within that state, and there can legally be no other." 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 392.
177 Id. at 424.
17M The dictum still applies today. In United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452
(1977), for example, the Court relied heavily on the M'Culloch language. The'issue was
whether California could tax the possessory interests of federal employees in housing
owned and supplied to them by the federal government. The United States argued that
the federal employees occupied these houses solely to discharge their duties, and main-
tained that M'Culloch forbade the tax because it was levied on federal property. Id. at 457.
10511980] TIME BARS
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:1011
against burdens imposed by nondiscriminatory state laws: a state
is not likely to emasculate rights of its creation. 179  Professor Ely
employed this rationale to explain why Justice Marshall suggested
that a nondiscriminatory tax on the real property of the Bank
might be valid:
The unity of interest with all Maryland property owners as-
sured by this insistence on equal treatment would protect the
Bank from serious disablement by taxes of this sort. The power
to tax real or personal property is potentially the power to de-
stroy. But people aren't lemmings and while they may agree to
disadvantage themselves somewhat in the service of some over-
riding social good, they aren't in the habit of destroying them-
selves en masse.180
The Court, however, disagreed: "the economic burden on a federal function of a state tax
imposed on those who deal with the Federal Government does not render the tax uncon-
stitutional so long as the tax is imposed equally on the other similarly situated constituents
of the State." Id. at 462. Because the Court found the federal employees were "no worse
off under California tax laws than those who work for private employers and rent houses
in the private sector," it held the tax nondiscriminatory and therefore valid. Id. at 465. See
Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939) (sustaining nondiscriminatory tax
on income of federal employees). But see United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174,
177 (1944) (indicating that properties, functions and instrumentalities of the federal gov-
ernment are immune from state taxation in any form). The Fresno Court referred to Al-
legheny County as the "single arguable departure" from the principle that nondiscriminatory
taxes, the legal incidence of which did not fall on the federal government, were constitu-
tional. 429 U.S. at 462. However, in one case the Supreme Court harmonized Allegheny
County with the general rule by finding that the tax involved fell on the federal "property
itself, not on the privilege of using or possessing it." United States v. Detroit, 355 U.S. 466,
471 (1958).
The M'Culloch dictum, however, has not survived intact. Cases have found an absolute
immunity, regardless of nondiscrinination, where states "impose taxes directly on the Fed-
eral Government, . . . [or where] the legal incidence of [the tax] falls on the Federal Gov-
ernment." United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. at 459 (footnote omitted). See
United States v. Tax Comm'n of Mississippi, 421 U.S. 599, 610 (1975); First Agricultural
Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'r, 392 U.S. 339, 347 (1968); Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scur-
lock, 347 U.S. 110, 122 (1954).
The distinction between legal incidence, which invokes absolute immunity, and mere
economic incidence is not clear. Courts continue to confront this issue "on a case by case
basis." United States v. New Mexico, 581 F.2d. 803, 806 (10th Cir. 1978). See, United States
v. Maryland, 471 F. Supp. 1030, 1036 (D. Md. 1979); Note, Federal Immuniy From State
Taxation: A Reassessment, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 695 (1978).
179 Some would differ with this logic. In M'Culloch, the petitioner urged the Court not to
adopt a discrimination analysis to test the validity of the tax: "A criterion which has been
proposed, is to see whether the tax has been laid, impartially, upon the State banks, as well
as the Bank of the United States. Even this is an unsafe test; for the state governments may
wish, and intend, to destroy their own banks." 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 392.
181 j. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 85 (1980) (emphasis in original). See also J.
CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 205-06 (1980).
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The discrimination branch of preemption thus serves a prophylac-
tic function, affording the beneficiary of a federal right protection
against burdensome state laws.
Other Supreme Court decisions illustrate this prophylactic
function. In McKnett v. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry., s18 the Court
struck down a state law that denied state courts jurisdiction over
federally-created claims arising in another state, but permitted
state courts to hear similar state-created actions. The Court simply
stated: "The plaintiff is cast out because he is suing to enforce a
federal act. A state may not discriminate against rights under fed-
eral laws."' 2  In Testa v. Katt 183 the Court was faced with a simi-
lar problem. The Rhode Island Supreme Court had held that the
state courts lacked jurisdiction over an action seeking treble dam-
ages under the Emergency Price Control Act *of 1942 because
Rhode Island refused to enforce the "penal" statutes of another
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, citing McKnett, reversed because
"this same type of claim arising under Rhode Island law would be
enforced by that State's courts."'' 8 4
There is a strong relationship between these discrimination
cases and the problem of absorbing state statutes of limitations. As
a general rule, federal courts should refuse to absorb state statutes
which provide longer periods for analogous state claims. Even if
the period for federal claims appears "reasonable," a court should
not apply it unless the benefited party can clearly demonstrate
that the period for the federal right is reasonable and the state
action merits the extra time. The danger of burdening the asser-
tion of federal rights posed by discriminatory limitations periods
justifies such a stiff rule.
Courts might adopt a per se rule against absorbing dis-
criminatory state time bars without allowing the state to show a
justification for the discrimination. The opportunity has not
arisen, apparently because most state time periods that discrimi-
nate against federal rights do so arbitrarily. A situation could be
imagined, however, where the state action legitimately required a
longer period. For example, a state might impose a one-year stat-
181 292 U.S. 230 (1934).
182 Id. at 234. In Republic Pictures v. Kappler, 327 U.S. 757 (1946) (per curiam), the
Court, citing McKnett, struck down a state statute of limitations providing a six-month limi-
tations period for actions arising under federal statutes, and a five-year period for similar
actions arising under state law.
283 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
"84 Id. at 394.
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ute of limitations on certain federal claims, and grant a two-year
period for analogous state claims, because plaintiffs with state law
claims must first pursue their grievances through administrative
channels, a requirement not imposed on plaintiffs with federal
claims. Arguably, courts should absorb the one-year period im-
posed by this hypothetical statute; there is really no "discrimina-
tion" against federal claimants because the administrative exhaus-
tion requirement imposed on state law claimants accounts for the
one-year difference in limitations periods.
Thus, where there is a substantial justification for an appar-
ently discriminatory scheme, the federal courts should absorb the
state period. The Fourth Circuit recently hinted that it would
adopt such an approach. In Johnson v. Davis, 185 the court refused
to absorb a state statute providing a one-year period for section
1983 actions because the state afforded a two-year period for
analogous state claims. The court stated, "absent some ... reasonable
basis for applying a shorter period for remedying a 'constitutional
tort' than for remedying the underlying state tort, we will disre-
gard this special limitation on section 1983 actions."'186
The two-part preemption analysis is relatively easy for courts
to apply. Courts must first inquire whether a state limitations
period is so short that it burdens the assertion of federal rights. If
it does, that is the end of the matter-the period cannot be ab-
sorbed. If it does not, the court must consider whether the statute
discriminates against federal rights, and if so, whether the
rationale for the discrimination is sufficiently compelling.
The judicial compulsion to absorb non-burdensome and
non-discriminatory state time periods does not extend to the full
panoply of state limitations law. The treatment of the ancillary
doctrines associated with statutes of limitations, to which this Proj-
ect now turns, is not so fixed by stare decisis as to be calcified.
Hence, the presumptive-as opposed to compulsory -application
115 582 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1978).
186 Id. at 1319 (emphasis added). The court did consider whether a possible reasonable
basis could be found for distinguishing between § 1983 actions and personal injury actions
in light of the general purposes of statutes of limitations. The court inquired whether a
§ 1983 claim was likely to become stale earlier than a personal injury action, and whether
the facts to be proved or the evidence to be considered differed for the two types of actions.
Finding no differences, the court refused to absorb the discriminatory one year period.
Arguably, the Johnson court was too lenient with the standard it set for the state
period. Courts should require a strong justification for state time periods that discriminate
against federal rights. An explanation -even if reasonable-for a discriminatory scheme
may not be sufficient to protect federal interests.
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of state limitations law frees courts to choose among the ancillary
doctrines and absorb only those that best effectuate federal
policies.
V
PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW: SUBSIDIARY ISSUES
With few exceptions, 8 7 federal courts have steadfastly re-
fused to deviate from the well-established practice of presump-
tively absorbing state limitations periods. 1 88  However, they are
less hesitant to create uniform federal rules governing subsidiary
issues related to the process of applying state statutes of limita-
tions, such as tolling, characterization of the cause of action and
definition of the time of accrual.' 8 9 Although courts engage in a
187 See, e.g., Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977) (refusing to apply
any state statute of limitations, holding federal policy requiring plaintiff to exhaust ad-
ministrative remedies before bringing suit inconsistent with imposition of an absolute state
period of limitations); McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958) (refusing
to apply two-year state limitations period in action for unseaworthiness because it would
vitiate plaintiff's right to sue under the three-year federal limitations period applicable to
Jones Act claims). In Public Adm'r v. Angela Compania Naviesa, S.A., 592 F.2d 58, 64 n.4
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 928 (1979), the court explicitly refused to follow McAllister
because of intervening Supreme Court decisions.
188 See, e.g., UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1965) (refusing to create
federal limitations period for claims arising under § 301 of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act). Despite inconsistency among the federal courts in choosing an appropriate limi-
tations period for claims arising under the National Labor Relations Act, the Court refused
to engage in "so bald a form of judicial innovation" as devising a uniform federal period of
limitations. Id. at 701. The Court acknowledged the importance of uniform administration
of the federal labor laws, but dismissed the argument for uniformity on the ground that
the need for uniformity is compelling only when its "absence [threatens] the smooth func-
tioning of [the] consensual processes" that Congress intended federal labor law to promote.
Id. at 702. Because these processes have broken down by the time a case comes to trial, the
Court implied that the need for uniformity was academic at best. Id.
However, Justice White, joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan, dissented, asserting
that congressional "silence on the limitations matter" did not mean that Congress intended
the federal courts to adopt diverse state laws. Id. at 710. Rather, Justice White argued that
formulation of a uniform time period for Labor Management Relations Act claims "repre-
sents only another task in [the] process" of developing the law of labor contracts with
which the Court was entrusted. Id. He noted that "there is no sense or justice in referring
to 50 or more different statutes of limitations," thus treating employees and employers
bound by the same labor contract differently, depending on the state in which suit was
brought. Id. at 712. Second, he noted the complex administrative problems plaguing lower
court determinations of what state period to apply. Id. at 712-13. These complexities,
which the "fertile imagination of counsel" would exacerbate, would prolong litigation. Id. at
713. Finally, drawing an analogy to judicial creation of the common law doctrine of pre-
scription, which presumes that judgments are paid after 20 years, be rejected the Court's
reluctance to fashion a uniform federal limitations period. Id.
189 See, e.g., Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 821 (1961). Unlike the Court in UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696
1056 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:1011
similar preemption analysis with respect to these subsidiary is-
sues, 190 the practical threshold level of federal interests necessary
(1965), the Second Circuit in Moviecolor found uniformity a persuasive reason for adopting
a uniform federal tolling doctrine in cases at law arising under the Clayton Act. The court
acknowledged that the federal interest in uniformity did not suffice to override the pre-
sumptive absorption of state statutes of limitation, because Congress presumably would
have written a uniform federal limitations period for antitrust'actions (as it did in 1955)
were the interest strong. 288 F.2d at 84. However, it did find the inconsistencies among
federal courts as to the applicable law on the subsidiary issue of tolling compelling:
Plainly Congress did not deem complete nation-wide uniformity of limitation
essential in such cases, else it would have provided its own period, as for the
subject with which we are here concerned, it now has done, 15 U.S.C.A. § 15b.
But we still must endeavor to determine whether, on the narrower issue of the
effect of the wrongdoer's concealment, Congress would have preferred unifor-
mity among the federal courts with respect to the right it had created, a un-
iformity favorable to recoveries by plaintiffs, or uniformity as between the
treatment of this right in federal courts and of rights of a related conceptual
character in the courts of the state where the federal court sits.
Id. (emphasis added). The court reasoned that federal interests in uniform administration
of rights, over which federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction, and in prolonging the
period of suit during the concealment of the wrongful act by the defendant "transcend
those of the states." Id. Thus, the Second Circuit in Moviecolr refused to absorb the forum
state's tolling law and applied the fraudulent concealment doctrine which Holmberg v.
Armrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946), had introduced into federal suits at equity.
See also Miller v. Smith, 615 F.2d 1037, 1042 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that in civil
rights suit, court may ignore state rule tolling limitations period during imprisonment un-
less prisoner first proves lack or access to'federal courts while imprisoned); Newman v.
Prior, 518 F.2d 97, 100 (4th Cir. 1975) (federal law determines time of accrual in action
under § 10b of Securities & Exchange Act of 1934); Mizell v. North Broward Hosp. Dist.,
427 F.2d 468, 475 (5th Cir. 1970) (lower court's dismissal of civil rights claims on ground
complaint time barred remanded for consideration of whether federal policies required
tolling during pendency of related state claims in state court); Banana Distribs., Inc. v.
United Fruit Co., 269 F.2d 790, 794 (2d Cir. 1959) (in antitrust claim that accrued before
effective date of federal statute of limitations, court refused to absorb state law tolling
statute where defendant absent from state, because federal service of process rules made
defendant amenable to process while outside state); Pesola v. Inland Tool & Mfg., Inc., 423
F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (strong federal interest in private resolution of labor dis-
putes under § 301 of Labor Management Relations Act required federal tolling rule during
pendency of internal union procedures; despite tolling, claim time-barred); Layne v. Inter-
national Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 418 F. Supp. 964, 965-66 (D.S.C. 1976) (federal law de-
termines whether action under §§ 411 and 412 of LMRDA survives death of litigants). Cf
Mishkin, supra note 91, at 804-05:
the question of how much [state law will be absorbed is] ... a matter to be
determined by the exercise of federal discretion. The main point here is that a
decision to apply state law as a matter of federal incorporation does not neces-
sarily carry with it the obligation to adhere to the range and techniques which
have been held to govern under E rie; there remains a freedom, after decision
to incorporate local law, to control the extent and methods of that adoption
which is not present when a determination has been made that state law will
apply because the court has no competence to do otherwise....
Most pervasive, perhaps, is the principle that a decision to apply state law
as a matter of federal judicial incorporation may frequently be made as to a
single issue at a time.
190 See Monaghan, supra note 1, at 12; notes 73-139 and accompanying text supra.
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to justify fashioning federal common law is lower than for the
initial decision to absorb a state period. 9a
Several subsidiary issues demand attention: (1) what body of
law controls the characterization of federal rights; (2) what factors
courts evaluate when characterizing that right; (3) what state law
analogues courts ultimately choose; (4) when applicable state
periods toll; (5) when federal rights accrue, survive, and revive;
and (6) which state's statute controls when the cause of action
does not arise in the forum state. In many of these areas, differ-
ing treatment of litigants, uncertainty, and judicial inefficiency
compel judicial creation of uniform federal rules. In others, the
problems associated with absorption of state law are not suffi-
ciently pressing to justify deviation from state law. The objective
of this selective absorption of state law and creation of federal law
is to promote predictable time periods.
A. Characterization of the Federal Cause of Action
1. What Law Controls
Before a federal court can apply a state limitations period, it
must choose the most analogous state cause of action. This pro-
cess of analogy requires the court to determine the essential
character of the federal claim. The federal right may resemble a
tort, breach of contract, or some other state-created cause of ac-
tion.
Circuit courts have split over whether state or federal law
governs the characterization process.' 92  In UAW v. Hoosier Cardi-
nal Corp., 193 the Court ruled that the characterization quIestion, at
least in cases arising under the National Labor Relations Act, "is
191 See Note, supra note 8, 53 COLUm. L. REv. 68, at 71-72:
These related issues, such as when a cause of action accrues, need not be de-
cided in accordance with state law despite the fact that it is a state statute which
has fixed the period of limitation. The failure of a federal statute to provide a
limitation period is difficult to remedy by judicial action, but the courts are well
situated to write federal law on the subsidiary issues involved in the limitation
of actions.
Cf C. WRIGHT, supra note 4, at 288 (court has "greater flexibility ... when state law is
absorbed, as compared to the Erie-type situations where it is controlling of its own force").
192 Although courts disagree whether state or federal law determines the essential nature
of a cause of action, all agree that once a court chooses an analogy, state law governs
interpretation of the state statute of limitations. See, e.g., Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187,
189 (9th Cir. 1962); Ware v. Colonial Provision Co., 458 F. Supp. 1193, 1194 (D. Mass.
1978)
193 383 U.S. 696 (1975).
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ultimately a question of federal law," but that "there is no reason
to reject" a state characterization that is not unreasonable or in-
consistent with federal policy.1 94 Although it upheld the district
court's characterization of the plaintiff's federal claims according
to state law, the Court did not require courts to adopt state
characterizations of federal rights; the words "there is no reason
to reject" do not mean that "a court must apply" state law. Thus
UAW left the lower courts free to apply federal law if federal in-
terests so require. By refusing to establish a uniform federal
characterization' 9 5 and deferring to the lower courts' case-by-case
evaluations of national interest, UAW contributed little consistency
or predictability. 196  The circuit courts continue to look both to
federal and state law in characterizing the essential nature of the
claim.
194 Id. at 706.
195 Cases arising under § 15 of the Sherman Antitrust Act before Congress attached a
limitations period to it in 1955 (Act of July 7, 1955, Ch. 283, § 1, 69 Stat. 283, currently
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1976)), exemplify the inconsistency that use of the state and
federal approaches of characterization produces. The issue in the antitrust cases was
whether an antitrust claim for treble damages was compensatory or punitive. Both the state
and federal approach cases cited Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta,
203 U.S. 390 (1906), to support their method of characterization. Compare Hoskins Coal &
Dock Corp. v. Truax Traer Coal Co., 191 F.2d 912, 914 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 947 (1952) (adopting state approach on the ground that Chattanooga meant only that
the general federal statute of limitations for penalties and forfeitures did not apply to
antitrust treble damage claims, not that state penalty periods were also inapplicable), with
Fulton v. Loew's, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 676, 682 (D. Kan. 1953) (adopting federal approach
on ground that Chattanooga meant that an antitrust suit for treble damages was necessarily
compensatory because the Chattanooga Court did not analogize to the federal penalty
period).
The rationale of the federal approach cases was that state law should not exert a
"formative influence on federal substantive law" in a "field divorced from state regulation."
Electric Theater Co. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 113 F. Supp. 937, 941 (W.D.
Mo. 1953). The antitrust claim was a "purely federal cause of action" over which the fed-
eral courts had exclusive jurisdiction. Id. The court in Electric also cited the benefits of
uniformity of characterization to support its adoption of the federal approach. Id. at 942.
The Second Circuit echoed this reasoning in adopting, as a matter of federal common law,
the fraudulent concealment tolling doctrine in antitrust suits. See Moviecolor Ltd. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 821 (1961).
196 UAW involved claims against an employer arising under § 301 of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1976) [hereinafter cited as LMRA]. Cases
dealing with other sections of the labor act or other federal statutes without limitations
periods can thus distinguish UAW; courts can argue that federal interests surrounding
other national rights, unlike those underlying § 301, do require reference to federal prece-
dent when a court determines the essential nature of a cause of action. Thus, UAW is not
controlling outside § 301. Further, courts can circumvent UAW by finding that the state
characterization is unreasonable or inconsistent with federal policy. See text accompanying
note 194 supra. Finally, the federal courts do not consistently follow UAW even in § 301
cases. See, e.g., DeArroya v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packing, 425 F.2d 281, 283 (Ist
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970) (stating UAW required absorption of a state statute of
limitation but left open question of which statute); notes 230-31 infra.
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Cases arising under the Civil Rights Acts exhibit the most sig-
nificant disparity in the characterization process. Several circuits,
often citing UAW, have decided that characterization is a matter of
federal law; the Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits characterize claims arising under the Reconstruction Era
civil rights statutes' 97 according to federal law.' 98  These "federal
approach"'199 circuits usually attempt to choose the analogy that
best effectuates the federal policies underlying the federal statut-
ory right.20 0 Exemplary of the "federal approach" is Shouse v.
Pierce County, 20' a Ninth Circuit case brought under section 1983.
197 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985(3) (1976).
198 Second Circuit: See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Martin, 478 F.2d 520, 526-27 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 872 (1973) (citing only to federal precedent in determining that analogous
period for § 1983 claim is that for a "liability created by statute"); Swan v. Board of Higher
Educ., 319 F.2d 56, 60 (2d Cir. 1963).
Fourth Circuit: See, e.g., Johnson v. Davis, 582 F.2d 1316, 1318-19 (4th Cir. 1978)
(citing a federal precedent in deciding that two-year period for "personal injuries" most
analogous for § 1983 claim); Almond v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200, 203-04 (4th Cir. 1972) (citing
federal precedent in applying state personal injuries period to § 1983 claim).
Sixth Circuit: See, e.g., Mason v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 517 F.2d 520, 521-22 (6th Cir.
1975) (no reference to state law in characterizing § 1981 claim as having no common law
analogue; applied period for "liability created by statute").
Seventh Circuit: Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331, 334-38 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
438 U.S. 907 (1978) (court looked exclusively to federal precedent in characterizing § 1981
claim as "fundamentally different" from a common law tort and applying statutory liability
period).
Ninth Circuit: Donovan v. Reinbold, 433 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1970) ("Congress has
not evinced any intention to defer to the states the definition of the federal right created in
section 1983"; statutory liability period most analogous); Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187,
189 (9th Cir. 1962) (federal court "determines for itself the nature of the right conferred
by the federal statute"; statutory liability period applied to § 1983 claim).
Tenth Circuit: Zuniga v. Amfac Foods, Inc., 580 F.2d 380, 383 (10th Cir. 1978) ("the
characterization of this [§ 1981] action for the purpose of selecting the appropriate state
limitations provision is ultimately a question of federal law"; contract period most analo-
gous) (quoting UAW, 383 U.S. at 705).
19 The phrase "federal approach" does not connote a consistent methodology; rather, it
connotes a failure to use state law. A federal court may conduct a de novo inquiry into the
nature of the federal right, or it may simply rely on federal precedent for the appropriate
characterization without discussing the rationale or origin of the precedent. This precedent
itself may or may not use a "state approach." In such cases, it may be difficult to determine
why the court felt compelled to use a certain characterization; i.e., which law required it to
do so. If a court looks solely to federal precedent, for all practical purposes its approach is
federal, because it is actually determining what a federal, not state, court would do. See,
e.g., Johnson v. Davis, 582 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1978); Mason v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 517
F.2d 520 (6th Cir. 1975); Rosenberg v. Martin, 478 F.2d 520 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
872 (1973).
200 See, e.g., Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331, 334-38 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438
U.S. 907 (1978) (§ 1981 claim); Donovan v. Reinbold, 433 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1970)
(§ 1983 claim). Effectuation of federal policy is a notion implicit in the policy of absorbing
state law; absorption could not occur if a state period seriously impaired the policy under-
lying a statutory right. See notes 165-79 and accompanying text supra.
201 559 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1977).
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The Shouse court stated that a federal court "determines for itself
the nature of the right conferred- by the federal statute." 02  It
noted that the effectuation of federal interests guides the process
of characterization and that a federal court must choose the state
period that is "sufficiently generous ... to preserve the remedial
spirit of the federal civil rights actions." 203
Some circuits exhibit great inconsistency in their approaches
to characterization. These courts look both to federal and state
law when the), characterize, or use language that suggests a state
approach, yet apply federal characterizations. For example, 204 the
Third Circuit applies both state and federal law in the characteri-
zation process. In Wilson v. Sharon Steel Corp.,205 a racial discrimi-
nation suit under section 1981, the court held that the "limitation
to be applied is that which would be applicable in the courts of
the state in which the federal court is sitting had an action seeking
similar relief been brought under state law." 206 The court re-
manded the case to the district court for a determination of the
applicable period, directing it to examine authority in Pennsyl-
202 Id. at 1146 n.5 (quoting Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187, 189 (9th Cir. 1962)).
203 Id. at 1146. Examining federal precedent and the federal interests at stake, the court
found that the most analogous state limitations period would be one for "liability created
by statute." Because the forum had no such period, the court applied the "catch-all"
period. Id. at 1146-47. Those cases that apply the "statutory liability" or "catch-all" periods
do not appear to characterize the federal right at all; finding no analogue in the state's
common or statutory law, these courts adopt the statutory liability periods almost by de-
fault. However, these "federal approach" courts must still analyze the essential nature of
the federal cause of action-as a matter of federal law-to determine that no state law
equivalent exists and that a "catch-all" or "statutory liability" period is appropriate.
Circuits choosing to apply these periods to Civil Rights Act claims, thus circumventing
a case-by-case process of analyzing the particular facts underlying a claim, include: the
Second Circuit, see, e.g., Keyse v. California Texas Oil Corp., 590 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1978)
(three-year statutory liability period for § 1981 claim); Rosenberg v. Martin, 478 F.2d 520
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 872 (1973) (six-year "statutory liability" period applied to
§ 1983 claim), the Seventh Circuit, see, e.g., Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978) (five-year "statutory liability" period applied to §
1981 claim); Baker v. F & F Inv. Co., 420 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821
(1970) (five year "catch-all" period applied to § 1982 action), and the Ninth Circuit, see,
e.g., Donovan v. Reinbold, 433 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1970) (three-year "catch-all" period
applied to § 1983 claim); Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1962) (three-year
statutory liability" period applied to § 1983 claim).
204 The inconsistency within individual circuits is the product both of confusion as to
what the federal interests underlying a particular right require and lack of congeniality
among circuit panels. Panels sitting in different states frequently disagree on the state
cause of action most analogous to the same federal claim. See notes 287-94 and accompany-
ing text infra. See generally Note, supra note 148, at 126-31.
205 549 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1977).
206 Id. at 280.
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vania state law on the question of the essential nature of the sec-
tion 1981 claim.2 0 7 Other Third Circuit decisions have also
adopted the state approach in adjudicating Civil Rights Act
claims.2 0 8  By contrast, the Third Circuit has in other cases re-
ferred primarily to federal law to characterize a federal right.20 9
For example, the court in Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Owner-
ship Ass'n.21° looked predominantly to federal precedent and re-
lied on its own de novo-and, by definition, federal-findings as
to the nature of the plaintiff's section 1982 claim.211  The court
justified its analogy to a state tort cause of action on federal policy
grounds,212 a common practice in "pure" federal approach cases.
On the other hand, the court also used language indicative of a
"state" approach and cited state precedents.213
Like the Third Circuit, the First Circuit is also erratic in liti-
gation arising under the Civil Rights Act. For example, in Walden
III, Inc. v. Rhode Island,2 14 the court applied a three-year tort
period to a section 1983 action. It signalled its adoption of the
state approach by stating that plaintiff's "alleged injuries are
properly construed as personal injuries under Rhode Island
law. '215  Yet, in Ware v. Colonial Provision Co. 216 a federal district
207 Id.
208 See, e.g., Jennings v. Shuman, 567 F.2d 1213 (3d Cir. 1977). In characterizing the
nature of §§ 1983 and 1985 claims alleging a conspiracy to bring false criminal charges
against the plaintiff under color of state law, the court inJennings held that "federal courts
must ascertain the underlying cause of action under state law and apply the limitation
period which the state would apply if the action had been brought in state court." Id. at
1216. The court then considered Pennsylvania state cases to determine whether plaintiff's
federal claim sounded in the tort of malicious abuse of process, or the tort of malicious use
of process. Id. at 1216-19. See also Ammlung v. City of Chester, 494 F.2d 811, 814 (3d Cir.
1974) (fragmenting civil rights claim into three analogies and looking to state law to deter-
mine what claim did not sound in).
209 See, e.g., Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450, 458-59 (3d Cir. 1979) (con-
curring opinion, Sloviter, J.) (emphasis in original):
[oince the federal court determines that there is more than one state statute of
limitations which it can borrow, the selection of the one most appropriate to use
must be made by considerations which comport with federal policy. The state
policy of repose is relevant only if, and to the extent to which, it is consistent
with the underlying federal claim.... It is important to recognize, therefore,
that it is federal law and federal policy which is paramount, and if the federal
policy leads to the state law, it is done as an application of a federal choice of
law.
210 559 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1977).
211 Id. at 901-02.
212 Id. at 903 n.26. However, the court did not base its holding on policy grounds.
213 Id. at 902-03.
214 576 F.2d 945 (1st Cir. 1978).
215 Id. at 947.
216 458 F. Supp. 1193 (D. Mass. 1978).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
court sitting in Massachusetts applied a two-year tort period to a
section 1981 claim, but held that federal law "governs the ques-
tion" of "what is the nature of a § 1981 action." 217 In Partin v. St.
Johnsbury Co.,2 18 the district court acknowledged the uncertainty in
the First Circuit about what law governs the process of characteri-
zation: "[i]t is unclear whether, in adopting the analogous state
statute of limitations, a federal court must also look to whether
state law would characterize the federal action as ex contractu or ex
delicto .... ",219
Only the Fifth Circuit looks exclusively to state law to charac-
terize federal civil rights claims. In two recent cases, Shaw v.
McCorkle 220 and Ingram v. Steven Robert Corp.,221 the Fifth Circuit
dispelled all doubts that it regarded state law as controlling, de-
spite previous Fifth Circuit opinions holding the contrary. 222  The
Fifth Circuit noted that its earlier cases required "determination
based on federal law of the 'essential nature' of the federal
claim," 223 but emphasized that this line of cases had nonetheless
gone on to apply state law characterizations. The court stated that
"references to federal law ... in this line tend to be of little im-
port. Federal interests are thus generally subordinated to a
mechanical application of state law." 224 Finding that even the os-
tensibly federal approach cases in the Fifth Circuit "depend sub-
stantially on state law in categorizing the essential nature of the
claim," 225 the court unequivocally adopted a state approach: "how
would a [state] court categorize this action or an action seeking
similar relief?" 226
The circuits have also inconsistently characterized claims aris-
ing under the Labor Management Relations Act 227 and the Labor
17 Id. at 1194. See also Holden v. Boston Hous. Auth., 400 F. Supp. 399 (D. Mass. 1975)
(two-year tort period applied to § 1983 claim).
218 447 F. Supp. 1297 (D.R.I. 1978) (§ 1981 claim).
219 Id. at 1301 n.3. The court failed to resolve the uncertainty because the state and
federal characterizations were identical on the facts before the court. Id.
220 537 F.2d 1289 (5th Cir. 1976) (§§ 1983 and 1985 claims).
221 547 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1977) (§§ 1981 and 1983 claims).
222 Ingram v. Steven Robert Corp., 547 F.2d 1260, 1261 (5th Cir. 1977); Shaw v.
McCorkle, 537 F.2d 1289, 1292-93 (5th Cir. 1976).
223 537 F.2d at 1292 (emphasis in original); 547 F.2d at 126. See, e.g., McGuire v. Baker,
421 F.2d 895, 898 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 820 (1970); Beard v. Stephens, 372 F.2d
685, 688 (5th Cir. 1967). It is virtually impossible to tell what, if any, approach these cases
took. Their importance lies in Shaw's and Ingram's rejection of any suggestion of a federal
approach.
224 547 F.2d at 1261.
225 537 F.2d at 1293.
226 Id.
227 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1976).
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Management Reporting and Disclosure Act.22 8  For example, the
Fifth Circuit has clearly adopted the state approach,229 while the
Seventh and Eighth Circuits have adopted a hybrid approach in
labor cases. 230  The other circuits employ a federal approach in
cases arising under the national labor acts.2 31 Circuits have taken
more consistent approaches when characterizing claims arising
228 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976) [hereinafter cited as LMRDA].
229 As with other Fifth Circuit cases, see note 223 supra, it is difficult to tell what ap-
proach the Fifth Circuit thought it took. It actually applied state law. See, e.g., Sewell v.
Grand Lodge of the Int'l Ass'n of Mach. & Aero. Workers, 445 F.2d 545, 549 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1024 (1972) (applying Alabama law to determine nature of
claim of wrongful discharge from employment under 29 U.S.C. §§ 411(a)(1), (2) (1976));
Dantagnan v. I.L.A. Local 1418, 496 F.2d 400, 403 (5th Cir. 1974) (referring to Louisiana
law to determine if claim under 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(3) (1976) to recover illegally collected
union dues was ex contracto or ex delicto).
2"0 Two cases in the Eighth Circuit dealing with LMRA § 301, Butler v. Local Union
823, 514 F.2d 442 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975), and Sandobal v. Armour &
Co., 429 F.2d 249 (8th Cir. 1970), indicate a split in the circuit over characterization. Un-
dertaking a de novo classification of the plaintiff's federal claim, the Butler court held that
it had to choose a period that best promotes federal interests. 514 F.2d at 446. Giving
superficial recognition to UAW, the court stated that "[w]hen a plaintiff siles on a federal
cause of action, the character of the action-e.g., whether it is one in 'tort' or in
'contract'-is a federal question." Id. In contrast, the court in Sandobal characterized plain-
tiff's § 301 claim according to Nebraska law. 429 F.2d at 252-54. The Sandobal court was
uncertain whether jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship or on § 301 of the
LMRDA. Id. at 251. Nonetheless, the court decided that, on either basis, it had to choose
the analogy that a state court would choose.
The Seventh Circuit has also applied both state and federal approaches in labor cases.
In Grant v. Mulvihill Bros. Motor Serv., Inc., 428 F. Supp. 45 (N.D. Ill. 1976), the court
held that it could best effectuate federal labor policy by characterizing, as a matter of
federal law, a suit seeking relief under § 301 against plaintiff's employer and union as
sounding in contract. Id. at 47. In contrast, the court in Mikelson v. Wisconsin Bridge &
Iron Co., 359 F. Supp. 444 (W.D. Wis. 1973), adopted a state characterization of a similar
suit; the court held the state's characterization was not binding, but adopted it nonetheless
"in the interest of uniformity." Id. at 447. The court did not explain whether it sought to
promote uniformity among federal courts or between the state and federal system.
231 First Circuit: See, e.g., DeArroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packing, 425 F.2d
281 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970) (looking exclusively to federal precedent for
LMRA § 301 claim); Second Circuit: See, e.g., Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d 1234,
1251-52 (2d Cir. 1970), cert denied, 401 U.S. 1009 (1971) (action under LMRA § 301 and
LMRDA § 102; "it is for the federal court to consider the character of the claim involved,
and give effect to the nature and purpose of the federal act from which the claim derives
and to the federal objectives pursued"); Fourth Circuit: See, e.g., Howard v. Aluminum
Workers' Int'l Union, 589 F.2d 771 (4th Cir. 1978) (LMRA § 9 and LMRDA § 101; exclu-
sive reference to federal precedent); Coleman v. Kroger Co., 399 F. Supp. 724, 729 (W.D.
Va. 1975) (looking exclusively to federal precedent; "characterization [of LMRA § 301
claim] ... is a matter of federal law"); Sixth Circuit: See, e.g., Pesola v. Inland Tool & Mfg.,
Inc., 423 F. Supp. 30, 33 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (looking exclusively to federal precedent;
"[f]ederal law determines which state statute is the most appropriate [for LMRA § 301
claim]); Ninth Circuit: See, e.g., Price v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 586 F.2d 750, 752 (9th
Cir. 1978) (looking exclusively to federal precedent; "[cIharacterization [of 45 U.S.C. § 152
(Railway Labor Act)] is a federal question").
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under other federal statutes. With the exception of the Ninth Cir-
cuit,232 courts considering claims brought under section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,233 and SEC Rule lOb-5 234
promulgated thereunder, uniformly follow a federal ap-
proach.235 Courts that have heard claims for damages implied
under the Constitution have unanimously adopted the federal ap-
proach.236 Finally, courts adhere to the federal approach 37 in
cases arising under section 9(b) of the Military Selective Service
Act 238 of 1967.239
Courts generally fail to provide adequate justification for
their adoption of either the federal or the state approach. Several
circuits following the federal approach mechanically cite UAW,
stating merely that characterization is "ultimately a federal ques-
tion," without analyzing the federal interests that justify the de-
parture from the presumptive absorption of state law classifica-
In cases arising under the national labor acts courts following the "federal approach"
generally do not explain why they choose to characterize according to federal law and
deviate from UAW's presumptive application of state law characterizations. Courts refer to
federal precedent or perform de novo categorization of the federal right without citing the
federal interests that have overridden the presumptive absorption of state characteriza-
tions. Most "federal approach" courts simply focus on the court's statement in UAW that
"characterization ... is ultimately a question of federal law." UAW, 383 U.S. at 706. See,
e.g., Price v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 586 F.2d 750, 752 (9th Cir. 1978); Coleman v.
Kroger Co., 399 F. Supp. 724, 729 (W.D. Va. 1975).
232 Compare Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 635 (9th Cir. 1953) (analyzing Washington
state law to decide that liability for fraud under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does
not arise "upon a statute"), with Douglass v. Glenn E. Hinton Inv., Inc., 440 F.2d 912,
915-16 (9th Cir. 1971) (relying exclusively upon federal objectives underlying the statute
and federal interests in uniformity).
233 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1934 Act].
234 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979).
235 See note 272 infra.
236 See note 271 infra.
237 Although the circuits seem largely consistent in their method of characterizing these
federal causes of action, individual circuits lack internal consistency in characterizing
different federal rights. For example, the Fifth Circuit has employed the state approach in
adjudicating claims arising under the Civil Rights Acts, see notes 220-26 and accompanying
text supra, but uses a federal approach in analogizing 1934 Act claims and claims under the
Military Selective Service Act, 45 U.S.C. § 459 (b) (1972) [hereinafter cited as MSSA] (re-
pealed 1974 and substantially recodified under 38 U.S.C.A. § 2021(a) (1979)). See notes
272 & 273 infra. The Third Circuit has often used a state approach in civil rights litigation,
see notes 205-208 and accompanying text supra, but uses an exclusively federal approach in
1934 Act cases. See note 272 infra. Finally, the First Circuit has adopted a hybrid approach
in civil rights cases, see notes 214-19 and accompanying text supra, but has chosen not to do
so for labor cases. See note 272 infra.
238 45 U.S.C. § 459(b) (1972) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 93-508 and substantially re-
codified under 38 U.S.C.A. § 2021(a) (1979)).
... See note 273 infra.
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tions of federal rights.24 ° Most courts fail to offer any rationale
for their choices.241
To an idealist envisioning uniform federal law, the inconsis-
tency in, and often complete lack of, methods and rationales for
the question of what law governs characterization is distressing.
But even though inconsistency alone may provide insufficient im-
petus for change,242 the uncertainty produced by inconsistency
should concern both the idealist and the pragmatist. Not only do
the circuits take different approaches in characterizing federal
rights, but courts within the same circuit alternate unpredictably
between state and federal approaches both in analyzing different
federal rights and in examining the same federal claim in differ-
ent cases. The unpredictability that pervades the characterization
process impairs the ability of federal litigants to know before trial
what state time period the court will apply. Because it deprives
both plaintiff243 and defendant of adequate notice of how long
claims remain viable, this uncertainty contravenes both the policy
of giving plaintiff every reasonable opportunity to bring an action
and the remedial, notice-giving function of time bars. Uniform
reliance on federal law24 4 to characterize federal claims would
240 See Zuniga v. Amfac Foods, Inc., 580 F.2d 380, 383 (10th Cir. 1978) (§ 1981 claim);
Cox v. Stanton, 381 F. Supp. 349, 352 (E.D.N.C. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 529 F.2d 47
(4th Cir. 1975) (§ 1983 claim). In Ingram v. Steven Robert Corp., 547 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir.
1977), the Fifth Circuit did offer reasons for its presumptive application of state law. It
asserted that a state statute of limitations does not impair federal interests because it does
not abrogate a federal plaintiff's right to sue, but only regulates the time in which he may
exercise the right. Thus, "[i]f federal interests are affected, they are not so severely re-
stricted when the state limitations provision applies that we need fear the definition of
those interests in state terms .... Id. at 1262. The court's conclusion that federal interests
do not demand a uniform federal rule of characterization seems flawed. A uniform judicial
policy to look exclusively to federal law when characterizing would afford litigants greater
certainty concerning the type of analogy and length of period that the court would ulti-
mately chose. See notes 12-46 and accompanying text supra.
241 See, e.g., Brogan v. Wiggins School Dist., 588 F.2d 409 (10th Cir. 1978) (§ 1983);
Ammlung v. City of Chester, 494 F.2d 811 (3d Cir. 1974) (§ 1983); Bell v. Aerodex, 473
F.2d 869 (5th Cir. 1973) (MSSA § 459); Gray v. International Ass'n of Heat & Frost In-
sulators & Asbestos Workers, 416 F.2d 313 (6th Cir. 1969) (LMRA); Ware v. Colonial
Provisions Co., 458 F. Supp. 1193 (D. Mass. 1978) (§ 1981).
242 See Limitations Developments, supra note 12, at 1266-67 (inconsistency not a strong ar-
gument for national uniformity; variation in types and lengths of state limitations periods
does not significantly increase entropy within federal system).
24 See Ingram v. Steven Robert Corp., 547 F.2d 1260, 1263 (5th Cir. 1977) ("the uncer-
tainty about which limitations provision applies affords inadequate notice to potential plain-
tiffs").
244 Because characterization of a federal statutory right defines and limits the right, it
often requires evaluation of federal policy and congressional intent. See notes 246-73 and
accompanying text infra. Because federal courts are better able to discern and weigh na-
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promote certainty and would better comport with the proper
function of the federal courts.2 45
2. Factors Considered Once a Federal or State Approach is Chosen
After deciding whether to characterize the federal right ac-
cording to state or federal law, a court must determine what fac-
tors it will consider in choosing an analogous statute of limitations.
For example, the court might base its choice on the similarity of
the facts of the underlying transactions or the type of relief that
plaintiff requests. Alternatively, it might rely exclusively upon the
statutory or constitutional language and the abstract nature of the
rights and duties it creates. Finally, the court might consider how
each possible choice would effectuate federal interests. Not sur-
tional policy and are more likely to give full consideration to statutory purposes than are
state courts, characterization seems a proper federal function. See Note, supra note 191, at
71 (choice of analogous state statute "might well be said to contain a federal question-
characterization of the cause of action"); Note, supra note 140, 82 HARV. L. REV. at 1528;
cf. Donovan v. Reinhold, 433 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1970) ("Congress has not evinced any
intention to defer to the states the definition of the federal right created in section 1983").
Moreover, "[a]mple authority in analogous situations would support the application of fed-
eral law to classify the nature of [a] federal right." Note, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1458
(1952). For example, federal courts have chosen not to absorb state law in deciding
whether a claim survives a litigant's death and when a cause of action accrues because, like
characterization, such questions require interpretation of the nature of the federal statu-
tory right. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U.S. 96, 98 (1941) (accrual "is a federal question
and turns upon the construction of ... the applicable federal legislation"); Schreiber v.
Sharpless, 110 U.S. 76, 80 (1884) (survival "depends ... on the nature of the cause of
action"). But see Hill, supra note 75, at 99 (silence of Congress in not establishing limitations
period indicates that federal court should also absorb state law on subsidiary issues).
245 Uncertainty about the length and type of limitations periods applicable to federal
claims clearly provides sufficient reason for courts to look uniformly to federal law in
characterizing. Thus the rule set forth in UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696
(1965), requiring presumptive application of state law characterizations, demands reexami-
nation. Under UAW, a court may abandon this presumption when the state "characteriza-
tion is unreasonable or otherwise inconsistent with [the] policy [behind the statute in-
volved]." Id. at 706. The Court obviously was referring to state characterizations that bur-6
den or discriminate against federal rights. See notes 149-86 and accompanying text supra.
However, these traditional branches of preemption do not sufficiently protect federal in-
terests in this context.
If the RDA compels a federal court to absorb state law, only a direct conflict between
state law and federal statutory policies would justify a court's refusal to apply the former.
Justice White's dissent in UAW indicates that the court mistakenly assumed that the RDA
controlled on the issue of absorbing state law characterizations. See 383 U.S. at 709. This
error explains the majority's restrictive description of when a federal court can deviate
from the absorption of state law to fill the interstices of federal law.
Because the RDA is inapplicable to federally-created rights, a federal court absorbs
state law only as a matter of choice. Moreover, federal courts can exercise discretion to
account for any factors that they consider relevant to the determination of whether to
absorb or abandon state law; creation of federal common law is a free-form balancing
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prisingly, circuits employ all of these approaches, applying differ-
ent approaches to different federal causes of action and often ap-
plying inconsistent approaches to the same federal right.24 6  In
choosing factors, as in deciding what law governs characterization,
courts do not satisfactorily explain the reasons-if any-that
guide their choices.
Cases arising under the Civil Rights Acts exemplify the ab-
sence of uniform treatment. For example, the Tenth and Third
Circuits principally look to the factual allegations and relief re-
quested in plaintiff's complaint when analogizing the federal right
to a state cause of action. In Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Own-
ership Association,24 7 the Third Circuit examined defendant's con-
duct, plaintiff's alleged injuries and the relief requested in
analogizing a civil rights claim to a common law tort.248  The
court acknowledged that federal policy underlying the right jus-
tified its choice, but emphasized that the policy was "not a basis of
[its] decision."' 24 Similarly, the Tenth Circuit in Zuniga v. Amfac
process in which only stare decisis defines the boundaries of a court's discretion. Courts
have implicitly recognized the wide range of relevant factors. See, e.g., Johnson v. REA, 421
U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975) (considering interrelationship of state limitations rules in refusing
to create new federal tolling law); UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 712-13
(1966) (dissenting opinion, White, J.) (considering judicial efficiency and avoidance of
"litigation-creating complexities" sufficient justification for establishing uniform federal
characterization of suits under LMRA § 301); Williams v. Walsh, 558 F.2d 667, 674-76 (2d
Cir. 1977) (considering the "principles of federalism" and "the policy of repose which un-
derlies statutes of limitations" in determining whether to ignore state tolling law); Mizell v.
North Broward Hosp. Dist., 427 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1970) (considering concepts of
federalism in determining whether lower court should have tolled period applicable to
claims under §§ 1981, 1983, 1985). See also Mishkin, supra note 91, at 812 (determination
of whether to reject state law requires not only analysis of statutory policy, but "intro-
duces] an additional range of considerations having to do with the federal nature of the
Union.... Moreover, the choice of law issue involves examination of ... special factors not
generally important in the resolution of a direct substantive question"); Monaghan, supra
note 1, at 12 ("the cases are somewhat ad hoc-reflecting a crazy-quilt pattern of statutory,
constitutional, and pragmatic considerations"); Note, supra note 8, 69 YALE L.J. at 1438
("federal courts have come to rely upon increasingly less explicit legislative policies against
using state law, [and] the specific reasons for rejecting state law have tended to become
both obscure and unrelated to the issue in dispute. An example of this lack of clarity is the
frequent appeal to uniformity as a reason for rejecting state decisional rules.").
2146 See generally Annot., 45 A.L.R. FED. 548 (1979). A court's choice to apply state or
federal law when characterizing does not resolve which factors the court will consider in the
characterization process. For example, a court may decide to follow the characterization
that state law would impose, yet look only to the state's characterization of various factors
chosen as a matter of federal law.
247 559 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1977). Other cases in the Third Circuit looking to the factual
averments in the complaint include Jennings v. Shuman, 567 F.2d 1213, 1216-19 (3d Cir.
1977) and Ammlung v. City of Chester, 494 F.2d 811, 813-14 (3d Cir. 1974).
248 559 F.2d at 900-03.
249 Id. at 903 n.26.
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Foods, Inc.2 50 scrutinized the allegations in the complaint in deter-
mining that plaintiffs section 1981 claim of employment discrimi-
nation seeking re-employment and backpay resembled a "tortious
discriminatory [act] infringing contractual rights." 251
Several circuits have avoided application of inconsistent
periods-an inevitable product of case-by-case categorization of
facts and allegations-by looking solely to the nature of the fed-
eral right and the policies that support it.2 52  By analyzing the
bare statutory or constitutional language, the Second, Seventh and
Ninth Circuits have found state "catch-all" periods or periods for
"statutorily created liability" most analogous to federal civil rights
250 580 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1978).
251 Id. at 387.
22 A serious problem that occurs in circuits that look to the particular factual cir-
cumstances of each case is the fragmentation of a single federal right into several time
periods. For example, Jennings v. Shuman, 567 F.2d 1213 (3d Cir. 1977) and Ammlung v.
City of Chester, 494 F.2d 811 (3d Cir. 1974), involved actions under § 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act. Focusing on the particular factual allegations in the complaints, the court di-
vided the claim in each case into different common law analogues and applied different
time periods to different counts of the complaints. In Ammlung the court found that plain-
tiff's allegations sounded both in trespass and false arrest. Although plaintiff brought both
counts under § 1983, the court assigned a two-year period to the trespass count and a
one-year period to the false arrest claim. 494 F.2d at 813-14. Similarly, in Jennings the
court held that the facts underlying the action stated claims of both malicious use of proc-
ess and malicious abuse of process; the court barred the former claim, but not the latter.
467 F.2d at 1219. See also Williams v. Walsh, 558 F.2d 667, 670 (2d Cir. 1977) (dicta
suggesting that fragmentation of single § 1983 claim is appropriate); Chambers v. Omaha
Pub. School Dist., 536 F.2d 222, 227 (8th Cir. 1976) (fragmentation acceptable in "approp-
iate circumstances").
Even more common than the fragmentation of a single statutory cause of action is the
application of different state law analogues to claims arising under different sections of the
same statutory scheme-both when joined in the same suit and when litigated separately.
Beard v. Stephens, 372 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1967) is typical. The court applied a six-year
trespass period to plaintiff's § 1983 claim, but a one-year period for conspiracy to commit
a tortious act to plaintiff's § 1985 claim. Id. at 689-90. See also Green v. Ten Eyck, 572 F.2d
1233, 1237-39 (8th Cir. 1978) (three-year period for offense by public officer applied to
§ 1983 claim, but 180-day period for state discriminatory housing practices applied to
§§ 1981 and 1982 claims).
Surely Congress did not intend courts to multiply a single statutory cause of action or
different rights of action under one statutory scheme into several common law analogues,
thus establishing diverse limitations periods for actions under one federal statute. Frag-
mentation destroys the integrity of a unified body of law that Congress ostensibly intended
to be applied uniformly to different factual settings. For example, even if 42 U.S.C. § 1988
mandates the absorption of state law in civil rights actions (see note 138 and accompanying
text supra), it surely does not compel the splintering of the Civil Rights Act, the "overall
tenor [of which] ... is unitary even though the individual sections are aimed at particular
constitutional harms.... Suits under any one of these sections are founded upon depriva-
tion of the rights guaranteed by the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments." Note, supra
note 204, at 132. Moreover, congressional intent disfavoring fragmentation of federal legis-
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claims. 25 3  Because these circuits consider federal civil rights
claims fundamentally different from any preexisting common law
action, the lack of an analogy in state law for the federal rights
and duties created thus requires adoption of catch-all periods al-
most by default.254  These courts also emphasize the strong fed-
eral interests in uniformity and administrative efficiency. The
Seventh Circuit in Beard v. Robinson 255 asserted:
By following the ... approach of applying a uniform statute of
limitations, we avoid the often strained process of characteriz-
ing civil rights claims as common law torts, and the "[i]nconsis-
tency and confusion [that] would result if the single cause of
action created by Congress were fragmented in accordance with
analogies drawn to rights created by state law and the several
different periods of limitation applicable to each state-created
right were applied to the single federal cause of action." 256
The Fourth Circuit has also adopted a uniform approach-
but not by choosing a catch-all or statutory liability period. In-
stead, it restricts its examination to the nature of the federal right
and remedy established by the statutory languge. After focusing
on the language and history of section 1983, the court in Almond
v. Kent 257 concluded that "every cause of action under 1983 which
is well-founded results from 'personal injuries.' ",258 The Court
consequently applied the state's two-year statute of limitations
for personal injury actions. The court also noted, however, that
the nature of the 1983 right "depend[ed] on federal consid-
erations," 259 and the two-year statute of limitation would apply
lation is manifest in federal statutes which do have limitations periods; in such cases, one
period generally applies to all causes of action arising under an entire statutory scheme.
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1976) (single period for all antitrust claims); 35 U.S.C. § 286
(1976) (single period for all patent infringement claims). Several courts have implicitly rec-
ognized the significance of this problem, choosing to effectuate congressional intent by
refusing to use the fact approach in characterizing federal claims. See, e.g., Beard v. Robin-
son, 563 F.2d 331, 337 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 902 (1978) (uniform applica-
tion of statutory liability periods to all civil rights claims); Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187,
190 (9th Cir. 1962) (dictum suggesting application of statutory liability period to all civil
rights claims). But see Zuniga v. Amfac Foods, Inc., 580 F.2d 380, 383 (10th Cir. 1978)
(although possibly leading to fragmentation, fact approach preferable to single, uniform
period because "more in keeping" with teaching of UAW).
253 See note 198 supra.
254 See, e.g., Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331, 337 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S.
907 (1978) (§ 1981 claim); Donovan v. Reinbold, 433 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1970) (§ 1983
claim).
255 563 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978).
256 Id. at 337 (quoting Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187, 190 (9th Cir. 1962)).
27 459 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1972).
251 Id. at 204.
259 Id.
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"[e]ven if we [were to] conclude that a § 1983 action is not a suit
for 'personal injuries' within the Virginia concept of that type of
litigation." 260
The Fifth and Eighth Circuits have taken different ap-
proaches. Recent cases in both circuits apply the fact approach
and the uniform statutory-liability or catch-all approach to civil
rights claims.261 For example, in Glasscoe v. Howell262 the Eighth
Circuit held that either the catch-all or statutory liability period
applied to plaintiff's section 1983 claim.263 Examining the statu-
tory language, the court concluded that the right created by the
statute could not be "narrowly characterized as merely an action
for assault and battery," 264 and held that "section 1983 ... clearly
creates rights and imposes obligations different from any which
would exist at common law." 265 However, in Savage v. United
States,266 the same circuit looked solely at the factual allegations in
the complaint in deciding that a civil rights claim was most
analogous to a state cause of action for malicious prosecution. 267
The Eighth Circuit268 has repeatedly refused to resolve these con-
flicts in its approach. 69
260 Id.
26 See Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331, 337 n.7 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S.
907 (1978) (listing cases from Fifth and Eighth Circuits).
262 431 F.2d 863 (8th Cir. 1970) (claim alleging unnecessary use of violence in arrest by
police).
263 Id. at 865.
264 Id.
265 Id. (quoting Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187, 190 (9th Cir. 1962)).
266 450 F.2d 449 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1043 (1972).
261 Id. at 451-52. See also Johnson v. Dailey, 479 F.2d 86, 88 (8th Cir. 1973) (following
Savage).
26' The Fifth Circuit is similarly split. In Ingram v. Steven Robert Corp., 547 F.2d 1260
(5th Cir. 1977), the court focused on the relief plaintiff sought and "the circumstances of
[the] case," concluding that his rights under §§ 1981 and 1983 were analogous to a tort
cause of action under the forum state's law. Id. at 1263. Yet in Nevels v. Wilson, 423 F.2d
691 (5th Cir. 1970), the court applied a statutory liability period to a similar claim. See also
White v. Padgett, 475 F.2d 79, 85 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 861 (1973).
269 The Eighth Circuit has missed several opportunities to resolve the conflict. In Reed
v. Hutto, 486 F.2d 534 (8th Cir. 1973), the court declined because the applicable
limitations period would have been three years whether the court chose a statutory liability
period or one for negligence claims. In Chambers v. Omaha Pub. School Dist., 536 F.2d
222 (8th Cir. 1976), the court failed to resolve the inconsistency because the forum state
had enacted a statute expressly limiting federal statutory causes of action to three years,
obviating the need to analogize plaintiff's §§ 1981 and 1983 claims to common law equiva-
lents. In Clark v. Mann, 562 F.2d 1104 (8th Cir. 1977), the court again refused to resolve
the split. It held that the limitations period was three years, regardless of whether it fol-
lowed Glasscoe or Savage.
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The circuits have also taken inconsistent approaches in other
contexts. Cases arising under the national labor acts 270 and Bivens
suits for damages implied under the Constitution 271 reflect an ab-
sence of uniformity similar to that of the civil rights cases. In SEC
20 The following cases have taken a factual approach in analogizing labor claims: Dan-
tagnan v. L.L.A. Local 1418, 496 F.2d 400, 401-02 (5th Cir. 1974) (considered factual
averments in complaint and character of relief requested and absorbed 10-year quasi-
contract period for LMRDA § 101(a) (3) claim); Jones v. TWA, 495 F.2d 790, 799 (2d Cir.
1974) (considered remedy requested in determining six-year contract period applicable to
claim under § 6 of National Railway Labor Act); Sandobal v. Armour & Co., 429 F.2d 249,
252-56 (8th Cir. 1970) (considered facts and relief requested in holding written contract
period most analogous to claim under LMRA § 310).
The following cases have examined the rights created by the statutory language: How-
ard v. Aluminum Workers Int'l Union & Local 400, 589 F.2d 771, 773-74 (4th Cir. 1978)
(analyzed nature of statutory rights and duties and adopted tort-analogy for LMRA § 9,
personal injury analogy for LMRA § 101); Price v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 586 F.2d
750, 753 (9th Cir. 1978) (National Railway Labor Act § 2 imposing duties upon defendant
requiring application of three-year statutory liability period); De Arroyo v. Sindicato de
Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 287 (Ist Cir. 1970) (considering nature of plain-
tiff's statutory right to relief and union's duty in suit under LMRA § 301 and applying
one-year tort period); Pesola v. Inland Tool & Mfg., Inc., 423 F. Supp. 30, 33-34 (E.D.
Mich. 1976) (examining nature of statutory right and drawing tort analogy to LMRA
§ 301).
The following cases have analogized according to federal policy interests: Butler v.
Local 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442, 447-48 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
924 (1975) (federal labor policy dictating contract analogy for claims under LMRA § 301);
Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d 1234, 1251-53 (2d Cir. 1970) (weighing federal interest
in efficiency and uniformity and the policies underlying the national labor laws and apply-
ing six-year contract period to LMRA § 301 and LMRDA § 412); Grant v. Mulvihill Bros.
Motor Serv., Inc., 428 F. Supp. 45, 47-48 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (despite logical similarity of claim
to tort action, federal labor policy dispositive of period chosen for claim under LMRA
§ 301 and adopted contract analogy applied).
271 The following cases analogize claims for damages implied under the Constitution
according to a factual approach: Shifrin v. Wilson, 412 F. Supp. 1282, 1301-02 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (negligence period applied after a "close reading of plaintiff's complaint"); Felder v.
Daly, 403 F. Supp. 1324, 1326 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (intentional tort analogy drawn from
examination of complaint).
The following cases analogize according to federal interests, the nature of the right, or
both: Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331, 338 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 907
(1978) (unique nature of the federal constitutional right considered and federal interest in
treating members of same conspiracy alike requiied statutory liability analogy); Regan v.
Sullivan, 557 F.2d 300, 303-07 (2d Cir. 1977) (focusing on unique nature of the constitu-
tional right, which precludes analogy based on facts of case to common law claims, and
applying catch-all period to claim for damages under fourth, fifth, sixth, ninth, and four-
teenth amendments); De Malherbe v. International Union of Elevator Constructors, 449 F.
Supp. 1335, 1351 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (statutory liability period applicable to claim under fifth
amendment because of unique nature of constitutional right and federal interests in uni-
formity and judicial efficiency); Ervin v. Lanier, 404 F. Supp. 15, 20 (E.D.N.Y. 1975)
(three-year period for actions based on statutory liability held applicable, even though Bi-
vens suit is not such an action, because of federal interest in uniformly treating Bivens and
Civil Rights Act claims).
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1 Ob-5 actions272 and actions under the Military Selective Service
Act 273 however, courts exhibit consistent approaches. Just as for
characterization, inconsistency among and within circuits in fac-
tors considered when analogizing undermines the ability of parties
to determine with certainty the period applicable to the claims
they are litigating.
3. Analogies Adopted
The lack of uniformity in the characterization process-both
as to choice of law and method of analogizing- predictably pro-
duces divergence in the types274 of analogies courts draw. Cases
involving civil rights claims exemplify both inter- and intra-circuit
confusion. For example, the First Circuit analogizes section 1981
claims 275 to state tort causes of action. 276  The Second Circuit uni-
formly applies statutory liability periods to section 1981 claims. 277
The Tenth Circuit has analogized a section 1981 claim to a state
contract cause of action.278  Finally, in Green v. Ten Eyck, 279 the
Eighth Circuit found that plaintiff's section 1981 action was most
272 Courts considering 10b-5 actions analogize to best effectuate federal interests. See,
e.g., Forrestal Village, Inc. v. Graham, 551 F.2d 411, 413 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (analogy to local
blue sky law "best effectuates federal policy"); LaRosa Bldg. v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y, 542 F.2d 990, 992 (7th Cir. 1976) (local blue sky period adopted because of federal
policies of protecting the "uninformed, the ignorant, the gullible" and of increasing un-
iformity in federal courts' approach to limitations issues); Douglass v. Glenn E. Hinton
Invs., Inc., 440 F.2d 912, 914-15 (9th Cir. 1971) (policy of protecting federal plaintiff's
right to sue and interest in federal uniformity mandating three-year fraud period); Van-
derboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1240 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970) (com-
monality of purpose and effectuation of federal securities policy controlling in adoption of
local two-year securities period);. Charney v. Thomas, 372 F.2d 97, 100 (6th Cir. 1967)
(federal policy compelling fraud analogy because local blue sky law dissimilar to federal
securities law).
273 Courts analogizing under the MSSA use the fact approach. See, e.g., Bell v. Aerodex,
Inc., 473 F.2d 869, 872 (5th Cir. 1973) (looked exclusively to relief requested in MSSA § 9
suit in choosing period for restoration of wages); Marshall v. Chrysler Corp., 378 F. Supp.
94, 97-98 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (in MSSA § 9 suit looked to facts of underlying transaction
and to relief requested and chose personal injury analogy).
274 The courts also choose periods of different lengths, but this is an inevitable product
of the absorption process. However, federal courts can achieve uniformity as to the types of
analogies drawn.
272 See generally Note, Filing of an Employment Discrimination Charge under Title VII as Tol-
ling the Statute of Limitations Applicable to a 1981 Action: The Unanswered Questions of Johnson v.
REA, 26 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 889, 916-31 (1976).
276 Partin v. St. Johnsbury's Co., 447 F. Supp. 1297, 1301 (D.R.I. 1978); Ware v. Colo-
nial Provision Co., 458 F. Supp. 1193, 1196 (D. Mass. 1978).
277 See, e.g., Keyse v. California Tex. Oil Corp., 590 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1978).
278 Zuniga v. Amfac Foods, Inc., 580 F.2d 380, 386 (10th Cir. 1978).
279 572 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir. 1978).
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analogous to a state claim for discriminatory housing practices; it
remained viable for only 180 days. 2 0  Circuits adjudicating ac-
tions under sections 1983,281 1985(3),2 1982,283 SEC rule 10b-
5,284 the national labor acts 285 and the Military Selective Service
Act286 have also drawn differing analogies.
280 Id. at 1237 (looking to facts alleged).
281 See, e.g., Brogan v. Wiggins School Dist., 588 F.2d 409, 412 (10th Cir. 1978) (six-year
contract analogy); Walden III, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 576 F.2d 945, 946 (lst Cir. 1978)
(three-year tort analogy); Green v. Ten Eyck, 572 F.2d 1233, 1239 (8th Cir. 1978) (§ 1983
analogized to three-year period for derelict by one acting "in his official capacity"); Jen-
nings v. Shuman, 567 F.2d 1213, 1216-17 (3d Cir. 1977) (§ 1983 claim divided into one-
year malicious use of process and two-year malicious abuse of process analogies); Howell v.
Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272, 277 (3d Cir. 1972) (two-year personal injury analogy); Garner v.
Stephens, 460 F.2d 1144, 1145-48 (6th Cir. 1972) (five-year statutory liability period);
Beard v. Stephens, 372 F.2d 685, 688-90 (5th Cir. 1967) (six-year trespass period for
§ 1983); Wakat v. Harlib, 253 F.2d 59, 63-64 (7th Cir. 1958) (five-year catch-all period). See
also Note, Federal Borrowing of Arkansas Statutes of Limitations in Enforcement of the Reconstruc-
tion Civil .Rights Statutes, 31 ARK. L. REV. 692, 697-700 (1978); note 198 supra. See generally
Note, supra note 8, 1976 ARuz. ST. L.J. at 116-31.
282 See, e.g., Peterson v. Fink, 515 F.2d 815, 816 (8th Cir. 1975) (§ 1985(3) analogous to
unlawful conduct of public officers; three-year period applied); Crcsswhite v. Brown, 424
F.2d 495, 496 n.2 (10th Cir. 1970) (two-year period for "injury to the rights of another,
not arising on contract" applied to § 1985(3) claims); McGuire v. Baker, 421 F.2d 895,
898-99 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 820 (1970) (two-year period for action on a debt
applied to § 1985(3) claim); Jones v. Bombeck, 375 F.2d 737, 738 (3d Cir. 1967) (two-year
tort analogy applied to § 1985(3) claim) (alternate holding); Wakat v. Harlib, 253 F.2d 59,
63-64 (7th Cir. 1958) (five-year catch-all period applied to § 1983(5) claim). See generally
Note, supra note 281, 31 ARK. L. REV. at 697-700.
283 See, e.g., Green v. Ten Eyck, 572 F.2d 1233, 1237-38 (8th Cir. 1978) (180-day period
in Missouri Discriminatory Housing Practices Act most analogous to § 1982 claim); Meyers
v. Pennypack Woods Home Own. Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894, 900-01 (3d Cir. 1977) (six-year
period applicable to actions on a debt, contract or personal injury applied to § 1982 claim);
Baker v. F&F Inv., 420 F.2d 1191, 1198 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970) (five-
year catch-all period applied to § 1982 claim).
284 See note 275 supra. See generally Martin, Statutes of Limitations in 10b-5 Actions: Which
State Statute is Applicable?, 29 Bus. LAW. 443, 447-50 (1974); Raskin & Enyart, Which Statute
of Limitations in a lOb-5 Action?, 51 DENVER L.J. 301, 303-14 (1974); Note, Statutes of Limita-
tions in 10b-5 Actions, 39 U. Mo. K.C. L. REV. 283, 287-89 (1970-71).
2" For claims under LMRDA § 101, see, e.g., Howard v. Aluminum Workers Local 400,
589 F.2d 771, 774 (4th Cir. 1978) (two-year personal injury period applied to LMRDA
§ 101 claim); Dantagnan v. I.L.A. Local 1418, 496 F.2d 400, 401-03 (5th Cir. 1974) (ten-
year quasi-contract period); Sewell v. Grand Lodge of Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 445 F.2d
545, 549-50 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1024 (1972) (one-year tort period).
For claims under LMRA § 301, see, e.g., Butler v. Local 823, 514 F.2d 442, 446-48
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975) (five-year contract period applied to LMRA §
301 claim); De Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 286-87
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970) (one-year tort period); Pesola v. Inland Tool &
Mfg. Co., 423 F. Supp. 30, 33-34 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (three-year tort period); Carpenters &
Millwrights Health Benefit Trust Fund v. Domestic Insulation Co., 387 F. Supp. 144, 148
(D. Colo. 1975) (six-year contract period); Mikelson v. Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co., 359 F.
Supp. 444, 447 (W.D. Wis. 1973) (six-year contract period).
286 See Greathouse v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 381 F. Supp. 156, 163 (N.D. Ohio 1974)
(either oral contract or statutory liability period applicable to claim under MSSA § 9); see
also note 273 supra.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:1011
These intercircuit disparities reflect the confusion in this area
of the law. However, the widespread differences within circuits are
even more distressing. These conflicts undermine predictability
much more than do differences between circuits. For example,
the Sixth Circuit's analogies for section 1981 claims are notori-
ously erratic. In Johnson v. REA, 287 a Sixth Circuit panel applied a
Tennessee statute that provided a one-year period for federal civil
rights suits.28 8  However, in Marlowe v. Fisher Body28 9 another
Sixth Circuit panel absorbed Michigan's three-year statute of limi-
tations for personal injury.290 The Sixth Circuit chose still another
analogy in Mason v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 29 1 applying a six-year
statutory liability period.292  Similar disparity exists within the
Third, Fifth and Sixth Circuits with respect to claims under sec-
tions 1985(3)293 and 1983.294
287 489 F.2d 525 (6th Cir. 1973), aff'd, 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
281 Id. at 529.
289 489 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1973).
290 Id. at 1063. See generally Note, supra note 8, 1976 ARIZ. ST. L.J. at 121-23 (use of
personal injury analogy in civil rights actions).
291 517 F.2d 520 (6th Cir. 1975).
292 Id. at 521-22.
293 Fifth Circuit: See, e.g., Shaw v. McCorkle, 547 F.2d 1289, 1291-95 (5th Cir. 1976)
(six-year contract period); McGuire v. Baker, 421 F.2d 895, 898-99 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 820 (1970) (two-year period for action on a debt); Beard v. Stephens, 372 F.2d
685, 689 (5th Cir. 1967) (one-year period for conspiracy to commit a tortious act applied to
§ 1985(3) claim).
Sixth Circuit: See, e.g., Carmicle v. Weddle, 555 F.2d 554, 555 (6th Cir. 1977) (one-
year malicious prosecution and false arrest period); Garner v. Stephens, 460 F.2d 1144,
1146-48 (6th Cir. 1972) (five-year statutory liability period).
294 Third Circuit: See, e.g., Jennings v. Shuman, 567 F.2d 1213, 1217-19 (3d Cir. 1977)
(§ 1983 claim fragmented into one-year malicious use of process and two-year malicious
abuse of process analogies); Ammiung v. City of Chester, 494 F.2d 811, 814-15 (3d Cir.
1974) (§ 1983 claim fragmented on basis of facts into one-year false arrest/false imprison-
ment and two-year trespass analogies); Howell v. Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272, 276 (3d Cir. 1972)
(two-year period for personal injuries).
Fifth Circuit: See, e.g., Ingram v. Steven Robert Corp., 547 F.2d 1260, 1262-63 (5th
Cir. 1977) (one-year tort period); White v. Padgett, 475 F.2d 79, 85 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 861 (1973) (three-year statutory liability period).
Sixth Circuit: See, e.g., Carmicle v. Weddle, 555 F.2d 554, 555 (6th Cir. 1977) (one-
year malicious prosecution period); Garner v. Stephens, 460 F.2d 1144, 1146-48 (6th Cir.
1972) (six-year statutory liability period).
The First Circuit demonstrates a similar conflict. See Ware v. Colonial Provision Co.,
458 F. Supp. 1193, 1196 (D. Mass. 1978) (applying two-year period); Currington v.
Polaroid Corp., 457 F. Supp. 922, 923 (D. Mass. 1978) (applying two-year period for pri-
vate right of action for racial discrimination in employment) (mem.); Sims v. United
Com. Travelers, 343 F. Supp. 112, 115 (D. Mass. 1972) (applying six-year provision for
contract enforcement) (mem.). See also Daughtry v. King's Dep't Stores, Inc., 608 F.2d 906,
910 (1st Cir. 1979) (failing to resolve conflict).
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It is especially difficult to predict the applicable period in cir-
cuits adhering to the fact approach. Opinions from those circuits
have little precedential value. Unless the fact pattern of the liti-
gant's case is identical to those in the reported cases, he cannot be
certain how the court will characterize his complaint.29 5 Minor
variations in the type of relief requested for the same wrong may
result in a different analogy. Even if a circuit consistently
analogizes to a tort or contract period, uncertainty may still pre-
vail because there are innumerable types of tortious wrongs (e.g.,
trespass, negligence, battery and slander) and contractual breaches
(e.g., of written contracts, oral contracts and contracts implied in
fact), each with a different time period.2 06 As long as a court looks
to the facts pleaded and the relief requested, little certainty will be
possible.
The purposes of time bars demand that litigants be able to
predict with certainty how long a claim remains timely.
Unpredictability undermines the institutional purposes of limita-
tions periods. 97 The possibility that any one of several analogies
with different time limits may apply eliminates the stability and
order that a period of limitations should accord to property in-
terests.298 The absence of a certain, predictable period also ne-
gates the convenience2 99 that statutes of limitations are designed
to produce. Ideally, limitations periods reduce the burden on
court dockets by barring stale claims. However, in circuits which
analyze the facts and remedies requested in each case, or which
are inconsistent in the approaches they adopt, plaintiffs may bring
suits after one possibly analogous period has run in the hope of
persuading the court to analogize their suits to other causes of
action. Moreover, judicial inconsistency encourages litigants to ap-
peal cases in the hope that the appellate court will analogize the
claims differently. 300
The absence of predictable periods also undermines the re-
medial, 30 1 notice-giving aspect of time bars. When his potential
295 See Note, supra note 8, 1976 ARiz. ST. L.J. at 119-20; Note, supra note 275, at 930.
296 See Note, supra note 8, 1976 ARiz. ST. L.J. at 119-20.
297 See notes 17-25 and accompanying text supra.
298 See notes 18-20 and accompanying text supra.
299 See notes 21-22 and accompanying text supra.
300 See Note, supra note 8, 1976 ARiz. ST. L.J. at 120. Because the analogizing process
encourages appeals-which circuit courts often grant with instructions to the district court
to proceed to the merits-analogizing often results in inefficient use of judicial resources.
'0' See notes 26-29 and accompanying text supra.
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liability rests on a federal statute without a limitations provision,
the defendant cannot know how long he must preserve evidence
for his defense. 30 2
Finally, allowing a plaintiff to bring his action under any of
several possible analogies undermines the promotional function of
time bars.3 03  Uncertainty as to the applicable period may be a
two-edged sword: the analogy chosen by the court may benefit a
dilatory plaintiff, or it may deprive a plaintiff of a remedy when
he honestly believed his suit to be timely. Limitations periods
should encourage claimants to bring suit promptly, thus avoiding
stale claims, yet preserve every reasonable opportunity for rem-
edying their grievances. Inconsistencies in the analogizing pro-
cess upset this balance and undermine predictability.
Analogizing federal rights of action not only fails to serve the
fundamental purposes of time bars,30 4 but also may invite abuse.
302 Uncertainty in many circuits about the length and type of period applicable to a
federal statute may render an attorney's error in determining the most analogous statute of
limitations "reasonable," and thus would not subject him to liability for malpractice. Cf
Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 592-93, 364 P.2d 685, 689-90, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 825-27
(1961) (although attorney's estate plan invalidated due to rule against perpetuities, attorney
not negligent due to complexity of law of perpetuities).
303 See notes 31-35 and accompanying text supra.
304 At least two commentators have alluded to the problem of forum shopping inherent
in the analogizing process. See Note, Laches in Federal Substantive Law: Relation to Statutes of
Limitations, 56 B.U. L. REV. 970, 984 (1976); Note, supra note 8, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 68, at
77. These critics suggest that tardy plaintiffs can search for the forum with the most liberal
time limitations. See Note, 56 B.U. L. REV., supra, at 894.
It is necessary to define precisely what "forum shopping" means in this context. It is
clearly not the forum shopping between the federal and state systems that the Court in
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), sought to curtail; plaintiffs can bring most
federal question cases in state courts, and federal courts absorb the same limitations law
that would apply in state courts (including borrowing statutes per Cope v. Anderson, 331
U.S. 461 (1947)).
Where jurisdiction is concurrent, a plaintiff may, of course, forum shop by choosing
federal court to take advantage of the court's likely bias toward federal causes of action. See
generally Note, The Federal Common Law, supra note 140, at 1528 (inherent attractiveness of
federal judiciary). However, this situation is not unique to the statutes of limitations area,
because a favorably disposed federal court is always available where jurisdiction is concur-
rent. This is hardly troubling, because Congress established the federal system to provide
plaintiffs with an alternative to a possibly parochial and prejudiced state court system.
Thus, the only forum shopping that the absorption process is likely to promote is in
the choice of federal forums. This problem seems insignificant. First, the plaintiff will al-
ways have a choice of federal forums in a federal question case; he can always choose the
forum with the most favorable law. See H.L. Green Co. v. MacMahon, 312 F.2d 650, 652
(2d Cir. 1962) cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928 (1963) ("[a] certain amount of forum shopping
inevitably results from our federal system"). Forum shopping for limitations law is not a
unique problem. Second, the restrictive venue provisions in 28 U.S.C. § ,1391 (1976) for
federal question cases and personal jurisdiction requirements limit the choice of forums;
§ 1391(b) restricts federal question cases to districts where all defendants reside or where
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Uncertainty may provide a court flexibility to analogize capri-
ciously to a short period in order to dismiss the case and avoid
deciding a particular issue.3 0 5  More significantly, because some
federal claims have no state common law analogues, the analogiz-
ing process may be inherently inappropriate. For example, several
courts have held that claims arising under the Civil Rights Acts
are unique.30 6 Indeed, they do not sound in common law tort or
contract, but "creat[e] rights and impos[e] obligations different
from any which would exist at common law in the absence of [a]
statute." 307 "[A] deprivation of a constitutional right is signifi-
candy different from and more serious than a violation of a state
right and therefore deserves a different remedy even though the
same act may constitute both a state tort and the deprivation of a
constitutional right." 308 Similarly, it may be inappropriate to
analogize actions under section 10(b) of the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934,309 the national labor laws, 310 and claims for
the cause of action arose. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 139 1(c) (1976) ("corporation may be sued in any
... district in which ... incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business").
Third, because almost all jurisdictions have borrowing statutes, although the forum state
may have an unusually long period, the court will not apply that period unless the plaintiff
is also a resident of the forum state and can take advantage of the "resident plaintiff
exception." See notes 418-28 and accompanying text infra.
However, the federal plaintiff has some choices. First, he may have a choice between
states that follow the "single place of arising" theory and those that adhere to the "multiple
place of arising" theory-a choice which may produce different periods. See notes 412-14
and accompanying text infra. Second, when using a borrowing statute a federal court first
analogizes the action under the forum's laws and then borrows the analogous period of the
borrowee state. See, e.g., Arneil v. Ramsey, 550 F.2d 774, 779-80 (2d Cir. 1977). A plaintiff
may have a choice of different periods if forum "A" consistently analogizes to a tort
period, thus always taking the short tort period of a borrowee state, and forum "B" consis-
tently analogizes to a contract period, thus taking the longer contract period of a borrowee
state.
305 See Note, supra note 8, 1976 Aiuz. ST. L.J. at 118.
306 See, e.g., Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331, 337 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S.
907 (1978); Glasscoe v. Howell, 431 F.2d 863, 865 (8th Cir. 1970) (holding that § 1983
right cannot "be narrowly characterized as merely an action for assault and battery");
Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187, 190 (9th Cir. 1962). But see Zuniga v. Amfac Foods, Inc.,
580 F.2d 380, 386 (10th Cir. 1978) ("no doubt that there are some differences between a
civil rights claim ... and [state] ... claims, but we cannot say that a comparable claim is not
found in the contract and tort causes of action").
307 Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187, 190 (9th Cir. 1962) (quoted in Glasscoe v. Howell,
431 F.2d 863, 865 (8th Gir. 1970)).
308 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 (1961) (concurring opinion, Harlan, J.) (quoted
in Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331, 337 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978)).
109 Legislative history clearly indicates that Congress intended securities actions to have
short limitations periods-partly to prevent plaintiffs from taking advantage of fluctuating
securities values. See Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97, 100 n.4 (9th Cir. 1975); Martin, supra
note 284, at 454-56; Raskin & Enyart, supra note 284, at 302. Thus, analogizing a rule
lOb-5 claim to common law fraud periods, which average four years in length, ignores the
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damages implied under the Constitution. 311  In short, by
analogizing courts may create fiction-they may arbitrarily grasp
a state period for a federal claim without an appropriate state
analogue. 12 Such searching is tantamount to the judicial creation
of periods of limitation for federal rights-the same "bald ...
form of judicial innovation" 313 that the Supreme Court has dis-
couraged.
4. Judicial Streamlining of the Analogy Process
a. Uniform Selection of State Periods. The disparity within cir-
cuits in the types and lengths of periods found most analogous to
claims arising under federal statutes demands reform. The cur-
rent lack of predictability is more than a mere inconvenience. It
fundamental federal policy underlying the statute. See Martin, supra note 284, at 457; Ras-
kin & Enyart, supra note 284, at 316. Moreover, "it is universally true that in order to
establish ... civil liability ... under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, it is not necessary to
allege and prove the classic elements of common law fraud." Martin, supra note 284, at
457. See Raskin & Enyart, supra note 284, at 315. But cf. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185 (1976) (requiring scienter for civil liability claim under rule lOb-5). The incon-
gruity between the elements of and policy behind a securities action and the often-invoked
fraud analogy, see note 272 supra, counsels against use of the analogizing process. However,
both Martin, supra note 284, at 459, and Raskin & Enyart, supra note 284, at 316, recom-
mend uniform adoption of local blue-sky analogies because of their short periods and great
resemblance to the rule 1Ob-5 cause of action.
310 See Gatlin v. Missouri-Pac. R.R., 475 F. Supp. 1083, 1087 (E.D. Ark. 1979) ("duty of
fair representation [judicially derived from the national labor laws] does not have a truly
satisfactory counterpart in most state laws; rather, it is a sui generis right and duty").
"I Most courts have analogized claims for damages implied under the Constitution to
statutory liability periods. These courts uniformly recognize that the analogy is not wholly
satisfactory because no statute defines the federal right. However, they assert that it is the
best analogy possible due to the fundamental differences between common law causes of
action and constitutional rights. See, e.g., Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331, 338 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978) (adopting statutory liability period because interests
behind state causes of action possibly "inconsistent [with] or even hostile" to those underly-
ing constitutional actions) (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 394 (1971)); Regan v. Sullivan, 557 F.2d 300, 304 (2d Cir.
1977) (absorbing statutory liability period because "deprivation of a constitutional right is
significantly different from and more serious than a violation of a state right") (quoting
Cremins); De Malherbe v. International Union of Elevator Const., 449 F. Supp. 1335,
1345-50 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (absorbing statutory liability period because constitutional right
fundamentally different from one sounding in tort or contract).
312 Such arbitrary searching obviously diminishes judicial efficiency. Instead of ruling
expeditiously on limitations defenses by referring to a certain body of limitations law,
courts expend valuable time and effort in determining the least incongruous analogy to
unique federal rights. Cf UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 712-13 (1966)
(dissenting opinion,White, J.) (criticizing majority's refusal to establish uniform period for
claims under LMRA § 301 because decision would spawn "unnecessary complexities and
opportunities for vexatious litigation").
313 Id. at 701.
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arguably burdens the assertion of federal rights sufficiently to jus-
tify creation of uniform federal rules. Reform is possible either
through legislation, which Congress is unlikely to enact, or
through judicial streamlining of the present system.
Perhaps the simplest judicial remedy is uniformly to apply
state "catch-all" or "statutory liability" periods to all federal causes
of action without limitations periods.' 4  The Second, Seventh,
and Ninth Circuits have adopted this approach for all claims aris-
ing under the Civil Rights Acts. 3 15  Because determination of
whether state or federal law governs characterization is necessary
only if the court analogizes on a case-by-case basis, this approach
avoids one source of intra-circuit disparity. Moreover, absorption
of the statutory liability period is more appropriate than adoption
of common law analogues because, by definition, the former
applies to claims not found in the general catalogue of common
law actions. Thus, statutory liability periods are well suited to
those federal claims, such as implied damages actions under the
Constitution,31 6 that lack common law analogues. 31 7
A second solution is the application of a single state law anal-
ogy to all claims arising under a particular federal statute. The
Fourth Circuit applies a personal injury analogy to all section
1983 claims,31 8 and the First Circuit has acknowledged that "it is
obviously preferable that one statute of limitations, such as that
provided for torts, apply generally to most if not all §1983 actions
arising in a particular jurisdiction." 31' At least two commentators
have recommended that all eleven circuits uniformly absorb state
blue sky periods for claims arising under section 10(b) of the Se-
curities and Exchange Act of 1934.320 The Seventh Circuit has
done so on the ground that the approach tends to produce a
more "orderly" development of the law. 32 1  On the other hand,
314 Of course, this remedy would be unavailable in those few states lacking "catch-all" or
"statutory liability" periods.
315 See Note, supra note 8, 1976 ARIZ. ST. L.J. at 97, 124 ("The Seventh Circuit's consis-
tent use of catch-all limitations in federal civil rights litigation fosters predictability. Parties
can assess in advance whether their actions are barred.").
316 See note 311 and accompanying text supra.
317 Catch-all periods are less appropriate. Although not expressly limiting any particular
common law right, and thus ostensibly tailored to statutory claims, they apply to any
statutory or common law cause of action not specified in a state's remaining limitations
provisions.
38 See, e.g., Johnson v. Davis, 582 F.2d 1316, 1319 (4th Cir. 1978); Almond v. Kent, 459
F.2d 200, 204 (4th Cir. 1972).
319 Walden, III, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 576 F.2d 945, 947 (1st Cir. 1978).
320 See Martin, supra note 284, at 459; Raskin & Enyart, supra note 284, at 316.
321 LaRosa Bldg. Corp. v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 542 F.2d 990, 992 (7th Cir.
1976).
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the Ninth Circuit has chosen to apply a fraud analogy to all rule
1Ob-5 suits for reasons of predictability.322
A third possibility is to analogize to federal statutes of limita-
tions.323 This approach might promote uniform administration
of federal rights and reduce forum-shopping among circuits.324  But
analogizing to federal periods entails several problems. Most sig-
nificant, stare decisis has probably foreclosed deviation from state
law. Unlike the resolution of the subsidiary issues, the absorption
of state law has become a matter of judicial compulsion,325 and
federal courts deviate from the practice only when absorption
would vitiate a federal statutory right.326
322 See, e.g., Douglass v. Glenn E. Hinton Indus., 440 F.2d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 1971).
323 Cf. Note, supra note 304, 56 B.U. L. REV. at 984-87 (advocating reference to federal
rather than state limitations periods as guides for applying laches).
324 See McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 229-30 (1958) (concurring
opinion, Brennan, J.) (applying federal statute of limitations to admiralty claim); Note,
supra note 304, 56 B.U. L. REV. at 985.
32 See notes 139-46 and accompanying text supra.
326 See, e.g., UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 701 (1966) (refusing to
establish a uniform federal period for LMRA § 301 claims because not "vital to the im-
plementation of federal labor policy") (emphasis added); Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co.,
611 F.2d 450, 456 (3d Cir. 1979) (concurring opinion, Sloviter, J.) ("the instructions we
have received from the Supreme Court are unambiguous: in the absence of a federal limi-
tations period, resort must be had to the applicable state statute of limitat. ons."). Those few
courts which have analogized to federal periods have justified their choices on classic
preemption grounds. See notes 163-79 and accompanying text supra. For example, in McAl-
lister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958), the Court refused to apply a two-
year period for state-created personal injury actions, although the personal injury cause of
action resembled plaintiff's claim for damages due to the unseaworthiness of his
employer's vessel. Instead, the Court applied the three-year federal period applicable to
suits for maritime negligence under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976). The majority
reasoned that application of the shorter two-year period to the unseaworthiness claim
would deprive a plaintiff of his right to sue for a full three years under the Jones Act. It
noted that a claimant must, for all practical purposes, bring these claims in the same suit
because res judicata as to one claim would bar a subsequent suit on the other. 357 U.S. at
224-25. Although it also cited other reasons for adopting a federal period, the Court's
opinion primarily reflected concern for the destruction of a specific federal right. Indeed,
the Court held that a state court "may not qualify [a] seaman's Jones Act right." Id. at 225.
The court also adopted a federal period in Gatlin v. Missouri-Pac. R.R., 475 F. Supp.
1083 (E.D. Ark. 1979), on the ground that absorption of state law would undermine the
effective implementation of the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63 (1976). The
court interpreted the complaint as alleging a breach of plaintiff's union's duty of fair rep-
resentation during arbitration of his claims against his employer. Id. at 1084. The court
stated that all employment contract claims under RLA § 153 are subject to mandatory arbi-
tration. In the interest of finality of arbitrated decisions, Congress enacted a two-year limi-
tations period in which an employee could seek limited judicial review of a decision. Id. at
1088. See 45 U.S.C. § 153 (first) (r) (1976). Because claims against a union for breach of its
duty to represent an employee fairly during arbitration would destroy the finality of arbi-
tration, the court held that employees must bring fair representation claims within the
federal statutory two-year period. The court thus refused to adopt a longer state tort or
contract analogy, which would "undermine the overall federal legislative policy." Id. at
1089.
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Even if courts traditionally required a lower threshold of in-
terference with federal interests to deviate from adopting a state
limitations period, use of federal limitations analogies would be
less desirable than either of the other reform proposals. The
likelihood of inconsistent analogies would be great because there
is no federal catch-all period as in most states. Without a generally
applicable period, courts would be forced to choose an analogy
from the wide range of federal rights with limitations provisions,
many with common law roots, making the analogizing process as
difficult and as arbitrary as the present system. 327  Further,
analogizing to federal statutes of limitation would afford litigants
no greater certainty than the two proposals for judicial reform
that this Project suggests. Choice of a single analogy for a particu-
lar right in each circuit would ensure that litigants could predict
the applicable period, regardless of whether federal or state law
supplied the limitations period. Finally, the propriety of analogiz-
ing statutory rights to statutory, as opposed to common law, time
periods32 8 is not a compelling reason to adopt federal periods. By
uniformly absorbing state statutory liability periods, circuits can
achieve this conceptually appropriate result within the present
analogizing process.329
Neither remaining proposal-adoption of statutory liability
or catch-all periods, or adoption of a single state analogy for each
federal statute-will eliminate intercircuit conflicts. Consistency
among circuits will come only if the Supreme Court establishes
uniform analogies. One might argue that this Project's proposals
327 Use of federal periods would enhance intracircuit consistency, because the length of a
period would not vary from state to state within a circuit. However, unpredictability would
still be possible because a circuit could find different federal periods applicable in different
cases involving the same rights.
328 See notes 306-07 and accompanying text supra.
329 Of course, analogizing to federal periods may be warranted when adoption of state
law would undermine the particular federal statutory scheme in question, or perhaps when
the federal statute is so complex that even a crude state analogy would be impossible and
borrowing of an incompatible state law would impede effective judicial administration of
the right. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Law (RICO), 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-68 (1976) might well be an example of such a statute. The courts have not yet
confronted RICO in the context of an applicable limitations period. A RICO charge re-
quires proof that defendant engaged in at least two of over 25 underlying offenses; in
addition to providing for criminal liability, RICO allows recovery of treble damages, court
costs and attorneys' fees in civil actions. See generally Smith, Flanagan and Pastuszenski, The
Statute of Limitations in a Cilil RICO Suit for Treble Damages, 2 TECHNIQUES IN THE INVESTI-
GATION AND PROSECUTION OF ORGANIZED CRIME: MATERIALS ON RICO 974, 1053 (G.R.
Blakey ed. 1980) (Publication of Cornell Institute on Organized Crime) (advocating
analogizing RICO to federal statutes of limitations).
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will encourage forum-shopping among circuits. However, because
of restrictions on venue 330 and personal jurisdiction, 331 plaintiffs
will rarely be able to choose among circuits when filing suit.332 In
addition, the proposal to adopt a single common law analogy may
be attacked as theoretically unsound because it analogizes a fed-
eral statutory right, which may have no common law analogue, to
a state-created nonstatutory cause of action. 333 However, these
minor problems pale in comparison with the benefits of enhanced
predictability for litigants that the reform proposals would pro-
duce.
b. Factors in the Selection Process. In determining the most
analogous period, courts should first examine the language of the
statute and the rights and duties it creates. Because they seek one
controlling period, 334 courts should not consider the individual
fact patterns of cases. They should look to federal precedent for
guidance to promote uniformity and certainty because defining
and limiting a federal right is a function of the federal courts.335
330 See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1976).
331 See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Rush v.
Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
332 See note 304 supra.
333 See notes 306-13, 317 and accompanying text supra. Although a federal right arising
under the civil rights statutes or one for damages implied under the Constitution may not
have a precise common law counterpart, some analogues may be preferable to others. For
example, a personal injury analogy may be preferable to a contract or tort analogy for civil
rights claims. Although the court in Almond v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200, 204 (4th Cir. 1974)
emphasized that a § 1983 claim had no common law analogue, it nevertheless applied a
state personal injury period to the action. Refusing to acknowledge that it had analogized,
the court asserted that it had defined a unique federal right in purely federal terms (which
happened to coincide with terms applicable to state created rights), and held that "every
cause of action under § 1983 which is well-founded results from 'personal injuries.' " Id.
Some courts may disagree with the proposition that a state statute applicable to common
law claims can approximate the true nature of a federal civil rights action. See, e.g., Beard
v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331, 337 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978) (the Civil
Rights Acts "creat[el rights and impos[e] obligations different from any which would exist
at common law in the absence of statute") (quoting Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187, 190
(9th Cir. 1962)) (emphasis added).
'3' The effectiveness of this proposal hinges on a circuit's choice of a narrow state law
analogy. Characterizing a particular federal right as sounding generally in tort or contract
leaves too much room for inconsistency. For example, a broad mandate from a circuit
court that all civil rights claims are analogous to tort causes of action would permit lower
courts to analogize to a wide range of tortious conduct (e.g., trespass, battery, negligence),
depending on the particular facts of a case. Thus, precision in choosing an analogy is a
prerequisite to intracircuit consistency and predictability. Cf Note, supra note 281, 1976
ARIz. ST. L.J. at 117-23 (examining variety of tort and contract analogies possible).
33' See Note, supra note 140, 82 HARV. L. REv. at 1528 (asserting superiority of federal
judiciary in ascertaining and effectuating federal policy); note 209 and accompanying text
supra.
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A court should also consider the type of evidence that litigants are
likely to present in suits arising under a particular federal
right.336 Analogizing to a state right involving the presentation of
similar evidence would support the policy of terminating claims
when evidence will likely be lost and memories faded. 37 Finally,
courts should examine the legislative intent 338 and policies under-
lying the federal right.339  This inquiry would encourage courts
to absorb a period that relates rationally to the right that it
limits.3 4 0
:a6 Cf. Note, supra note 304, 56 B.U. L. REv. at 987 (recommending that courts applying
laches "focus on the evidentiary ... issues presented by the federal right").
"7 See Limitations Developments, supra note 13, at 1185 ("[t]he particular period selected
[by the legislature for a cause of action) ... often varies with the degree of permanence of
the evidence required to prove either liability or extent of damage").
a13 Professor Monaghan suggests that "[c]ongressional purpose [may be] divined by the
normal common law techniques of looking to the words of the statute, the problem it was
meant to solve, the legislative history, the structure of the statute, its place among other
federal statutes, and the need for a uniform national rule of law." Monaghan, supra note 1,
at 12.
139 See notes 270-71 supra; cf. Raskin & Enyart, supra note 284, at 314-15 (arguing for
consideration of the legislative policies behind § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934 in choosing an analogous period); Note, supra note 8, 1976 ARIz. ST. L.J. at 113-15
(analysis of the purposes behind the Civil Rights Acts important because "it bears upon the
development of a principled means of selecting statutes of limitations").
Courts have investigated legislative purposes in searching for state causes of action
analogous to claims arising under the national labor laws. See, e.g., Abrams v. Carrier
Corp., 434 F.2d 1234, 1251-52 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1009 (1971) ("[in
determining which state limitation period is applicable [to a claim under LMRA § 301] the
federal court [must] ... give effect to the nature and purpose of the federal act ... and to
the federal objectives pursued"); De Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse,
425 F.2d 281, 285-87 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970) (federal policy not requir-
ing use of contract analogy when claims under LMRA § 301 against employer and union
joined in single suit); Grant v. Mulvihill Bros. Motor Serv., Inc., 428 F. Supp. 45, 47 (N.D.
IlI. 1976) (federal policy embodied in LMRA § 301 best served by single contract period
when claims against employer and union joined).
Courts have undertaken similar inquiries when drawing analogies to claims arising
under the securities laws, and have often found that a short blue sky law period for claims
under SEC Rule lOb-5 best effectuates federal policy. See, e.g., LaRosa Bldg. v. Equitable
Life Assurance Soc'y, 542 F.2d 990, 992 (7th Cir. 1976); Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97,
100 (4th Cir. 1975); cf. Charney v. Thomas, 372 F.2d 97, 100 (6th Cir. 1967) (adopting
common law fraud analogy because the federal courts "must choose among the several
state statutes of limitation and apply that one which best effectuates the federal policy at
issue").
340 Of course, such probing can help find a period that relates rationally to the federal
right only if the legislative history is itself clear. When it is not, the court must depend on
the rights and duties that the language of the statute establishes and on the type of evi-
dence that the parties will likely present. When the legislative intent is clear, a court will
have a principled means of choosing analogous periods, even if the federal right at stake
has no precise common law referent.
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Of course, without congressional enactment of limitations
periods, complete uniformity in the length of periods applicable
to any federal right is unattainable. Variation in lengths of limita-
tions periods is an inevitable aspect of the absorption process.
However, such variation should not entail lack of predictability; as
long as litigants know what type of period a court will absorb, they
will be able to predict how long a claim will endure. Both propos-
als advocated here will restore predictability; each circuit should
therefore adopt either a statutory liability or catch-all approach,
or a single common law analogy, for each type of federal claim.
Under either proposal, litigants will no longer have to wait until
trial to know whether plaintiff's claims are time-barred.
B. Exceptions to and Qualifications on Time Bars
Once a federal court has decided which state period of limita-
tions applies to a federal right, it must resolve several ancillary
issues. For example, it must determine whether any circumstances
justify suspending the period, and whether the cause of action
accrued when defendant's wrongful act occurred or when plaintiff
began to incur injury. As with the process of analogizing, the sub-
sidiary issues of tolling, accrual, commencement, relation-back,
survival and revival exhibit a curious mix of absorbed state law
and judge-made federal law.
1. Tolling
At least one Court has said, "[s]tatutes of limitations are
primarily designed to assure fairness 'to defendants." 34' Time
bars encourage plaintiffs to bring suit promptly by preventing
suits on stale claims. However, circumstances beyond a plaintiff's
control may prevent him from suing within the applicable limita-
tions period. Such circumstances include incompetency, incarcera-
tion, and inability to secure personal jurisdiction over the defen-
dant. 3 42  Legislatures and courts have concluded that when
3" Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965).
342 State statutes toll limitations periods under several circumstances. See generally Limita-
tions Developments, supra note 13, at 1220-37. For example, almost all states suspend the
running of a period when the defendant is absent from the forum state. See Barney v.
Oelrichs; 138 U.S. 529, 536 (1891) (suit under federal statute without limitations period to
recover money illegally collected); Jolivet v. Elkins, 386 F. Supp. 261, 272 (D. Md. 1974)
(§ 1983 claim); Winkler-Koch Eng'r Co. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 100 F. Supp. 15, 30
(S.D.N.Y. 1951) (antitrust claim); Vernon, The Uniform Statute of Limitations an Foreign Claims
Acts: Tolling Problems, 12 VAND. L. REv. 971, 982-83 (1959). Most states require that the
defendant be absent and be beyond service of process. See notes 424-25 and accompanying
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"plaintiff has not slept on his rights but, rather, has been pre-
vented from asserting them, 343 the running of the otherwise ab-
solute344 statute of limitations is suspended or "tolled," commenc-
ing anew when the obstacle disappears.
Suspending the time period represents a reordering in im-
portance of the underlying purposes of limitations periods. Toll-
ing embodies an overriding policy choice that a plaintiff should
have every reasonable opportunity to assert his claims.3 45 It also
serves the institutional concern for credibility; 346 for example, a
judicial system could hardly engender public confidence if it
barred plaintiff from suing when he became mentally incapaci-
tated and unable to bring suit within the limitations period as a
result of defendant's tort. In such cases these two factors outweigh
remedial347 and promotional3 48 concerns. Thus, courts and legisla-
tures created tolling rules to acknowledge that plaintiff's right to
sue may outweigh the risk that a court may try a stale claim after
the point at which defendant reasonably believed his liability has
ceased.349
text infra. This position is sound-if defendant is amenable to process his absence does not
prevent plaintiff from bringing a timely suit. For a detailed discussion of tolling when the
defendant is absent from the state, see notes 424-28 and accompanying text infra.
Other circumstances suspending statutes of limitations include incarceration, incompe-
tence, estoppel and waiver, death of a party, and revival of the action either upon the
making of a fresh promise to perform an agreement or upon part performance. See, e.g.,
Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939, 941-42 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 894 (1972)
(applying Illinois law tolling period during incarceration to § 1983 claim); cf. Garvy v.
Wilder, 121 F.2d 714, 717-18 (7th Cir. 1941) (applying state law on revival to 12 U.S.C.
§ 64, National Bank Act claim); Briley v. Crouch, 115 F.2d 443, 444-45 (4th Cir. 1940)
(applying state revival law in suit to recover balance due on stock assessment under federal
statute without limitations period); McDonald v. Boslow, 363 F. Supp. 493, 498 (D. Md.
1973) (applying state law tolling period during party's incompetence to § 1983 claim). See
generally Limitations Developments, supra note 13, at 1220-37. The doctrine of revival rewinds
the time-bar clock applicable to a contract action. Courts have stated that the making of a
new promise, or partial fulfillment of the original promise, renews the obligation by im-
plidtly recognizing its validity. The period applicable to the "original obligation" is tolled,
but a new and complete period begins to run as to the "new," revived obligation. Garvy v.
Wilder, 121 F.2d 714, 717-18 (7th Cir. 1941); Briley v. Crouch, 115 F.2d 443, 444-45 (4th
Cir. 1940).
343 Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 429 (1965). See also Limitations De-
velopments, supra note 13, at 1220.
344 See Note, supra note 62, at 1144 n.111.
345 See Vernon, supra note 342, at 982.
146 See notes 23-25 and accompanying text supra.
147 See notes 26-30 and accompanying text supra.
348 See notes 31-35 and accompanying text supra.
349 See Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) ("[the] policy of re-
pose, designed to protect defendants, is frequently outweighed ... where the interests of
justice require vindication of the plaintiff's rights").
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The level of federal interests necessary to override the pre-
sumptive application of state law as to subsidiary issues350 is lower
than that necessary to justify a refusal to absorb a state period. 351
In Johnson v. REA 352 the Supreme Court held that "state law is
[the federal courts'] ... primary guide ' 353 in tolling questions. A
federal court must adopt state law regarding "the overtones and
details of application of the state limitation period to the federal
cause of action,' 354 but should displace state law with uniform
federal tolling rules "where [its] application would be inconsistent
with the federal policy underlying the cause of action. 355
The Johnson Court did not find federal interests sufficient to
override the presumptive application of state law, 356 but other
350 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 140, at 762-70. See generally, Note, supra note 140,
82 HARV. L. REV. at 1517-19.
351 See id. at 1524 ("the federal courts may decline to follow all the details of the state's
construction of its statute"); notes 188-91 and accompanying text supra.
352 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
351 Id. at 465. See also UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 706 (1966) ("there
is no reason to reject the characterization that state law would impose unless that charac-
terization is unreasonable or otherwise inconsistent with national labor policy").
',4 Id. at 464.
155 Id. at 465. In Johnson, the Court rejected plaintiff's invitation to fashion federal law
tolling the period applicable to his § 1981 suit during the pendency of an EEOC investiga-
tion of his employment discrimination charges under Title VII. The Court held that the
state's tolling law governed plaintiff's action because the policy behind § 1981 did not
require a special federal tolling rule. Moreover, a uniform federal rule would destroy the
integrity of the state period, which could be "understood fully only in the context of the
various circumstances that suspend it." Id. at 463. The Court explained that "[iun virtually
all statutes of limitations the chronological length of the limitation period is interrelated
with provisions regarding tolling, revival, and questions of application." Id. at 464.
Like the Court in UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966), the Johnson
Court did not fully describe the range of factors that a court may consider when deciding
whether to reject state law.
In Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 100 S. Ct. 1790 (1980), the Supreme Court refused
to restrict the range of factors that federal courts should consider. The Tomanio Court
viewed § 1988 as a congressional codification of the judicial presumption to fill the in-
terstices of the federal Civil Rights Act with state law. See note 138 supra. Therefore, even in
the litigation of civil rights actions, federal courts should be concerned with a broad range
of factors when deciding to absorb state tolling law. Moreover, § 1988 only applies to
actions brought under the Civil Rights Acts, and Tomanio is arguably limited to § 1983
actions. See note 138 supra.
256 Other cases involving the borrowing of state limitations periods have, like the Johnson
Court, found federal interests insufficient to override the presumption to apply state toll-
ing rules. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 100 S. Ct. 1790, 1798-99 (1980) (because
federal policies not violated by presumptive absorption of state tolling law under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988, lower court erred in creating federal rule tolling period for § 1983 claim during
pendency of related state court action); Kaiser v. Cahn, 510 F.2d 282, 287 (2d Cir. 1974)
(federal policy embodied in § 1983 did not require tolling of period during plaintiff's
successive periods of incarceration); Blair v. Page Aircraft Maintenance, Inc., 467 F.2d 815,
819-20 (5th Cir. 1972) (delay of government in filing suit under § 459 of Military Selective
Service Act cannot toll periods absent state tolling provision); Falsetti v. Local 2026, UMW,
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courts have. In Pesola v. Inland Tool & Manufacturing, Inc.,"35 the
court held that the strong federal policy favoring private resolu-
tion of labor disputes required tolling the state statute during
pendency of internal union procedures addressing plaintiff's griev-
ances.3 58  In Mizell v. North Broward Hospital District,359 the Fifth
Circuit reversed the lower court's holding that the statute of limi-
tations barred plaintiff's claims under sections 1983 and 1985(3),
and remanded for evaluation of whether federalism and the
policies behind the civil rights statutes demanded federal tolling
during pendency of litigation of related state claims in state
court.3
60
Perhaps the most renowned case finding that federal policy
interests demand the displacement of state tolling law by a fed-
eral rule is Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,361 an antitrust
case in which the Second Circuit adopted the equitable doctrine of
fraudulent concealment. In Moviecolor the forum state's law did
not toll the limitations period while the plaintiff was kept ignorant
of his right to sue. However, in view of the federal interest in
249 F. Supp. 970, 973 (W.D. Pa. 1965), aff'd, 355 F.2d 658 (1966) (refusing to toll state
period applied to claim under LMRA § 301 during pendency of prior state suit, "there
being no applicable Pennsylvania statute protecting plaintiffs against such exigencies").
117 423 F. Supp. 30, 34 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
358 Id. at 34. The court stated that "[t]he basic inquiry in determining whether a limita-
tion period should be tolled is 'whether congressional purpose is effectuated by tolling the
[state] statute of limitations in given circumstances.' " Id. (quoting Burnett v. New York
Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 427 (1965)).
359 427 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1970).
36' Id. at 474. The court asserted that:
[I]t is clearly within the underlying purpose of the Civil Rights Acts to encour-
age utilization of state administrative and court procedures to vindicate alleged
wrongs under a state-created cause of action before requiring a plaintiff
to bring his federal suit to prevent his being barred by a state statute of limi-
tations .... [Courts] look to the federal purpose, policy and intent of Congress
as to the objectives of the legislation in determining whether the pursuit of state
remedies tolls this statute.
Id.
The court alluded to "the salutary rule that under our system of federalism aggrieved
persons should be encouraged to utilize state procedures before appealing to the federal
courts .... [A] federal rule on tolling ... should be observed, if such rule clearly carries
out the intent of Congress or of the constitutional principle at stake." Id.
In Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 100 S. Ct. 1790 (1980), the Court implicitly over-
ruled Mizell's disposition of plaintiff's § 1983 claim. The Tomanio Court held that federal
policies do not require tolling of the period applicable to § 1983 claims during pendency of
a related state court action. Id. at 1798-99.
361 288 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1961) (Friendly, J.).
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uniformity, at least as to the "narrower issue" of tolling,362 and
the purpose-of the Clayton Act to serve "not merely private but
public ends,' 363 the court held that a borrowed state limitations
period is tolled until the plaintiff discovers his cause of action if
defendant's fraud causes plaintiff's ignorance. 36 4
Since Johnson v. REA, the Second Circuit has further de-
veloped its analysis of tolling questions. The Johnson test for de-
362 Id. at 84.
363 Id.
361 Id. Moviecolor extended the holdings of Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (11 Wall.) 342
(1874), and Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946). In Bailey, the Court applied the
equitable doctrine of tolling during the fraudulent concealment of a cause of action to
suspend a federal statute of limitations. The Court noted that prevention of fraud was an
important function of statutes of limitations. 88 U.S. at 349. Permitting a limitation period
to run despite concealment by the defendant of the cause of action would encourage
fraud. Id. See notes 37-46 and accompanying text supra.
In Holmberg, the Court extended the application of the doctrine to equitable actions
involving federally-created rights without limitations provisions. Asserting that Congress
could "hardly expect [the courts] to break with historic principles of equity in the enforce-
ment of federally created rights," 327 U.S. at 395, the Court held that "[lt would be too
incongruous to confine a federal right within the bare terms of a State statute of limitation
unrelieved by the settled federal equitable doctrine as to fraud, when ... a federal statute
... would be given [a] ... mitigating construction [as in Bailey]." 327 U.S. at 397. Because
Holmberg involved an equitable right, the Court absorbed the state statute of limitations
only as a guide for the Court's discretionary application of laches. 327 U.S. at 396-97. See
generally note 13 supra.
Other courts have followed Moviecolor, extending the fraudulent concealment tolling
doctrine to actions at law based on federal rights without limitations periods. See, e.g.,
Baker v. F & F Inv., 420 F.2d 1191, 1199 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970)
(§ 1982 claim); Morgan v. Koch, 419 F.2d 993, 997 (7th Cir. 1969) (10b-5 claim); Janigan
v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 784 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965) (10b-5 claim). Long
v. Abbott Mtg. Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1095, 1098-99 (D. Conn. 1976) ("Federal policies un-
derlying ... [SEC Rule] 10b-5 suits seek to deter securities fraud [and] ... will be better
served by a uniform federal tolling policy that does not penalize plaintiffs for the time
delays caused by the frauds they suffer."); cf. Bufalino v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 404 F.2d
1023, 1028 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 87 (1969) (absorbing state's fraudulent
concealment doctrine and following Moviecolor's rationale); Public Serv. Co. v. General Elec.
Co., 315 F.2d 306, 311-12 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 809 (1963) (expressly following
Holmberg in antitrust action); Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447, 455 (9th Cir. 1956) (apply-
ing state's fraudulent concealment tolling doctrine in Rule lOb-5 action and following
Moviecolor's rationale).
The circuits generally agree on the elements of fraudulent concealment:
At least two types of fraudulent behavior toll a statutory period.... In the first
type, the most common, the fraud goes undiscovered even though the defen-
dant after commission of the wrong does nothing to conceal it and the plaintiff
has diligently inquired into its circumstances. The plaintiffs' due diligence is
essential here.... In the second type, the fraud goes undiscovered because the
defendant has taken positive steps after commission of the fraud to keep it
concealed.... This type of fraudulent concealment tolls the limitations period
until actual discovery by the plaintiff.
Tomera v. Galt, 511 F.2d 504, 510 (7th Cir. 1975).
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termining whether a court could displace state tolling law focused
mainly on evaluating federal policy, but the Court did consider
whether tolling, on the particular facts of the case at bar, would
disserve the policy of repose underlying statutes of limitations.3 6 3
The Second Circuit has held that Johnson requires courts to "strike
a balance" between protecting the federal legislative policy at stake
and promoting the purposes behind limitations periods. 366  In
both Williams v. Walsh367 and Meyer v. Frank,368 the Second Circuit
assessed whether plaintiff had diligently brought suit and whether
the defendant had achieved repose before commencement of the
action. 369
Although the Second Circuit intended this case-by-case fac-
tual analysis to promote the underlying purposes of limitations
periods, such ad hoc determinations ironically tend to undermine
these purposes. Predictability is the key to fulfillment of the
policies embodied in statutes of limitations.3 7 0  The practice of
365 421 U.S. at 466-67, 467 n.14. InJohnson, the plaintiff argued that his prior filing of a
Title VII employment discrimination charge with the EEOC tolled the period applicable to
his § 1981 claim. Rejecting this argument, the Court noted plaintiff's dilatoriness:
"Petitioner freely concedes that he could have filed his § 1981 action at any time after his
cause of action accrued .. " Id. at 466. Moreover, the Court stated that it was "not at all
certain" that plaintiff's prior filing with the EEOC had placed defendant on notice of
subsequent suit under § 1981 in federal court, or instead that defendant had achieved
repose, believing reasonably that his liability had terminated upon resolution of the EEOC
charge. Id. at 467 n.14. The Court suggested that only where the claims in two suits are
identical can the filing of one suit adequately place defendant on notice of his potential
liability in the second suit. Id.
366 Williams v. Walsh, 558 F.2d 667, 674-76 (2d Cir. 1977); Meyer v. Frank, 550 F.2d
726, 729-30 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 830 (1977).
The discussion in Johnson of whether tolling the limitations period would serve the
purposes of limitations periods was mere surplusage. The Court's refusal to toll focused on
the insufficiency of federal interests, and the close interrelationship between state tolling
rules and state limitations laws. See 421 U.S. at 465-67. Unfortunately, the Second Circuit
has attached undue importance to the Court's gratuitous analysis of the purposes of time
bars.
367 558 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1977).
368 550 F.2d 726 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 830 (1977).
369 558 F.2d at 674-76; 550 F.2d at 729-30. In each case the court found the plaintiff
dilatory and held that defendant had achieved a state of repose which tolling of the period
would violate. Each plaintiff had brought related federal claims in state court prior to filing
suit in federal court and argued that the previous actions should have tolled the period
applicable to the federal actions. In Meyer, the court held that the prior state suit did not
put defendant on notice of the later suit, and that defendant had achieved repose because
the claims in state court rested on a different constitutional theory. 550 F.2d at 730. In
Williams, the court assumed arguendo that some of plaintiff's claims in both suits were simi-
lar or identical; nonetheless, it held that defendants lacked notice of the later claims be-
cause the named defendants in each case were different. 558 F.2d at 675.
30 See notes 297-303 and accompanying text supra.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
examining plaintiff's dilatoriness and defendant's repose in each
case further diminishes what little predictability exists in the pres-
ent process of analogizing federal causes of action.371 The Sec-
ond Circuit's decisions transform the predictable law of tolling,
which suspends a period for definite, predictable reasons, into a
rule resembling laches, an equitable doctrine which eschews cer-
tainty in favor of assessing the timeliness of suits on a case-by-case
evaluation of the equities.372 In determining whether to create
federal tolling rules courts should restrict themselves to analyzing
the policy behind the relevant federal statutory right. 373  Once a
circuit decides whether the federal interests behind a particular
provision require a federal tolling rule, or whether state tolling
rules suffice, litigants will have settled precedent permitting pre-
diction of whether special circumstances have tolled an applicable
limitations period.
Because most state tolling rules suspend periods in clearly de-
fined circumstances,37 4 a uniform federal law of tolling is not war-
ranted. The disparity among state suspension laws is tolerable be-
cause litigants in each state can reasonably ascertain before trial
whether the particular facts of the litigation will trigger the tolling
of the applicable limitations period. Unlike the analogizing proc-
ess, tolling does not entail the uncertainty produced by judicial
characterization of the federal right; application of state tolling
rules is largely mechanical37 5 and predictable. Thus, only where
the state law would vitiate a federal litigant's rights-either by ex-
posing a defendant to perpetual liability that Congress never in-
tended, or by erecting virtually insurmountable barriers to a
timely suit-should a court create federal tolling rules.
37' See notes 274-313 and accompanying text supra.
372 See note 13 supra; cf. Gillons v. Shell Oil Co., 86 F.2d 600, 607 (9th Cir. 1936), cert.
denied, 302 U.S. 689 (1937) (doctrine of estoppel is "more clearly defined" than that of
laches, which is "directed more intimately to the conscience of the [judge]"). A further
difference between tolling and laches is that tolling suspends the running of a fixed period
of limitations, whereas a court applying laches views the statutory period as a guide; the
court remains free to adopt a period shorter or longer than that defined by the statute. See
generally note 13 supra.
373 For a discussion of how courts should divine federal interests, see note 338 supra.
371 Such clearly defined circumstances include the death, incompetency, and incarcera-
tion of the litigant. See note 342 supra. However, some state tolling laws are not precisely
defined and far from mechanical. For example, laws tolling during defendant's "fraudulent
concealment" necessitate analysis of plaintiff's diligence in discovering his cause of
action-a fact which may not be reasonably ascertainable until trial.
M See note 374 supra.
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2. Subsidiary Issues for Which Federal Courts Have Created Uniform
Federal Rules: Commencement, Accrual, Relation-Back, Survival and
Revival
Federal courts have not consistently absorbed state laws that
govern the subsidiary issues involved in applying a state statute of
limitations. For example, rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure provides that actions in the federal courts commence upon
the filing of a complaint with the court.37 6  In Bomar v. Keyes,37 7
the court held that rule 3 was valid under the Rules Enabling Act
because it did not abridge, enlarge, or modify the substantive
rights of any litigant.378  Subsequent cases have reaffirmed the
validity of rule 3,379 although limiting the holding of Bomar to
cases based on federal question jurisdiction. 8 °
Federal law also governs whether amendments to a complaint
or answer relate back to the time of the filing of the original
376 See generally Blume & George, supra note 8, at 955-57.
377 162 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 825 (1947).
378 Id. at 140-41 (L. Hand, J.). The court reasoned that rule 3 did not affect the substan-
tive rights of the litigants because statutes of limitations qualify only remedies, not the
substantive statutory right itself: "We have not to deal with a case in which the limitation is
annexed as a condition to the very right of action created.... [A]nd when a right is not so
conditioned, the statute of limitations is treated as going to the remedy." Id.
379 See, e.g., Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280, 302 (9th Cir. 1959) (§ 1983 claim);
Jackson v. Duke, 259 F.2d 3, 6 (5th Cir. 1958) (§ 1983 claim); cf. Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460, 470 (1965) (presumption that, when a situation is covered by one of the Federal
Rules, the rule governs, displacing any state rule).
380 In Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 100 S. Ct. 1978 (1980), a unanimous Court held
that state law, not rule 3, provides the rule of decision in diversity cases for commencement
of an action for statute of limitations purposes. See Ragan v. Merchant's Transfer
Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533 (1949) (applying state commencement law in diversity
case because of outcome-determinative effect of rule 3). Walker settles a dispute among the
circuits, see 100 S. Ct. at 1982 n.6, but disrupts an area of law that had been settled since
Bomar.
By holding that rule 3 does not commence actions for statutes of limitations purposes
in diversity cases, the Court left open the question of what commencement rule applies in
nondiversity cases. A simple solution would be for federal courts to devise a common law
rule commencing actions upon filing of the complaint with the court- consistent with the
prior view of rule 3. However, an equally plausible approach, which is consistent with the
ad hoc absorption of state time periods, but departs from the historical view of commence-
ment of actions in nondiversity cases, would be a presumptive absorption of state com-
mencement rules. Cf Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 100 S. Ct. 1790, 1798-99 (1980) (prin-
ciples of federalism favoring absorption of state law as to subsidiary issue of tolling in
§ 1983 action). A final alternative would be to allow rule 3 to regulate the commencement
of suits for statutes of limitations purposes in nondiversity actions. If Walker is not simply
an interpretation of rule 3, but an "Erie case," the application of state commencement law
may be a product of limitations upon the scope of the federal rules imposed by the Rules
Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976). Under this view, the application of rule 3 might be
broader in nondiversity cases than in diversity cases. Cf. Ragan v. Merchant's Transfer
Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. at 533 (recognizing Bomar as good law).
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pleading. Rule 15(c)38 provides that an amendment is not time
barred if it would have been timely when the litigant originally
filed and if the claim or defense in the amended pleading arises
from the same transaction or occurrence described in the original
pleading.3 8 2  No court has questioned the rule's validity under the
Rules Enabling Act in federal question cases, and, indeed, rule
15(c) supports the institutional purposes behind limitations
periods.383 Because an amendment arising out of the same trans-
action or conduct underlying the original pleading will probably
require presentation of similar evidence, allowing it to relate back
will not lead to the trial of claims that have grown stale due to lost
or forgotten evidence. Moreover, the rule is unassailable on
grounds of fairness. The original pleading places defendant on
notice that plaintiff may later raise closely related claims.
Federal law also governs two other subsidiary issues: accrual
and survival of the cause of action. Federal courts do not even
presumptively apply state law in deciding when a particular fed-
eral right arises,384 or in determining if the representative of a
plaintiff or defendant may sue or be sued in the place of a litigant
who dies before vindicating his rights. 385 Courts have held, how-
381 FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) provides in part: "Whenever the claim or defense asserted in
the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date
of the original pleading."
382 See generally Blume & George, supra pote 8, at 957-59. This Project's discussion of
rule 15(c) is limited to the relation-back of claims, not parties. Furthermore, this Project
assumes that rule 15(c) is more liberal than its state counterparts.
383 See notes 17-25 and accompanying text supra.
384 See, e.g., Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 464 (1947); Fisher v. Whiton, 317 U.S.
217, 218 (1942); Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U.S. 96, 98 (1941); Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97,
100 (4th Cir. 1975).
385 See, e.g., Schreiber v. Sharpless, 110 U.S. 76, 80 (1884) (action to recover for
copyright infringement abated despite statute to contrary); Nelson v. Knox, 230 F.2d 483,
484 (6th Cir. 1956) (survival of § 1983 claim); Barnes Coal Corp. v. Retail Coal Merchants
Ass'n, 128 F.2d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 1942) (survival of antitrust claim); Layne v. International
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 418 F. Supp. 964, 965-66 (D.S.C. 1976) (question of survival of
claims under LMRDA §§ 411, 412 "is not governed by state survival statutes or state deci-
sions"); Sands v. Abelli, 290 F. Supp. 677, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (survival of LMRDA §§
401-53 claim).
If the representative of a deceased litigant cannot sue (or be sued), the right of action
does not "survive," but is said to "abate." The common law rule in tort actions was that all
claims abated upon the death of the tortfeasor. See Derdiarian v. Futerman Corp., 223 F.
Supp. 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). The reason for this rule is probably that tort law was an
outgrowth of criminal law, under which punishment and blame could not survive the death
of the wrongdoer. Id. The "modern rule as to survivability is that action for torts in the
nature of personal wrongs such as slander, libel [or] malicious prosecution ... die with the
person, whereas, if the tort is one affecting property rights, the action survives." Nelson v.
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ever, that state law controls in survival questions arising under the
Civil Rights Act due to congressional command to absorb state law
presumptively.38 6
It is not entirely clear why federal courts choose to create
uniform federal rules of survival and accrual, deviating from the
presumptive absorption of state law that governs choosing and tol-
ling a base time period and characterizing the federal right. In-
deed, at least one commentator finds no reason why the courts do
not treat all subsidiary issues alike. 3 17  Courts have distinguished
accrual388 and survival38 9 from other subsidiary limitations issues
Know, 230 F.2d 483, 484 (6th Cir. 1956). The rationale behind this dichotomy is that an
injured person cannot benefit from a recovery after death, whereas a cause of action to
rectify property damage can achieve its purposes despite the owner's death because prop-
erty passes to the deceased's representative after death. See Layne v. International Bhd. of
Elec. Workers, 418 F. Supp. 964, 965-66 (D.S.C. 1976).
38( 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). In Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978) the Court
held that § 1988 requires absorption of state survival statutes in actions arising under the
Civil Rights Act. Id. at 593-95. Section 1988 provides in part that the Civil Rights Act
provisions "shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United
States ... but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the
provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies ..., the common law, as modified and
changed by the constitution and statutes of the [forum] state ... , so far as [it] is not
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and
govern the ... courts." 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). The Court construed this to mean that the
federal judiciary can disregard state law only where it is clearly inconsistent with federal
law, such as where state law does not provide for the survival of any actions, or if it
restricts significantly those that do survive. Since the forum state in Robertson did provide
for survival when the representative of the deceased litigant was an immediate relative, the
Court found that the policies behind § 1983, upon which plaintiff based his claim, did not
require creation of a federal rule. 436 U.S. at 594. Section 1988 thus establishes at least a
presumption to apply state law similar to that of Johnson v. REA, 421 U.S. 454, 463-65
(1975), and UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 706 (1966). See discussion of
§ 1988 absorption of state tolling law in § 1983 as requiring presumptive actions, supra
note 138.
387 See Note, supra note 8, 53 CoLUvi. L. REv. 68, at 72; cf. Board of Regents v. To-
manio, 100 S.Ct. 1790, 1798-99 (1980) (federalism favoring absorption not only of state
period, but also subsidiary issue of tolling); Johnson v. REA, 421 U.S. 454, 463-65 (1975)
(state period incomprehensible without absorbing integrally related tolling rules).
388 See, e.g., Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 464 (1947) ("when the applicable state
statute of limitations begins to run depends upon when, under federal law, the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency. .. , is empowered by federal law to bring suit"); Rawlings v. Ray, 312
U.S. 96, 98 (1941) (accrual "is a' federal question and turns upon the construction of the
assessment and the authority of the Comptroller to make [the assessment] under the
applicable federal legislation").
389 See, e.g., Schreiber v. Sharpless, 110 U.S. 76, 80 (1884) ("The right to proceed against
the representatives of a deceased person depends not on forms and modes of proceeding
in a suit, but on the nature of the cause of action.... Whether an action survives depends
on the substance of the cause of action, not on the forms of proceeding to enforce it.");
Barnes Coal Corp. v. Retail Coal Merchants Ass'n, 128 F.2d 645, 648 (4th Cir. 1942)
("[T]he question of survival is not one of procedure but one which depends 'on the sub-
stance of the cause of action.' "); Layne v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 418 F.
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on the ground that they are substantive, not procedural questions,
thus requiring a court to construe the substantive nature of the
federal statutory right at stake. Although not explicit in the cases,
the likely rationale for the treatment of survival and accrual is
that federal courts better protect and effectuate the policies un-
derlying federal rights than do state laws.
390
Although judicial treatment of accrual and survival issues of-
fers a persuasive justification for overriding the presumptive ab-
sorption of state law, 391 it is irreconcilable with the Supreme
Court's holding in UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp.392 In UAW, the
Court held that characterization of the nature of federal statutory
rights for purposes of analogy calls for presumptive absorption of
state law. 393  Characterization requires that a court construe the
substance of a right; the court must analyze, for instance, whether
the right sounds essentially in tort or contract, and what federal
interests underlie the statute. Consequently, characterization is as
much a "non-procedural" issue as courts have claimed survival
and accrual are. Both issues require courts to interpret legislative
intent and examine federal interests. Despite the traditional belief
that federal courts are better equipped to ascertain and promote
federal policy, the Court in UAW found that federal interests did
not demand a federal rule of characterization. Thus, UAW argu-
ably requires courts presumptively to absorb state law on accrual
and survival issues.
However, the UAW Court failed to perceive that the lack of
predictability surrounding the subsidiary issues justifies abandon-
ing the presumptive absorption of state law in favor of uniform
federal common law rules. Uncertainty can impose an intolerable
burden on the assertion of federal rights, especially in the case of
mere subsidiary issues which, unlike state tolling laws,394 are not
Supp. 964, 965 (D.S.C. 1976) (survival "is to be determined by an interpretation of the
[federal] statute"). See Hill, supra note 75, at 99; Limitations Developments, supra note 13, at
1267.
30 Cf. Note, supra note 140, 82 HARV. L. REV. at 1528 ("[Tlhe federal judiciary is
particularly well-suited to develop decisional law that advances broad federal policies. Fed-
eral judges tend to have more familiarity and sympathy with federal policies and their
goals than state judges. Judges selected and paid by the national government are more apt
to give full scope to the means that government chooses to reach its objectives.").
See Hill, supra note 75, at 99 ("subsidiary questions which go to the nature of the
cause of the action and the time when it accrues should be decided in accordance with
federal law").
392 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
391 Id. at 706.
"' See note 36 supra.
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capable of simple, mechanical application. Thus, although the
survival and accrual cases reflect a lack of respect for stare decisis,
they correctly ascertain the need for uniform federal rules.
C. Borrowing of Foreign States' Limitations Periods
The presumptive absorption of state law requires courts to
apply the forum state's choice of which period applies when the
cause of action arises elsewhere. Most states have enacted borrow-
ing statutes, which commonly bar an action in the forum state if it
would be barred in the jurisdiction of accrual. Although some
states without borrowing statutes still adopt a foreign period only
if it is "substantive," several have recently rejected this archaic
doctrine, and look instead to the interests of the forum state and
the state of accrual to determine which period should control.
1. Characterization as Procedural or Substantive
The traditional practice in states without borrowing legislation
is to characterize the limitations period of the state of accrual as
either procedural or substantive.395 The forum state will adopt
the foreign period only if the court considers it substantive. 396
Moreover, the forum state will only borrow the foreign period if
it is shorter than the forum's.397  The theory underlying this "lex
fori" rule is that, if a statute of limitations is procedural, affecting
only the remedy, the running of a foreign jurisdiction's time
period does not extinguish the right itself and the plaintiff may
still sue upon the right if the forum's period has not expired. 39 8
"' See Vernon, Statutes of Limitations in the Conflict of Laws: Borrowing Statutes, 32 ROCKY
MTN. L. REv. 287, 289 (1960); Wurfel, Statutes of Limitations in the Conflict of Laws, 52 N.C.
L. REv. 489, 514 (1974); Note, Conflicts of Laws: Statutes of Limitation, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 385,
385 (1976).
'9' Some courts hold that a statute of limitations can be substantive only if the right that
it limits is statutory and did not exist at common law. See, e.g., Kozan v. Comstock, 270
F.2d 839, 841 (5th Cir. 1959); Holford v. Leonard, 355 F. Supp. 261, 263 (W.D. Va. 1973);
Morris Plan Indus. Bank v. Richards, 131 Conn. 671, 674, 42 A.2d 147, 148 (1945). Courts
generally characterize foreign limitations periods as substantive if either the statute creating
the right contains its own limitations period, or if the limitations period refers specifically
to the legal right involved. See Note, supra note 395, at 386.
397 See Vernon, supra note 395 at 290; Note, supra note 395, at 387.
3" See id. at 385. In determining whether a foreign statute of limitations is procedural
or substantive, the forum state will usually look to the opinions of the foreign jurisdiction's
courts. See Ester, Borrowing Statutes of Limitation and Conflict of Laws, 15 U. FiA. L. REv. 33,
61 (1962); Wurfel, supra note 395, at 516 ("[T]his question is determined by the conflicts
law of the forum ... [which] normally requires the adoption of the classification made by
the loci state.").
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Critics have assailed this rule as irrational, 399 arguing that it leads
to forum shopping.40 °
2. Interest Analysis
Courts in jurisdictions without borrowing provisions have re-
cently begun to reject the lexfori rule, opting instead for a case-
by-case analysis of the interests of the forum and foreign states in
choosing an applicable period. 401  "Interest analysis" is nothing
more than a modern conflict of laws approach to statutes of limi-
tations questions; the court must assess whether the forum state's
policies and its contacts with the cause of action are stronger than
those of the state in which the claim accrued. 40 2  In Heavner v.
'99 If the foreign state's period has run, thus extinguishing the remedy, little of the right
remains. To contend that a time bar has not terminated the substance of the right is, for
all practical purposes, absurd. See Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 137, 305 A.2d
412, 416 (1973) ("[a] right for which the legal remedy is barred is not much of a right")
(quoting R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLIcTs LAW § 127, at 304 (1968)). Professor Vernon
argues:
Convenience appears to be the only justification for [this] rule calling for the
application of local procedure without regard to the foreign fact elements in
the case.... However, here the procedural designation is not justifiable on the
basis of convenience. It is no more difficult for local courts ... to ascertain the
foreign statute of limitation than it is for them to discover the foreign 'substan-
tive' law ... Despite the absence of reason, the courts persist in the classifica-
tion.
Vernon, supra note 395, at 288-89. See also Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 139, 305
A.2d 412, 417 (1973) ("considerations of convenience and practicality dictating the forum's
choice of its own procedure 'would appear to have little pertinency to the bar of limita-
tions' ") (quoting Marshall v. George M. Brewster & Son, Inc., 37 N.J. 176, 180, 180 A.2d
129, 131 (1962)).
400 See Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 137, 305 A.2d 412, 416 (1973) ("plaintiffs
whose claims are barred by the governing substantive law are allowed to shop around for a
jurisdiction in which the statute is longer, in the hope of getting service there on the
obligor") (quoting R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICrS LAW § 127, at 304 (1968)). However,
the problem of forum shopping in federal question cases involving state statutes of limita-
tions seems insignificant. Shopping for the federal forum with the most favorable law is
characteristic of the federal system. See H.L. Green Co. v. MacMahon, 312 F.2d 650, 652
(2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928 (1963). See generally note 304 supra.
401 See, e.g., Dindo v. Whitney, 429 F.2d 25, 26 (1st Cir. 1970) (diversity case); Farrier v.
May Dep't Stores Co., 357 F. Supp. 190, 191 (D.D.C. 1973) (diversity case); Heavner v.
Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 140, 305 A.2d 412, 418 (1973); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v.
Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 193, 203, 206 N.W.2d 414, 419 (1973) (state-created
cause of action). See generally Milhollin, Interest Analysis and Conflicts Between Statutes of Limi-
tation, 27 HASTINGs L.J. 1 (1975); Wurfel, supra note 395, at 560-67; Note, supra note 395,
at 388-94. However, the Second Circuit has refused to apply interests analysis in SEC rule
lOb-5 cases involving New York's borrowing statute. See Arneil v. Ramsey, 550 F.2d 774,
779 (2d Cir. 1977); Sack v. Low, 478 F.2d 360, 367 (2d Cir. 1973).
40' See, e.g., Dindo v. Whitney, 429 F.2d 25, 26 (1st Cir. 1970). InDindo, the action grew
out of an automobile accident that had occurred in Quebec, Canada. Plaintiff, a Vermont
resident, sued defendant, a New Hampshire resident, in New Hampshire federal district
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Uniroyal, Inc.40 3 the New Jersey Supreme Court formulated a
five-part test to govern interest analysis, holding that it would
borrow the period of a foreign jurisdiction if (1) the cause of ac-
tion accrued in the foreign state; (2) all litigants are present and
amenable to the process in the foreign state; (3) the forum has no
substantial interests in the litigation which would necessitate appli-
cation of its own time period; (4) the period of the state of accrual
has expired; and (5) the substantive law of the foreign jurisdiction
governs the suit.40 4  Although this approach is more logical than
the lexfori doctrine,40 5 the latter rule may actually be preferable
because of the greater certainty that it affords litigants in predict-
ing how long a defendant's potential liability endures.40 6
court. On appeal from the lower court's dismissal of the action, the First Circuit found that
Quebec's contacts with the cause of action were minimal; neither litigant resided there, and
New Hampshire supplied the controlling substantive law. Furthermore, borrowing
Quebec's limitations period would not promote important policies of Quebec; its limitation
period sought to protect its own citizens, none of whom were involved in the litigation.
Thus, borrowing a foreign statute of limitations would disserve the forum state's policy of
leaving "its courts open for a period long enough to permit this plaintiff's claim." Id.
403 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973).
404 Id. at 141, 305 A.2d at 418.
405 The rationale behind interests analysis is that the same jurisdiction should supply the
substantive law and the statute of limitations of the same state. See Heavner v. Uniroyal,
Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 138, 305 A.2d 412, 416 (1973) ("no court should enforce a foreign cause
of action which is barred by the law governing the substantive rights of the parties") (cit-
ing Lorenzon, The Statute of Limitations and the Conflict of Laws, 28 YALE L.J. 492, 496-97
(1919) ("[w]henever considerations call for the application of the contract, tort or other
'substantive' law of a foreign jurisdiction, it would appear that its time bar should also be
recognized") (quoting Vernon, supra note 395, at- 291)). This reasoning is sound because
the length of a limitations period and the substantive right itself are often closely related.
To borrow a foreign state's substantive law, but not its applicable limitations period, thus
permitting suit on the right long after the foreign legislature intended, would violate im-
portant policies of the foreign jurisdiction. However, this problem does not exist in federal
question cases involving borrowing issues because the controlling substantive law is federal.
406 The obvious flaw of interests analysis is its uncertainty. The interests of the forum
and foreign states may differ-from case to case depending on the number and citizenship
of the litigants and the policies behind the statutes of limitations and substantive law in-
volved. See, e.g., Dindo v. Whitney, 429 F.2d 25, 26 (1st Cir. 1970) (analyzing residence of
parties, policies behind the two jurisdictions' limitations periods and the significant contacts
of each state with the cause of action). At least one court has weighed the disadvantage of
predictability in the interests analysis approach against the benefit of promoting interstate
order and advancing governmental interests, concluding that decreased predictability is
tolerable. See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 193, 203, 206
N.W. 2d 414, 419 (1973). This decision is incorrect; without certainty, a limitations system
cannot fulfill the institutional, remedial, and promotional functions of time bars. See notes
13-35, 46 and accompanying text supra. Indeed, one commentor concludes that "interest
analysis leads to results too unpredictable to suffice as a workable method of choosing a
statute of limitation," Note, supra note 395, at 394.
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3. Borrowing Statutes
Most jurisdictions have statutes that borrow the limitations
period of the state in which the cause of action "arose," ''accrued,"
or "occurred. 40 7  As with the lexfori doctrine, borrowing legisla-
tion 40 8 usually provides for adoption of only those foreign periods
shorter than the forum's.40 9 Courts have split over whether bor-
The problem of uncertainty, of course, is less pressing in federal question cases in
which federal substantive law controls. States have few, if any, interests in litigation in
federal court involving rights created by federal statutes. Consequently, fewer variables
enter a federal court's application of a forum state's interests analysis. For example, the
federal court will not have to evaluate the policies underlying either state's substantive law.
It might, however, consider the residency of the parties and the policy behind each state's
period of limitations. Cf. Dindo v. Whitney, 429 F.2d 25, 26 (1st Cir. 1970) (applying
forum's period in diversity suit where defendant not a resident of the foreign state because
foreign state's period designed to protect resident defendant).
407 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 361 (West 1954); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-118
(1974); IDAHO CODE § 5-239 (1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 21 (1975); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 413.320 (1979); Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.190 (1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 11.020 (1979);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-45 (1953).
"" Legislatures intended borrowing statutes to fulfill several purposes: (1) spurring the
growth of commerce in the forum by barring unsettled claims of long duration that ordi-
narily would be barred elsewhere; (2) discouraging nonresidents from litigating in the
forum, thus relieving congestion in the forum's courts; (3) preventing forum shopping by
denying a plaintiff the longer period available in the forum when the action was barred in
the place of accrual; (4) encouraging immigration into the forum state; (5) preventing the
unfairness of exposing the defendant to suit in the forum after he had acquired repose in
his state of residence, or in the state of accrual; (6) diminishing the possibility of perpetual
liability for the defendant in the forum. See Ester, supra note 398, at 40-43. See also Milhol-
lin, supra note 401, at 28-29.
At least the last of these purposes is no longer compelling. The dangers of perpetual
liability were far greater 20 years ago than they are today because most states have mod-
ified their tolling laws. The majority of jurisdictions formerly tolled their limitations
periods with the mere absence of the defendant from the forum. Due to the advent of
long-arm jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants (see International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)) most states today require not only that the defendant be
absent, but also that he be beyond the range of the forum's effective service of process.
Contra Vaughn v. Dietz, 430 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Tex. 1968) (tolling when defendant simply
absent from forum state). See generally Note, Tolling the Statute of Limitations: Restricted by
Enlarged Personal Jurisdiction, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 565, 575-76 (1979). Therefore, except
where the plaintiff is exempt from borrowing provisions under a resident plaintiff excep-
tion (see notes 418-19 and accompanying text infra), or where the defendant has never
entered the forum or has had insufficient contacts with the forum state, perpetual liability
is no longer a problem. See notes 425-30 and accompanying text infra.
409 Wurfel, supra note 395, at 519-20 ("a borrowing [statute] is usually applied only to
curtail, and not to enlarge, the applicable limitation of the forum"). Statutory provisions
limiting borrowing to periods shorter than the forum's include DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 8121 (1975), N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-21 (1969), 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5521 (Purdon
Supp. 1979), and W. VA. CODE § 55-2A-2 (1966). Courts in several jurisdictions have re-
stricted borrowing to the shorter of the two periods. See Sheets v. Burman, 322 F.2d 277,
278 (5th Cir. 1963) (applying Mississippi law); Krussow v. Stixrud, 33 Wash. 2d 287, 290
205 P.2d 637, 639 (1949); Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 342 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
865 (1979).
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rowing the base time period of the state of accrual also requires
adoption of its ancillary rules such as tolling, survival, and re-
vival.4 10
The federal system absorbs a highly inconsistent and often
irrational body of law411 when it adopts state borrowing legisla-
tion.412  Although most borrowing statutes make reference to
41o See Ester, supra note 398, at 57 ("[a] majority of the courts begin with the basic
proposition that the borrowed prescriptive period is applied with all its accouterments re-
gardless of whether they be in the form of additional statutory provisions or interpretive
judicial decisions"); Wurfel, supra note 395, at 523-27. Devine v. Rook, 314 S.W.2d 932
(Mo. App. 1958) illustrates the majority view: "[The borrowee's period] is not wrenched
bodily out of its own setting, but taken along with it are the court decisions of its own state
which interpret and apply it, and the companion statutes which limit and restrict its opera-
tion. This we think is the general law." Id. at 935. The probable reason for the forum's
borrowing of not only the period, but also of all the borrowee state's ancillary doctrines is
the belief that the period and its accouterments are interdependent. For example, the bor-
rowed period might be longer if the borrowee state had no tolling rule. See Vernon, supra
note 395, at 325; 75 HARV. L. REV. 627, 629 (1962).
411 See Vernon, supra note 395, at 323 ("A complete lack of consistency is found in
existing statutory solutions. Uniform legislation would appear to present the only real hope
of establishing a rational and consistent system.").
412 Federal courts regularly confront and absorb state borrowing statutes. Several courts
have applied the forum state's borrowing statute in cases involving claims under SEC rule
lOb-5. See, e.g., Arneil v. Ramsey, 550 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1977); Sack v. Low, 478 F.2d 360
(2d Cir. 1973); Korn v. Merrill, 403 F. Supp. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd without opinion, 538
F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1976); Klapmeier v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 363 F. Supp. 1212
(D. Minn. 1973); cf. Winkler-Koch Eng'r Co. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 100 F. Supp. 15
(S.D.N.Y. 1951) (applying New York borrowing statute in case arising under Clayton Act,
now codified at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976)).
The Supreme Court first absorbed a state borrowing statute in a case arising under a
federal right without a limitations period in Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461 (1947). In
Cope, the Court disposed of two suits by the receiver of an insolvent national bank in
Kentucky against Ohio and Pennsylvania stockholders to recover assessments that the
Comptroller of the Currency had levied against them under the double liability provision
of the National Bank Act, Rev. Stat. § 5151; Act of Dec. 23, 1913, ch. 6, § 23, 38 stat. 273
(formerly codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 63, 64) (repealed 1959). In the first suit, Anderson v.
Andrews, 156 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1946), rev'd, 331 U.S. 461 (1947), the receiver sued
Pennsylvania stockholders in a federal district court sitting in Pennsylvania. The Third
Circuit held Pennsylvania's borrowing statute inapplicable on the ground that a federal
right did not arise in any particular jurisdiction because a national sovereign had created it.
Thus, the court reasoned that there could be no "state in which the cause of action ac-
crued" within the meaning of the Pennsylvania statute from which the court could borrow
a period. Id. at 975. In the second suit, Helmers v. Anderson, 156 F.2d 47 (6th Cir. 1946),
aff'd, 331 U.S. 461 (1947), the plaintiff-receiver sued Ohio shareholders in a federal district
court sitting in Ohio. The Sixth Circuit rejected the argument that a federal cause of action
had no situs of accrual within a particular state, reversing the lower court.
Noting that "limitations on federally created rights to sue have ... been considered to
be governed by the limitations law of the state where the crucial combination of events
transpired," the Court refused to follow Andrews' "sterilizing interpretation" of the forum's
borrowing statute. 331 U.S. at 466. The Court held that the plaintiff's federal causes of
action under the National Bank Act arose, within the meaning of the forum's borrowing
provision, in Kentucky, the place where "[p]ractically everything that preceded the final
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where the "cause of action arose," state courts disagree on the
definition of the "place of accrual. ' 41 3  Most jurisdictions follow
the "single place of arising" theory, under which the period of
only one state is relevant; the state of accrual is usually the state in
which the last event necessary to establish liability occurred. 414
However, others have adopted a "multiple place of arising" theory
under which the cause of action arises in every state in which the
defendant is amenable to suit. 41 5  Still others have chosen the
fixing of liability of shareholders" transpired. Id. at 467. Finding that federal causes of
action without limitations periods do have a situs of accrual in a particular state, the Court
held that the plaintiff-receiver's suits in both Helmers and Anderson were barred under the
borrowee state's law.
Cases cite Cope as authority for applying the forum state's borrowing rules when ab-
sorbing a state'limitations period. See, e.g., Arneil v. Ramsey, 550 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir.
1977); Sack v. Low, 478 F.2d 360, 365 (2d Cir. 1973).
413 See Vernon, supra note 395, at 300 ("[n]o consistent pattern appears ... in the courts'
efforts to locate the situs of the arising").
4 Professor Vernon noted:
Traditionally, it has been thought that a cause of action arises at ... the place
where the wrongful act or omissiop occurs. And, conceptually, it does seem that
a "cause of action cannot have two places of origin." [footnote omitted] Thus,
the place of performance in contracts and the place of impact in torts, as the
situs of the action or inaction complained of, are normally designated as the
place where the claim arose or accured [sic].
Id. at 302. For a collection of cases illustrating the majority approach, see id. at 302 n.64.
See generally Milhollin, supra note 401, at 25-41 (criticizing "last act" doctrine as definition
of single place of accrual and recommending adoption of interests analysis). Cf. TEx. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5542 (Vernon 1958) (borrowing only the period of the state from
which the defendant migrated into the forum state).
415 Vernon, supra note 395, at 302-04. Professor Vernon labels the multiple place of
arising theory a "legal realist approach," because it requires a geographic co-existence of
right and remedy. Legal realists believe that a cause of action cannot realistically accrue
unless the defendant is amenable to process. Thus, under this view, a cause of action may
arise in several states if defendant is amenable to process in each. A multiple place of
arising forum will bar plaintiff's suit if the time period of any of the states in which defen-
dant remains amenable to process has run. Id. See Ester, supra note 398, at 49-53. States
that have adopted the multiple place of arising theory include Massachusetts (MAss. ANN.
LAws ch. 260, § 9 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1980) (no action maintainable if barred by the law of
"any state" in which defendant resided)), and Iowa (IowA CODE § 614.7 (1977) (suit in
forum barred if period of "any state" in which defendant resided has run)). The multiple
place of arising approach appears harsh because it requires plaintiff to sue before any of
several possible time bars have run. For example, if plaintiff sues in Massachusetts and the
defendant has resided in three different states before plaintiff brings suit, plaintiff's suit is
barred if any of the three periods have run. Under the majority position, unless the de-
fendant was beyond the long-arm jurisdiction of the states in which he resided, their
periods would not be tolled in his absence. See notes 425-27 and accompanying text infra.
Like the tolling doctrine that suspends a period in the defendant's absence only if he was
also beyond service of process, this approach places a premium on the plaintiff's diligence.
Evaluation of the merits of the multiple place of arising theory requires consideration
of the policies embodied in limitations periods. Because it requires utmost diligence, this
approach serves the promotional function of time bars. Where the litigants do not reside in
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interests analysis approach to determine where the cause of action
accrued.416 Finally, several states have adopted a "resident plain-
tiff exception," and will not borrow a shorter foreign limitations
period when the plaintiff is a resident of the forum state.417
a. Discriminatory Effect of the Resident Plaintiff Exception. The
most distressing aspect of borrowing statutes is the frequent resi-
dent plaintiff exception, which raises the possibility of liability for
a defendant extending far beyond the forum's statutory period.
Parochial favoritism underlies this exemption; 418 the forum in-
tends its own residents to have the advantage of the forum's
period when it is longer than that of the state of accrual. Such
exceptions give residents a substantial advantage over nonresi-
dents, whose suits may be barred if either the forum's period or
that of the borrowee state has run. 41 9  The resident litigant's suit
remains timely in the forum as long as its period has not run,
despite the expiration of several otherwise applicable foreign
periods.
the same state, the plaintiff is strongly encouraged to leave his state, locate the defendant
and serve him with process. Moreover, by promoting docket-clearing and diminishing the
trial of stale claims, the multiple place of arising theory serves the institutional purposes of
time bars. Perhaps most important, permiting plaintiff to sue in the forum after the limita-
tions of several foreign jurisdictions have run (because neither the courts of the single
place of accrual nor of the forum state had jurisdiction over the defendant, thus tolling
both states' periods) vitiates defendant's right to repose. The defendant develops a legiti-
mate expectation that his liability has terminated once the time periods of the states in
which he has resided have run. And, although this approach appears to contravene the
policy of giving the plaintiff every reasonable opportunity to vindicate his claims, this ar-
gument falters upon closer inspection. The plaintiff has been given several reasonable
periods in which to sue-those of each state in which defendant has resided. See Ester,
supra note 398, at 50.
Finally, the apparent harshness of compelling the plaintiff to search out and serve an
absent defendant decreases when compared to the majority rule that a limitations period
tolls only when the absent defendant is beyond service. Vaughn v. Dietz, 430 S.W.2d 487,
489 (Tex. 1968); Note, supra note 408, at 575-76; see notes 425-27 and accompanying text
infra. Even if a state followed the single place of accrual theory, this tolling doctrine would
require absolute diligence on the part of the plaintiff in serving an out-of-state defendant,
especially given the liberal long-arm jurisdiction with which most states have vested their
courts.
416 See, e.g. Thigpen v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 11 Ohio App. 2d 179, 181 229 N.E.2d
107, 109 (1967).
417 Several states do not borrow the period of the place of accrual when the plaintiff is a
resident of the forum state. See, e.g., CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 361 (West 1954); MIcH.
COMP. LAws ANN. § 600-5861 (West Supp. 1979); N.Y. Civ. PnAc. LAw § 202 (McKinney
1972).
41s See Ester, supra note 398, at 71; Vernon, supra note 398, at 311.
419 See Vernon, supra note 395, at 311.
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Although the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality
of resident plaintiff exceptions,4 " such provisions are unfair and
their absorption violates the federal interest in equal treatment of
litigants; 421 "Any favoring of local plaintiffs ... seems overly
parochial in a federal system ... and indefensible on rational
grounds. 4 2  This federal interest goes beyond a mere desire to
421 In Canadian N. Ry. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553 (1920), the Court held that exempting a
resident plaintiff from borrowing statutes did not violate a nonresident's rights under the
"privileges and immunities" clause of the U.S. Constitution, Article 4, § 2:
The principle on which this holding rests is that the constitutional re-
quirement is satisfied if the non-resident is given access to the courts of the
State upon terms which in themselves are reasonable and adequate for the en-
forcing of any rights he may have, even though they may not be technically and
precisely the same in extent as those accorded to resident citizens. The power is
in the courts, ultimately in this court, to determine the adequacy and reasona-
bleness of such terms. A man cannot be said to be denied, in a constitutional or
in any rational sense, the privilege of resorting to courts to enforce his rights
when he is given free access to them for a length of time reasonably sufficient
to enable an oridinarily diligent man to institute proceedings for their protec-
tion.
Id. at 562.
421 Federal courts absorb the resident plaintiff exception when they adopt state statutes
of limitations and state borrowing rules. See, e.g., Figueroa v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 231 F.
Supp. 168, 169-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (looking to state statute of limitations as guide in apply-
ing laches in federal admiralty suit; New York borrowing statute inapplicable because
plaintiff was resident of forum state). Few cases have actually held the borrowee state's
period inapplicable under this exception because ihe plaintiff has rarely been a resident of
the forum state. The restrictive venue provisions for federal question suits in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391 (1976), which permits suit only where defendant resides or where the cause of
action arose, probably account for the paucity of cases in which plaintiff was a resident of
the forum state. Innumerable cases in which the plaintiff was a nonresident have at least
implicitly absorbed the exception by first stating that the forum's borrowing statute would
not apply were plaintiff a resident of the forum, and then determining the plaintiff's resi-
dent to see if he qualified for the exception. See, e.g., Posner v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 972, 977 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (because plaintiff's nonresi-
dence "concededly present," resident plaintiff exception inapplicable); Haberman v. Tobin,
466 F. Supp. 447, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("for purposes of New York's borrowing statute [the
corporation] ... is a non-resident of New York"); Gross v. Diversified Mortgage Investors,
438 F. Supp. 190, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (because plaintiff's residence not "at all times" clear,
court dismissed without prejudice because it could not determine whether resident plaintiff
exception applied); Arneil v. Ramsey, 414 F. Supp. 334, 337-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (borrow-
ing statute applies only where the action accrued outside New York and where plaintiff is a
nonresident), aqfd, 550 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1977); Korn v. Merrill, 403 F. Supp. 377, 383-85
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd without opinion, 538 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1976) (although plaintiff resi-
dent of forum state, resident plaintiff exception inapplicable because claim accrued in
favor of corporation, a nonresident).
422 Vernon, supra note 395, at 311. In part borrowing statutes were enacted to prevent a
litigant from unfairly prosecuting a claim in the forum state when the laws of the jurisdic-
tion in which the cause of action arose barred the claim; legislators were motivated by a
concern for fairness and a desire to prevent forum-shopping. See note 408 supra. Resident
plaintiff exceptions create a limited kind of forum-shopping by encouraging plaintiffs to
sue at home whenever the local time period is longer than that of the place of accrual.
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achieve uniformity for its own sake. Rather, it is a concern that
each plaintiff receive substantially the same opportunity to rem-
edy the violation of his rights. The resident plaintiff exception
ensures that the vagaries of the absorption process will prove
more beneficial to in-state plaintiffs than to nonresident claimants.
This discrimination is inconsistent with federal interests and with
the purposes for which legislatures enacted borrowing provi-
sions.423
b. Potential for Extended Liability under the Resident Plaintiff Ex-
ception. Not only is the resident plaintiff exception unfair, but it
creates the possibility of extended liability for the defendant. Most
jurisdictions do not toll their limitations periods unless an absent
defendant is beyond the reach of their long-arm statutes,424 a
situation that arises infrequently. 425 However, if the defendant has
never set foot in the forum state, if the cause of action accrued
elsewhere, and if the state long-arm statute does not extend to the
limits of the Constitution, his contacts with the forum state may
not be sufficient to render personal jurisdiction reasonable. In
such a situation, the forum's period would toll during the defen-
dant's absence. The resident plaintiff exception renders irrelevant
the running of any foreign time bars; only the time period of the
forum, tolled in defendant's absence, would control. Under these
circumstances, the defendant would still be liable in federal court
even if he were to enter the forum state ten, fifteen, or twenty
years after the accrual of the cause of action because the court's
jurisdiction in federal question cases is not limited by state long-
arm statutes.426
The possibility of extended liability strongly contravenes the
policies underlying time bars. The knowledge that the forum's
period has tolled encourages resident plaintiffs to wait until the
423 See note 408 supra.
424 See Note, supra note 408, at 575-76; Vaughn v. Dietz, 430 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Tex.
1968).
425 See Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 553-54 (1980) (dissenting opinion, Stewart J.);
Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 191-92 (1979) (dissenting opinion,
White, J.); Edward J. Moriarty & Co. v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 289 F. Supp. 381,
389-90 (S.D. Ohio 1967); First Flight Co. v. National Car Loading Corp., 209 F. Supp. 730,
736-38 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); C. WRIGHT, supra note 4, at 304-05. However, in practice, "the
federal district courts are subject to the limitations on service of process that apply to state
courts." F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.10, at 620 (2d ed. 1977).
426 The assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant passes muster under the
Constitution if the defendant has had sufficient "minimum contacts" with the forum state
to make the exercise of jurisdiction over him reasonable. See World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. 559 (1980); Rush v. Savchuk, 100 S. Ct. 571 (1980).
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defendant becomes subject to suit in the forum, thereby reactivat-
ing the forum's time period. The possibility that important wit-
nesses may die or disappear and that evidence may be lost or for-
gotten 427 frustrates the institutional and remedial interests in
avoiding trials of stale claims.428  Further, the combination of tol-
ling and the resident plaintiff exception robs defendant of his
right to repose. 42 9  Defendant has a right to feel secure in his
possessions and free in his conduct after a reasonable time has
expired; clearly, fifteen or twenty years is not reasonable in the
absence of fraud or evasion by defendant. Finally, defendant is
entitled to know with certainty how long his liability extends. Such
certainty is unavailable where his liability depends on whether he
happens to subject himself to the personal jurisdiction of the
forum.
4. Proposed Judicial Reform
The inconsistencies of local laws in determining what limita-
tions period controls when the cause of action accrues outside the
forum state weigh against their absorption into the already incon-
sistent process of adopting state limitations periods. Federal liti-
gants in states employing the interest analysis approach will often
be subject to the limitations periods of borrowee forums, although
those in states still adhering to the lexfori doctrine will rarely be.
Litigants in "multiple place of arising" jurisdictions may find their
claims barred long before litigants in "single place of arising"
jurisdictions. This unequal treatment of federal litigants clearly
mandates uniform federal legislation. Change through the federal
judiciary is unlikely because the federal interests in uniformity
and administrative efficiency are insufficient to override the pre-
sumptive absorption of state borrowing doctrines. Further, the
application of borrowing rules is highly mechanical, and hardly
presents the administrative problems that typify characteriza-
tion.430
427 The Supreme Court has frequently emphasized the purposes of statutes of limita-
tions in the federal system. In Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. REA, Inc., 321 U.S. 342,
348-49 (1944) the Court stated that:
Statutes of limitation ... in their conclusive effects are designed to promote
justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been
allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and
witnesses have disappeared. The theory is that even if one has a just claim ...
the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to
prosecute them.
428 See notes 16-31 and accompanying text supra.
429 See notes 16-20 and accompanying text supra.
430 See, e.g., UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 706 (1966).
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However, federal interests may be strong enough to justify
modification of a discrete aspect of the borrowing process-the
resident plaintiff exception. This exception conflicts with the fed-
eral interests in equal treatment of litigants, avoiding stale claims
and granting defendant repose within a reasonable period.431 To
remedy these problems, federal courts should uniformly refuse to
absorb resident plaintiff exceptions when borrowing statutes of
limitations. Under this approach courts would continue to absorb
state laws that toll limitations periods when the defendant is not
within the forum's personal jurisdiction; such tolling is consistent
with the equitable purposes of time bars.
CONCLUSION
The Rules of Decision Act does not mandate the absorption
of state law for federal rights without limitations periods. Con-
gress deferred to the discretion of the federal courts in limiting
such rights. Despite the judicial freedom to fashion uniform fed-
eral rules, federal limitations law is now an inconsistent and un-
predictable patchwork of state law and judge-made rules. This
Project has suggested a general framework to restore predictabil-
ity, the most important function of limitations periods, to federal
litigants.
However, absolute certainty and consistency are possible only
if Congress enacts a uniform law of limitations. The optimum
solution would be federal statutes not only prescribing periods for
each federal right, but also regulating tolling, accrual, and the
other subsidiary issues. Ideally, Congress should enact a general
catch-all period for groups of federal rights. But, because Con-
gress is unlikely to enact such legislation the federal judiciary
must reform this confused area of the law. Thus, courts should
presumptively absorb state limitations periods, tolling provisions
and borrowing statutes-except for resident plaintiff exceptions.
However, courts should fashion federal rules for the characteriza-
tion process and the remaining ancillary issues.
Mitchell A. Lowenthal Brian E. Pastuszenski
Mark E. Greenwald*
431 For a discussion of the lower threshold of federal interests necessary to override
absorption of state law as to subsidiary issues, see notes 187-91 and accompanying text
upra.
* The authors express their gratitude to Curtis Gimson and Donald Winslow, without
whose insights this Project would not have been possible, and to Professor Kevin M. Cler-
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